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ABSTRACT
Bankruptcy is a statutory system, yet it is replete with practices for which there is no 
direct authorization in the Bankruptcy Code.  This article argues that the authorization for 
judicial creation of bankruptcy law beyond the provisions of the Code has been misidentified as 
the equity powers of bankruptcy courts.  This misidentification has led courts to place 
inappropriate statutory and historical limitations on non-Code practices because of discomfort 
with unguided equitable discretion.  
Both the statutory and historic limitations are problematic.  The statutory authorization 
for the bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers appears to have been repealed by what one judge has 
called one of the clumsiest acts of Congress.  The statutory section to which courts now look, 11 
U.S.C. § 105(a), is inapplicable, and its use as a framework for evaluating non-Code practices 
has led to questionable decisions.  Likewise, the historic limitations of the pre-Code practices 
doctrine are unsatisfactory and have produced contradictory Supreme Court decisions.  
Instead, this article argues that non-Code practices are better thought of as a federal 
common law of bankruptcy.  Federal common law is judge-made law that depends on precedent 
and judicially-devised tests rather than unpredictable discretion or rigid application of statute.  
Viewing non-Code practices as federal common law would lead to more predictable and 
consistent decisions without sacrificing the judicial flexibility necessary to facilitate corporate 
reorganizations.
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I.  INTRODUCTION:  “THE BANKRUPTCY COURT IS A COURT OF EQUITY”
A basic tenet of bankruptcy practice is that “the bankruptcy court is a court of equity.”1
Judges and litigants regularly cite the “court of equity” maxim to justify a particular conclusion 
or result that lacks specific statutory authorization.2  Bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers are
routinely cited as the authority for common, if contested, non-Code Chapter 11 practices such as 
critical vendors motions (the pre-plan payment of pre-petition debts to certain suppliers of the 
debtor as a condition of further supply);3 substantive consolidation of separate companies that 
have filed for bankruptcy;4 cross-collateralization (securing pre-petition debt with pre- and post-
petition collateral as part of a post-petition financing arrangement);5 and discharges or releases of 
1 E.g., Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002); Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545. 549-50 (1990); 
Norwest Bank Worthington, v. Ahlers. 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988); Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 214 
(1945); SEC v. U.S. Realty Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939); 
Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 300 U.S. 131, 136 (1937); Cont’l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Chi. R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 675 (1935); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240-41 
(1934); Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 535 (1900); Ex parte, the City Bank of New Orleans (In 
the matter of William Christy), 44 U.S. 292. 311-313 (1845). 
According to one bankruptcy judge, “the bankruptcy court is a court of equity” is the most 
frequently uttered substantive phrase by attorneys in her courtroom.  See Marcia Krieger, “The 
Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”:  What Does that Mean? 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 297 (1999). 
2
 Krieger, supra note 1, at 297.
3 E.g., In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 825-26 (D. Del. 1999); In re Ionosophere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 
174, 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Gulf Air, 112 B.R. 152, 154 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1989).  
4 E.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2004); In re Huntco, Inc., 302 B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2003); Alexander v. Compton (In re 
Bonham), 229 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Circle Land and Cattle Corp., 213 B.R. 870 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. 1997); In re Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 B.R. 563 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993); Eastgroup 
Properties v. Southern Motel Assoc., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245 (11th Cir. 1991); First Nat’l Bank of El Dorado 
v. Giller (In re Giller), 962 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1992); Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. 
(In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.), 860 F.3d 515 (2d Cir. 1988); Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In 
re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015, Advisory 
Committee’s Note (“consolidation, as distinguished from joint administration, is neither authorized nor 
prohibited by this rule since the propriety of consolidation depends on substantive considerations and 
affects the substantive rights of the creditors of different estates.”).  Some courts have cited 11 U.S.C.§ 
1123(a)(5)(C) (2000) as statutory authorization for substantive consolidation.  See, e.g., In re Stone & 
Webster, Inc., 286 B.R. 532 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); In re Standard Brands Paints Co., 154 B.R. 563 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
5 E.g., In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., Inc., 963 F.2d 1490, 1491 (11th Cir. 1992); Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. 
v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust (In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co.), 834 F.2d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 1987); 
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debtors’ officers, directors, owners, or professionals.6
Bankruptcy, though, is a statutory system.  Bankruptcy proceedings in the Anglo-
American tradition have always existed only as a matter of statute.7  The tension between the 
adjudicative processes implied in the “court of equity” maxim and the statutory provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code exists at the heart of bankruptcy.  Equity and statute are fundamentally 
different legal systems.  The very nature of complex statutory structures is to create clear, one-
size-fits-all rules that lack the fact-intensive flexibility and individualized justice of equitable 
discretion.8  It is hard to reconcile equity’s discretion to do substantial justice through creative 
remedies ex-post with a statutory regime that prescribes ex-ante precise rights and remedies.  
This is the fundamental struggle in bankruptcy:  how to reconcile the predictable rule of law with 
creative, flexible, practical, individualized justice that is sometimes necessary for effective 
reorganizations of debtors in order to maximize value for all constituencies concerned.  
Effective reorganization is the point of Chapter 11 bankruptcy law, but it is law after all, 
not a simple directive to fix a problem at any cost.  The Bankruptcy Code involves a complex 
Burchinal v. Cent. Washington Bank (In re Adams Apple, Inc.), 829 F.2d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1987); 
Borne Chem. Co. v. Lincoln First Comm. Corp. (In re Borne Chem. Co.), 9 B.R. 263, 269-70 (Bankr. D. 
N.J. 1984); In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Gen. Oil 
Distrib., Inc., 20 B.R. 873, 876 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Comm. Corp. (In re 
Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092, 1098 (2d Cir. 1979).  
6 See, e.g., Class 5 Nevada Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648 
(6th Cir. 2002); In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); In re PWS 
Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2000); In re 
Specialty Equipment Co., Inc., 3 F.3d 1043 (7th Cir. 1993); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 
960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992); In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989).  But cf. In re 
Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Western 
Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1990); Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In 
re Am. Hardwoods, Inc., 885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989).
7
 Krieger, supra note 1, at 275, 277-292.
8 Scarborough v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., (In re: Scarborough), No. 03-228, slip op. at 13 
(E.D.Pa. Oct. 28, 2004) (“The cases relied on by the parties…set forth bright line rule tests for applying 
[11 U.S.C.] § 1322(b)(2)'s anti-modification provision [for mortgages on debtors’ principal residences]. 
The problem with this is that, in an effort to create simplicity and predictability, they fail to adequately 
safeguard equity.”)
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political balancing of debtor and creditor interests.  It represents a political compromise, the 
terms of which should be respected, like any other piece of legislation.  Yet, what sense does it 
make to adhere to the strictures of the Code when doing so prevents the goal of the Code from 
being fulfilled?  The rule of law wins but a Pyrrhic victory when it defeats the purpose of the 
law.  To fetishize the text over its meaning is dangerous, but so too is lawmaking without the 
prophylactic limitations of statutory text.  Thus, the debate over the balance of equity and statute 
in bankruptcy is in some measure a debate between purposivist and textualist methods of 
statutory interpretation.9  The struggle between equity and statute is reflected throughout the case 
law on the authorization of non-Code practices and throughout the academic literature on 
bankruptcy.10  So how can equity be reconciled with a Code-based legal system like 
bankruptcy?11
This article argues that because American courts are uncomfortable with unguided 
equitable discretion, they have tried to limit their equitable powers to those authorized by statute 
or grandfathered in under the pre-Code practices doctrine.  These limitations are problematic 
both conceptually and in terms of the results they produce.  Although there was once statutory 
authorization for bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers, the relevant statutory section appears to 
have been repealed. The statutory section to which courts now look for the authorization of 
bankruptcy equity powers, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), is inapplicable, and its use as an analytical 
framework for evaluating non-Code practices has led to questionable decisions.  Likewise, the 
pre-Code practices doctrine is an unsatisfactory limitation on non-Code practices that has 
9 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001). 
10
 Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 574-580 (1998).  See also
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987).
11
 The question of how bankruptcy equity powers interact with non-Code law, such as state law, is beyond 
the scope of this article.  See Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 633 (2004); Alfred Hill, the Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1953). See also 
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).  
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin
4
produced contradictory decisions from the Supreme Court and is incapable of recognizing 
modern analogs to pre-Code practices.  
Judging always involves some measure of discretion; the question is how that discretion 
is to be channeled.  Instead of attempting to reconcile equity and statute through inapplicable 
statutory or historical constraints, this article proposes using federal common law as an 
alternative framework for analyzing non-Code practices.  Federal common law is judge-made 
law that depends on precedent and judicially-devised tests rather than unpredictable discretion or 
rigid application of statute.  Federal common law allows for the development of bankruptcy law 
outside the Code, but its constraints of precedent and judge-made tests allow for predictable and 
consistent judgments.  Federal common lawmaking has long quietly existed in bankruptcy, but it 
has been a clunking sort of common lawmaking because it has never been recognized as such.  
Instead, it has always been analyzed in terms of equity, which has led to the inappropriate 
statutory and historical limitations.
It is unclear at present whether federal courts have common lawmaking powers in 
bankruptcy.  The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue and the few circuits that have are 
split.  This article argues that federal courts do have such a power because of the uniquely federal 
interest in bankruptcy due to the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause of the 
Constitution,12 as implied by the Supreme Court’s recent bankruptcy sovereign immunity 
decision in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz.13  This article further argues that 
federal common lawmaking is proper in bankruptcy because there is an implicit Congressional 
authorization of common lawmaking power in the Bankruptcy Code, as indicated by its 
legislative history and Congressional and judicial ratification of common lawmaking powers. 
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
13
 546 U.S. ___ (2006), No. 04-885, slip op. (Jan. 23, 2006).
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Finally, this article demonstrates that analysis of non-Code practices as part of a federal common 
law of bankruptcy strikes a balance between the needs for flexibility and for the predictable rule 
of law and would result in more sensible rulings on non-Code practices.    
In arguing for a federal common law approach to bankruptcy, this article also attempts to 
stake out a middle ground between the two major camps in bankruptcy scholarship, which 
Douglas G. Baird has termed “traditionalists” and “proceduralists”,14 but which might better be 
termed “practicalists” and “proceduralists.”  Practicalists, who have what might be called a more 
“liberal” view of bankruptcy, believe that “bankruptcy law plays a special role in our legal 
system and advances substantive goals that are both important and distinctive.”15  They 
emphasize rehabilitation of debtors16 and, in the Holmesian tradition, emphasize the factual 
individuality of each case.17  Therefore, they believe that bankruptcy judges must have broad 
discretion and powers to implement bankruptcy policy.18  Bankruptcy law must be flexible 
enough to carry out its underlying policies. 
Proceduralists, on the other hand, do not see bankruptcy as at all special or different from 
other legal regime.  They favor clear rules and rule of law over judicial flexibility and discretion.  
They also tend to associate with the conservative law-and-economics school of legal thought.  
Proceduralists do not see the survival of the debtor as an independent good19 and emphasize that 
firms must “live or die in the market.”20  Instead, they are generally concerned with the ex-ante 
14
 Baird, supra note 10, at 574-580; Warren, supra note 10.  Such a binary divide obviously 
oversimplifies the complexity and nuance of bankruptcy scholarship, as Professor Baird acknowledges,
supra note 10, at 576, but it is also a useful characterization of the field.
15
 Baird, supra note 10, at 576.  
16 Id. at 577.
17 Id. at 579.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 579-80.
20 Id. at 578.
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incentive-setting effects of clear legal rules on creating efficient markets.21  Accordingly, 
proceduralists believe that the bankruptcy judge should play a more passive role and exercise 
less discretion.22
Non-Code practices, usually authorized under the rubric of bankruptcy equity, are a 
particular flash point for these scholarly camps.  For practicalists, non-Code practices represent 
the flexibility and realism of the bankruptcy courts at their best, while for proceduralists, non-
Code practices represent unnecessary, overreaching, and even harmful displays of judicial 
discretion and activism.23  In particular, the traditional analysis of non-Code practices through 
the lens of equity has only sharpened these divisions, as equity has become the byword for the 
creation of non-statutory rights in bankruptcy.  A federal common law approach to non-Code 
practices strikes a middle ground between the practicalist concerns of individualized justice and 
proceduralist concerns about rule of law.
This article begins with a consideration of what “a court of equity” might mean in the 
bankruptcy context.  It then turns to the problems of discretion within the American judicial 
system.  Next, it examines the two principle ways in which courts have attempted to limit 
equitable discretion—statutory authorization and historical practice—and the problems with each 
method, both conceptually and in terms of results.  The article then considers whether federal 
common lawmaking is possible in bankruptcy, and concluding that it is, appraises the advantages 
to such an analytical framework for non-Code practices. 
II.  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A “COURT OF EQUITY”?  
21 Id. at 580.
22 Id. at 579-80.
23
 Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge:  A Statutory Court of 
Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 37-39 (2005).
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A.  EQUITY JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE, AND POWERS
The term “equity” is particularly confusing in bankruptcy because of its multiple meanings.  
Depending on context, “equity” refers to jurisdiction, procedures, court powers, justice, an 
ownership interest, or type of right.  The last two of these meanings are distinct, and their use is 
readily discernable from context.  The first four meanings, however, have often been confused 
and conflated in the description of bankruptcy courts as “courts of equity.” 
Surprisingly, the origins of the “court of equity” maxim are unknown.  No reported case has 
considered the history of the maxim, and only two articles, by Bankruptcy Judges Marcia 
Krieger and Alan Ahart respectively, have addressed the meaning and history of the “court of 
equity” maxim.24  Neither Krieger nor Ahart pinpoints an origin for the “court of equity” maxim.  
Instead, they argue that the designation is purely a judicial creation.25  The earliest reported use 
of the phrase “the bankruptcy court is a court of equity” is from 1876,26 but cases going back as 
far as 1842 use similar language,27 and the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 provided that district courts’ 
jurisdiction in proceedings in bankruptcy was “to be exercised summarily, in the nature of 
summary proceedings in equity.”28
Krieger and Ahart both conclude that 19th and early 20th century references to bankruptcy 
24
 Krieger, supra note 1; Ahart, supra note 23.
25
 Krieger, supra note 1, at 301; Ahart, supra note 23, at 18. 
26 In re Moller, 1876 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1876) (“A court of bankruptcy is a court of 
equity.”). 
27 Ex Parte Foster, 9 F. Cas. 508; 1842 U.S. App. LEXIS 600 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (Story, J.) (“I lay it 
down as a general principle that the district court is possessed of the full jurisdiction of a court of equity 
over the whole subject matters which may arise in bankruptcy, and is authorized by summary proceedings 
to administer all that relief which a court of equity could administer, under the like circumstances, upon a 
regular bin and regular proceedings, instituted by competent parties.”) (emphasis added); Ayer v. Brastow, 
2 F. Cas. 263, 265, 1842 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27, at *7-*8 (D. Maine 1842) (“The proceedings in bankruptcy 
are according to the course of equity, and to enable the court to do full justice to all partners in interest, 
the district court, sitting as a court of bankruptcy, is clothed with all the powers of a court of general 
equity jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added). 
28
 27 Cong. Sess. 1, Ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440. 445, §6 (1841) (emphasis added). repealed Mar. 3, 1843, Ch. 82, 5 
Stat. 614.
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courts as courts of equity dealt only with questions of procedure and the distinction between the 
original (or summary) and plenary jurisdiction of district courts sitting in bankruptcy, a 
distinction similar to the current divide between core and adversary proceedings in bankruptcy.29
As Krieger noted, “[r]eferences to the bankruptcy court as a court of equity were most often used 
in a technical context to define the scope of exclusive or original bankruptcy jurisdiction.”30
Broader characterizations of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity, according to Krieger and 
Ahart, are the result of later judicial misreading of dicta in these early cases.31
Nonetheless, a significant number of early cases indicate that bankruptcy equity is more 
than procedural or jurisdictional.  These cases indicate that at the very least bankruptcy courts 
exercised the powers of courts of equity, particularly the injunction.32  Indeed, the 1841 and 1867 
29
 Krieger, supra note 1, at 298-301. See also Northern Pipeline Constr, Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982) (explaining difference between summary and plenary jurisdiction in bankruptcy).
30
 Krieger, supra note 1, at 298.  
31 Id. at 298-301; Ahart, supra note 23, at 18.  
32 See, e.g., In re Ohio Copper Mining Co., 241 F. 711, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (“The bankruptcy court is a 
court of equity, armed with equity powers in aid of its jurisdiction and the enforcement of its orders.”); In 
re Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 180 F. 549, 553 (W.D. Mo. 1910) (“A proceeding in bankruptcy is a 
proceeding in equity, and, for the purposes of enforcing and protecting its jurisdiction, a court of 
bankruptcy has all the inherent powers of a court of equity.”); United States v. Liberman, 176 F. 161, 162 
(C.C.E.D.N.Y, 1910) (“under the powers of a court of bankruptcy as a court of equity”); In re Hicks, 133 
F. 739, 746 (N.D.N.Y. 1905) (“The power to enjoin is inherent in the court of bankruptcy, as a court of 
equity.”); In re Siegel-Hillman Dry Goods Co., 111 Fed. 980, 983 (E.D. Mo. 1901) (“This court, sitting in 
bankruptcy, can exercise the full powers of a court in equity for the ascertainment and enforcement of the 
rights and equities of the various parties interested in the estate of the bankrupt company.”); Ex Parte 
Norwood, 18 F.Cas. 452, 455 (D. Ill. 1873) (“The bankruptcy law clothes the district courts, sitting as 
courts of bankruptcy, with all the powers of courts of equity.”); In re Mallory, 1871 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223, 
at *6 (D. Nev. 1871) (“Now, when congress delegated to the district courts, this equitable jurisdiction in 
bankruptcy, it must follow, by necessary implication, that it also delegated at the same time the power to 
administer such remedies known to the law as were absolutely indispensable to the complete exercise of 
the jurisdiction expressly conferred.”); Ayer v. Brastow, 1842 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27, at *7-*8 (D. Maine 
1842) (“The proceedings in bankruptcy are according to the course of equity, and to enable the court to do 
full justice to all partners in interest, the district court, sitting as a court of bankruptcy, is clothed with all 
the powers of a court of general equity jurisdiction.”); Ex Parte Foster, 9 F. Cas. 508; 1842 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 600 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (Story, J. on circuit) (“I lay it down as a general principle that the district 
court is possessed of the full jurisdiction of a court of equity over the whole subject matters which may 
arise in bankruptcy, and is authorized by summary proceedings to administer all that relief which a court 
of equity could administer, under the like circumstances, upon a regular bin and regular proceedings, 
instituted by competent parties.”).
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin
9
Bankruptcy Acts specifically gave bankruptcy courts enforcement powers equal to those of the 
circuit courts sitting in equity.33
Under the 1978 Code, bankruptcy courts arguably exercise equity powers through the 
All-Writs Act,34 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), and 28 U.S.C. § 1481.  Moreover, the 1978 Code 
incorporated many of the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence in statutory form, albeit 
through the filter of earlier Bankruptcy Acts.  For example, the automatic stay35 and the 
discharge36 incorporate the injunction.  The strong-arm power of the trustee,37 the Code’s broad 
definition of the estate,38 and the very nature of bankruptcy proceedings as involving multiple 
parties attempting to recover from a limited fund effectuate the marshalling of assets.  The 
requirement of timely filing of claims bears the imprint of the doctrine of laches.39  The 
treatment of the estate as a trust invokes the equitable corpus of the trust.  The Code has 
incorporated fraud actions, a hallmark of equity jurisprudence, as voidable preferences40 and 
fraudulent conveyances.41  Equitable subordination42 of claims is, of course, equitable, deriving 
from the “clean hands” maxim.  Core bankruptcy proceedings (as opposed to adversary 
proceedings) are also less formal and more summary in nature than trials at law.43  Indeed, the 
33
 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 39 Cong. Sess 2, Ch. 176, 14, 14 Stat. 517, 518 (repealed 1878); Act of Aug. 19, 
1841, 27 Cong. Sess. 1, Ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 445 (repealed Mar. 3, 1843) (Bankruptcy courts shall have 
“full authority and jurisdiction to compel obedience to all orders and decrees passed by them in 
bankruptcy, by process of contempt and other remedial process, to the same extent the circuit courts may 
now do in any suit pending therein in equity.”).
34
 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
35
 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
36
 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2000).
37
 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000).
38
 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
39
 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) (2000). 
40
 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000).
41
 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000).
42
 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2000).
43
 This informality of procedure is still preserved in the equity courts of the few states, like the Delaware 
Chancery Court, that have not merged law and equity into a unity court.  
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priority scheme of the Code44 is an implementation of the equity maxim that “equity is 
equality”45—like creditors are to be treated alike.  Many of the statutory powers of bankruptcy 
courts are themselves derived from equity powers.  
Moreover, even to the extent that the “court of equity” designation contains a procedural 
element, it cannot be divorced from the substantive component.  While bankruptcy proceedings 
historically had a more summary nature than trials at law, they have never been governed by 
Equity Rules,46 but by their own rules of procedure.47  The summary nature of equity 
proceedings is in keeping with equity’s emphasis on substance over form and the pursuit of 
justice over technical requirements.48  Thus, being a “court of equity” is a procedural designation 
only in indicating the bankruptcy proceedings are not bound by the procedures of a court of law.
Courts have often seen bankruptcy equity affecting not just jurisdiction or enforcement of 
orders, but also rules of decision and dictating how courts should apply their equitable powers.49
Historically, this often meant that the court looked beyond technical requirements to substantive 
justice, particularly regarding pleadings, respected substance over form,50 or balanced competing 
44
 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2000). 
45
 This maxim is often presented in its Latin form, æquitas est æqualitas.
46
 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v (1822); 42 U.S. (1 How.) xli (1842); Equity Rules of 1912, 226 U.S. 627-673 
(1913); 38 Stat. 956 (Law and Equity Act of 1915). 
47 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 55 Cong. 2d Sess., Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 
18-32 (repealed 1978)).  
48 See EDWARD D. RE AND JOSEPH R. RE, REMEDIES 30 (5th Ed. 2000) (“Equity Regards Substance 
Rather than Form.”).  Cf. Richard Francis’ Maxims of Equity (1726) quoted in PETER CHARLES HOFFER, 
THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE:  EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1990), 11-12 (“[E]quity 
regards not the circumstance, but the substance of the act.”).
49E.g., Larson v. First State Bank of Vienna (In re Eggen), 21 F.2d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 1927) (“A court of 
bankruptcy is a court of equity, and its judicial officers, its judge and its referee in bankruptcy, in deciding 
and adjudging the rights and duties of parties entitled to their decision, are governed by the principles and 
rules of equity jurisprudence.”); In re Siegel-Hillman Dry Goods Co., 111 Fed. 980, 983 (E.D. Mo. 1901) 
(“This court, sitting in bankruptcy, can exercise the full powers of a court in equity for the ascertainment 
and enforcement of the rights and equities of the various parties interested in the estate of the bankrupt 
company.”).
50 E.g., In re Kane, 127 F. 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1904) (“A court of bankruptcy is a court of equity, seeking to 
administer the law according to its spirit, and not merely by its letter.”); Swarts v. Siegel, 117 Fed. 13, 16 
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equities.51 The designation of bankruptcy courts as “courts of equity” is an indication not only of 
bankruptcy courts’ powers, but also of a manner of decision-making that involves a considerable 
exercise of discretion.
B.  DOING EQUITY:  PEPPER V. LITTON
The elements of equity jurisdiction, equity principles and rules, equitable administration, 
substance over form, waiving of technical requirements, and substantial justice coalesced in 
Pepper v. Litton, the Supreme Court’s most extensive discussion about what it means to be a 
“court of equity.”  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas declared:  
Courts of bankruptcy are constituted by §§ 1 and 2 of the Bankruptcy Act [of 
1898] (30 Stat. 544) and by the latter section are invested “with such jurisdiction 
at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in 
bankruptcy proceedings.” Consequently this Court has held that for many 
purposes “courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their 
proceedings inherently proceedings in equity.”  Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 
234, 240 (1934).  By virtue of §2[,] a bankruptcy court is a court of equity at least 
in the sense that in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Act, it 
applies the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence. Among the granted 
powers are the allowance and disallowance of claims; the collection and 
distribution of the estates of bankrupts and the determination of controversies in 
relation thereto; the rejection in whole or in part “according to the equities of the 
case” of claims previously allowed; and the entering of such judgments “as may 
be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions” of the Act.  In such respects 
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is exclusive of all other courts.  [Citation 
omitted.]
The bankruptcy courts have exercised these equitable powers in passing on a wide 
range of problems arising out of the administration of bankrupt estates.  They 
have been invoked to the end that fraud will not prevail, that substance will not 
give way to form, that technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice 
(8th Cir. 1902) (“In equity, and in bankruptcy, which is a branch of equity, names and forms are 
unimportant where the truth is evident.”).
51 E.g., In re Lahongrais, 5 F.2d 899, 901 (D. Nev. 1871) (“Furthermore a court of bankruptcy is a court 
of equity, and has jurisdiction as such court to set aside an allowance made as an administration expense, 
when it appears that it was procured through fraud, or that the amount allowed was so grossly excessive 
as to be tantamount thereto.”); Ayer v. Brastow, 1842 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27, at *7-*8 (D. Maine 1842) 
(“The proceedings in bankruptcy are according to the course of equity, and to enable the court to do full 
justice to all partners in interest, the district court, sitting as a court of bankruptcy, is clothed with all the 
powers of a court of general equity jurisdiction.”).
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from being done.52
Pepper v. Litton emphasized the application of principles and rules of equity jurisprudence, 
rather than equity procedure.  It also emphasized that these principles were to be applied to 
achieve substantial justice that was not limited by technical considerations and forms.  Whatever 
it might have meant in the 19th century for a bankruptcy court to be a “court of equity,” it has 
been an unchallenged axiom of bankruptcy law since Pepper v. Litton that bankruptcy courts are 
to apply bankruptcy law in accordance with the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence.
When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it did so with Pepper v. Litton in 
mind.  The legislative history of the Code shows that Congress thought of bankruptcy equity 
existing in a substantive, not merely procedural, sense.  The House Report on the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1978 emphasized that “[t]he bankruptcy court will remain a court of equity.”53  The 
House Report made this comment in the context of an explanation of a substantive, not 
procedural equity component of the Code, section 510(b), which allows for equitable 
subordination of claims.  Equitable subordination is a procedure in which a creditor’s claim on 
the bankruptcy estate is assigned lower priority than other claims on the estate because of some 
improper or inequitable behavior by the creditor.  Equitable subordination matters when the 
estate’s assets are inadequate to cover all creditors’ claims, as an equitably subordinated 
creditor’s recovery will be limited.  The House Report observed that section 510(b) was intended 
to codify Pepper v. Litton and that “[t]he court’s power is broader than the general doctrine of 
52
 308 U.S. at 304-305. 
53 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 359 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6315 (“This section[, proposed 
11 U.S.C. 510(b),] is intended to codify case law, such as Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) and 
Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Co., 306 U.S. 295 (1939) and is not intended to limit the 
[bankruptcy] court's power in any way. The bankruptcy court will remain a court of equity, proposed 28 
U.S.C. 1481; Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).”).
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin
13
equitable subordination, and encompasses subordination on any equitable grounds.”54  The 
legislative history also cited proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1481 as enacting this proposition.55
From the legislative history, then, one could read Congress’s codification56 of Pepper v. 
Litton in section 510(b) of the Code57 as allowing for substantive equity, but only in a particular 
situation, rather than providing a general guideline for decision-making throughout the Code.  If 
this were the case, however, it would seem odd to emphasize that the bankruptcy court would 
“remain a court of equity” merely by virtue of the power of equitable subordination, a single tool 
in equity’s toolbox, rather than a panoply of equity powers, especially as Pepper v. Litton made 
clear that bankruptcy equity is about a larger jurisprudential ethos of “substantial justice.”  
Exactly what that ethos means, though, was not spelled out in Pepper v. Litton.
Pepper v. Litton’s discussion of equity was painted in broad strokes.  It also involved a 
very clear-cut set of facts pointing to inequitable behavior by the debtor.  The debtor corporation 
and its sole shareholder were in cahoots in a “planned and fraudulent scheme.”58  Although 
complex, the “scheme followed an ancient pattern” with the aim of “defraud[ing] creditors [in a 
manner] reminiscent of some of the evils with which 13 Eliz. C. 5 was designed to cope.”59  The 
sole shareholder secured a sham default judgment against the debtor corporation for back wages 
in order to outmaneuver an adverse judgment in a creditor.60  Then, through a series of corporate 
transfers, the sole shareholder arranged for the judgment creditor to be the only general 
unsecured claim in bankruptcy against the debtor corporation, which conveniently had sufficient 




 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2000).
58
 308 U.S. at 298.
59 Id. at 296-297.  13 Eliz. C. 5 (1571), often called “The Statute of Elizabeth,” was the first English 
fraudulent conveyances statute.
60
 308 U.S. at 297-298.
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assets to pay off only the others creditors, including the shareholder’s sham default judgment.61
Bankruptcy relief was being sought inequitably to avoid the claims of one creditor.62
Because Pepper dealt with such an obvious abuse of process, it is not particularly 
instructive about how to resolve cases in which the equities are not so clear-cut.  Pepper speaks 
in generic terms of “substantial justice” triumphing over “technical considerations.”  Just how far 
can that go as a principle guiding decisions?  Is the power to pursue “substantial justice” the 
power to ignore the explicit provisions set forth by Congress as “technical considerations”? 
Equity jurisprudence is necessarily one of discretion; equitable relief is never mandatory.  
However broad a bankruptcy court’s discretion might be, it is clearly not absolute.63  The next 
sections probe the limits of that discretion.  
C.  BALANCING THE EQUITIES:  NLRB V. BILDISCO & BILDISCO
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco64 contains the Supreme Court’s most extensive discussion of 
what it means for a bankruptcy court to be a “court of equity.”  Bildisco dealt with the question 
of under what conditions a bankruptcy court could permit a debtor-in-possession to reject a 
collective bargaining agreement.  The Court held that collective-bargaining agreements subject 
to the National Labor Relations Act65 were covered by the assumption/rejection provisions for 
executory contracts contained in section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.66
61 Id. at 298-302.  
62 Cf. NMSBPCSLDHB, L.P v. Integrated Telecom Expr. Inc. (In re Integrated Telecom Expr. Inc.), 308 
F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 2004) (plan of reorganization failed to meet “good faith” filing requirement of 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2000) because sole purpose of bankruptcy filing was to benefit debtors’ shareholders 
at the expense of one lessor whose claim in bankruptcy was limited to one year’s rent under 11 U.S.C. § 
502(b)(6)(A) (2000)).  Cf. also In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 216 (3d Cir. 2005) (Deemed 
substantive consolidation as to certain creditors denied because “it is here a tactic used as a sword and not 
a shield.”). 
63 Neal Mitchell Assocs. v. Braunstein (In re Lambeth Corp.), 227 B.R. 1, 7 (B.A.P 1st Cir. 1998).
64
 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
65
 29 U.S.C. § 150 et seq. (1982).
66
 465 U.S. at 516. In reaction to Bildisco, Congress enacted section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code to 
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The Court did not debate the existence, extent, or role of bankruptcy equity in Bildisco.  
The Court assumed equity to be a defining characteristic of bankruptcy courts’ operations and 
explained the nature of bankruptcy equity in Chapter 11:  to balance the interests and potential 
hardships of all the parties involved as they would affect the success of a reorganization.  The 
balancing is left to the business judgment of the bankruptcy court.  
The language of the Court’s decision is illuminating and worth quoting at length:  
Since the policy of Chapter 11 is to permit successful rehabilitation of debtors, 
rejection [of an executory contract] should not be permitted without a finding that 
that policy would be served by such action….Determining what would constitute 
a successful rehabilitation involves balancing the interest of the affected parties—
the debtor, creditors, and employees.  The Bankruptcy Court must consider the 
likelihood and consequences of liquidation for the debtor absent rejection, the 
reduced value of the creditors’ claims that would follow from affirmance and the 
hardship that would impose on them, and the impact of rejection on the 
employees.  In striking the balance, the Bankruptcy Court must consider not only 
the degree of hardship faced by each party, but also any qualitative differences 
between the types of hardship each may face.  
The Bankruptcy Court is a court of equity, and in making this determination it is 
in a very real sense balancing the equities, as the Court of Appeals suggested.  
Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court must focus on the ultimate goal of Chapter 11 
when considering these equities.  The Bankruptcy Code does not authorize 
freewheeling consideration of every conceivable equity, but rather only how the 
equities relate to the success of the reorganization.  The Bankruptcy Court’s 
inquiry is of necessity speculative, and it must have great latitude to consider any 
type of evidence relevant to this issue.67
Bildisco leaves no doubt that a balancing of equities in light of bankruptcy policy goals, rather 
than a statutory checklist, is central to bankruptcy adjudication.  Of course, one might ask how 
this is different from any assignation of a matter to a court’s discretion, such as in sentencing or 
determining whether the probative value of evidence outweighs its prejudicial tendency.  One 
govern the rejection of collective bargaining agreements.  11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).  While Bildisco’s 
holding on what procedures govern the rejection of collective bargaining agreements is no longer 
applicable law, the enactment of section 1113 in no way vitiates the general applicability of Bildisco’s 
discussion of the role of equity in Chapter 11 proceedings, which was not confined to the context of 
section 1113.
67
 Id. at 527.
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might further ask how this differs from the discretion exercised by administrative law judges, 
whose powers, like those of bankruptcy judges, do not stem from Article III of the Constitution.  
The Bildisco court was emphasizing that the Bankruptcy Code cannot presumptively be 
read on its face like any other statute.  The application of the statutory language of the Code, 
then, cannot be a robotic exercise, and literal meaning is not enough, for the Code’s provisions 
must be evaluated in light of the policies embodied in the Code.  The need to evaluate statutes in 
light of the policies they embody is hardly a novel concept in statutory interpretation.68
Nonetheless, Bildisco’s purposivist emphasis on the policy goals of bankruptcy over a purely 
textualist approach is in marked contrast to much of the Court’s recent bankruptcy jurisprudence.  
In Bildisco, though, the Court was emphasizing that the Code must be read as containing terms 
of art, written in light of equitable interpretation and application.  As Justice Douglas wrote in 
Bank of Marin v. England, “[We] do not read these statutory words with the ease of a computer.  
There is an overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction.”69
What the Court indicated in Bildisco is that in Chapter 11 the goal of debtor rehabilitation 
is to guide the balancing of the equities and that a tie goes to the debtor.  In balancing the 
equities, weighting should not be done by the dollar value of claims.  While all prayers for relief, 
be they for monetary or injunctive remedies, are reduced to monetary claims in bankruptcy by 
section 502(c)(2),70 the Court’s emphasis on the qualitative nature of parties’ hardships means 
that bankruptcy courts should look to the original nature of the claim.  Thus, economic harms 
should not necessarily be weighed the same as non-economic harms.  Tort victims, employees, 
68 E.g., United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849) (“In expounding a statute, we must 
not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, 
and to its object and policy.”).
69
 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966).
70
 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(2) (2000).
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trade creditors, and financial creditors need not be treated the same on a per-dollar basis in 
balancing equities. The non-pecuniary harms that would result from a determination should be 
weighed in the equation.71
Bildisco’s emphasis on doing substantial justice through balancing competing equities 
has often been forgotten by courts that are less comfortable with the judicial discretion involved 
in weighing equities.  These courts have turned instead to the talismans of statutory authorization 
and the pre-Code practices doctrine to guide their decisions by limiting equitable discretion and 
the ability to do substantial justice.  The next section considers why courts are so uncomfortable 
with equitable discretion.  
III. JUDICIAL DISCOMFORT WITH EQUITABLE DISCRETION
A.  SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS
The exercise of discretion is a concern throughout the American judicial system because 
it is in some sense a lawmaking activity.  In our Constitutional system, the legislative power is 
the power to set rules of decision, which vested in Congress at the federal level.  The separation 
of powers principle holds that the legislature makes the laws and the judiciary merely interprets 
them.  Broad judicial discretion is problematic because it changes the rule of decision from one 
set by the legislature to one set by the adjudicator. 
The actual separation of powers is often blurrier than standard civics classes present it.  
The legislature can delegate its powers, for example.72  The existence and scope of such a 
delegation is a major concern in the realm of administrative law, where a central question is the 
scope of the rule-making authority of administrative agencies.  If there is a proper delegation 
lawmaking power to the judiciary, either by the Constitution or by Congress, then judicial 
71
 Unfortunately, Bildisco does not indicate anything about how equities should be weighed in Chapter 7 
or Chapter 13 cases, or arguably in liquidating Chapter 11s.  
72 E.g., Texas Indus., Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.  451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). 
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discretion is does not present such serious separation of powers concerns; rather the powers of 
each branch of government are simply redefined.   
Moreover, it is hard to draw a bright line between judicial interpretation and lawmaking; 
these activities exist along a spectrum.73  At one end of the spectrum is the interpretation of 
statutory terms; at the other is the creation of new rules of decision or causes of action.  
Somewhere in between stands what might be termed “interstitial lawmaking” —filling in 
statutory gaps, rather than creating law out of whole cloth.   
Interpretation of the law is part of the unquestioned role of the judiciary,74 and to the 
extent that administrative agencies assume this judicial role, of agency action.75  Judicial 
lawmaking in the sense of creating new rules of decision, however, is often viewed with great 
suspicion as “judicial activism,” violating the separation of powers principle.76  Interstitial 
lawmaking by expert bodies, be they agencies or specialized courts, is also generally tolerated 
because it is necessary in the modern state.  
Agency rulemaking can span the entire spectrum from interpretation to creation of new 
rules of decision.  The courts police such rulemaking by examining the statutory authorization 
for the rule-making power and determining whether the rulemaking was within the scope of the 
73 Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 893-94 
(1986); Peter Westen & Jeffrey Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. 
REV. 311, 332 (1980); but cf. Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the 
Interpretive Process:  An “Institutional” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 788 (1989) (“[T]he 
difference between common law and statutory interpretation are [sic], both conceptually and politically, 
qualitatively different.”). Notably, Redish defines many of the points along the spectrum as interpretation 
in order to achieve a neater binary divide.  Id. at 794.
74 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
75 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
76 E.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“We Americans have 
a method for making the laws that are over us.  We elect representatives to two Houses of Congress, each 
of which must enact the new law and present it for the approval of a President, whom we also elect.  For 
over two decades now, unelected federal judges have been usurping this lawmaking power….”).
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authorization.77  Many courts also have adopted this approach when attempting to determine the 
authorization of bankruptcy courts to depart from the strictures of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Accordingly, the struggle over non-Code practices has largely become a debate about the scope 
of the statutory authorization of bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers.  As the following section 
shows, the existence of any such statutory authority at present is doubtful, and the debate over 
non-Code practices has been misframed in terms of equity for historical reasons.  Instead, this 
article argues, non-Code practices should be viewed in terms of federal common law.  The use of 
the term “equity” in the bankruptcy context is really “fortuitous coinage” for what is better 
described as federal common lawmaking.
The misframing of the authorization of non-Code practices in terms of equity has been 
particularly problematic because of the peculiar difficulties that equitable discretion and powers 
present for any statutory regime.  The nature of equity is to be flexible and individualized, while 
the purpose of a code is to provide clear ex-ante rules that will result in uniform decisions.  
Allowing courts that implement a code-based regime to go farther afield than the statutory 
language undercuts the point of codification.  To the extent that equitable powers authorize 
unlimited deviations from the Code, they present the danger of the exceptions swallowing the 
rule. 
B.  “DOING LAW” VERSUS “DOING JUSTICE”
The misidentification of the authorization of non-Code practices as stemming from the 
equity powers of bankruptcy courts has led courts to apply inappropriate statutory and historical 
limitations on non-Code practices because of discomfort with unguided equitable discretion.  
Judicial discomfort with equity complicates any attempt to reconcile equity powers with a code-
77 See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2000). 
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based legal regime.  The term “equity” itself seems to set off judicial alarm-bells.  A general 
judicial nervousness about “doing justice” instead of “doing law” has been imbedded in our legal 
system at least since Marbury v. Madison.78  This judicial unease has become distinctly more 
pronounced on the Rehnquist court with its comparatively textualist emphasis.  
Marbury, which lies at the bedrock of the American statutory-Constitutional state, looks 
to positive rights created by statute or the Constitution.  Marbury emphasized “where there is a 
legal right, there is also a legal remedy.”79  At the center of equity jurisprudence, however, lies 
the maxim that “Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy.”80 Equity thus looks to 
the existence of a wrong, which assumes something approaching a divine or natural law set of 
rights, as opposed to a statutory right.81  For example, the notoriously vague notion of fiduciary 
duties are rarely put into a statutory form; they exist, but not by virtue of legislative decree.  
These sorts of rights might have historical origins, but they are affirmatively non-statutory.82
Statute and equity are adjudicative systems based on drastically divergent principles of the 
derivation of rights.  
American legal education judges are trained to protect statutory rights and to do law, not 
justice.83  In part, though, it stems from the lack of a generally accepted meaning of what 
78
 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
79 Id. at 163.
80 SNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 24 (27th Ed. 1973) (“Indeed, it would not be difficult to reduce [all of 
the equity maxims to two:] ‘Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy’, and ‘Equity acts on 
the person.’”).  This maxim also appears as ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy) 
and lex semper dabit remedium (the law always gives a remedy), formulations that are much closer to that 
of Marbury v. Madison.
81
 The office of Lord Chancellor was originally held by a prelate.  Krieger, supra note 1, at 279. 
82 Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 492 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
83 Oral Argument, In re: John Amendt, No. 05-2458 (3d Cir., Jan. 18, 2006) at 
http://ca3phi02/iptvmedia/05-2458InReJohnAmendt.wmv at 13:49. (Becker, J.) (Petitioner urging court 
to grant mandamus to prevent venue transfer of an ERISA case under an abuse of discretion standard) 
(Judge Becker:  “When you [petitioner’s counsel] say  how [will we] explain to ourselves [a denial of 
mandamus, we respond]—We’ll follow the law.  Your suggestions here that this [transfer of venue] is 
grotesque and all the rest of this.  This is a legal case.  This is going to be decided on the law, not on the 
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substantial justice is.  While society might have a common sense of what is just in some 
situations, there are many technical scenarios for which no societal consensus exists.  “Doing 
justice” is too much of a generality to provide meaningful guidance to courts.  In America judges 
do law, not justice, so the idea of the law instructing them to do substantial justice—“a roving 
commission to do equity”84—is quite unnerving.  
The jurisprudential concern about “doing equity” is not just one of a lack of uniform 
results between courts, but one of judges themselves not knowing how to proceed.  It is far easier 
to follow the techniques of application of law to fact taught in law school than to create justice 
out of whole cloth; judges are not Solomons.  Nor are they generally technical experts in any 
particular field.  Without some channeling or direction of their discretion, many judges would 
simply be lost, particularly in cases where one’s personal moral (or economic efficiency) 
compass can give no bearing.  This concern was evident in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Butner v. United States, in which the Court ruled that state law, rather than a “federal rule of 
equity”85 should govern the right to rents collected during the period between a mortgagor’s 
bankruptcy and the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property:86
The equity powers of the bankruptcy court play an important part in the 
administration of bankrupt estates in countless situations in which the judge is 
required to deal with particular, individualized problems.  But undefined 
considerations of equity provide no basis for adoption of a uniform federal rule 
affording mortgagees an automatic interest in the rents as soon as the mortgagor is 
declared bankrupt.87
The problem for the Supreme Court was that considerations of equity were “undefined,” and the 
emotions….To think that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals is gonna to decide on the basis of emotional 
arguments!  There are emotional factors on both sides are every case.  There are legal issues here.  And 
when you say ‘how do you explain to people?’  You have to explain that a federal appellate court is 
confronted with certain precedents, like our precedent on mandamus, and these other things…. ”).
84 United States v. Sutton, 786 F. 2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986).
85 Butner, 440 U.S. at 49, 53. 
86 Id. at 49.
87 Id. at 55-56.
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Court did not feel comfortable providing such a definition itself.  The circuits that had adopted a 
“federal rule of equity” to govern the situation had reasoned that “since the bankruptcy court has 
the power to deprive the mortgagee of his state-law remedy, equity requires that the right to rents 
not be dependent on state-court action that may be precluded by federal law.”88  This rule, 
however, sometimes “affords the mortgagee rights that are not his as a matter of state law.”89
The Supreme Court reasoned that state law should govern because treating a party’s property 
rights different in bankruptcy than under state law could allow bankruptcy to become a windfall 
to certain parties,90 an “inequity” that using state law as the rule of decision would avoid.91  The 
Supreme Court was concerned that entering into a consideration of equity would itself create 
inequity because these considerations were “undefined.”   
The Supreme Court’s concern about “undefined considerations of equity” was in part 
because of the issue at hand.  The question of automatic security interests in rents is a technical, 
financial question; it does not implicate social values and mores the way issues like non-statutory 
substantive due process rights such as abortion or First Amendment issues, or statutory rights 
such as sentencing schemes do.  Without the strong tug of a moral compass, it is far easier for 
federal courts to disregard equitable considerations and defer to the terms of a statutory scheme, 
state law, and established precedent.  
The Bankruptcy Code does not make courts’ task any easier.  The Code provides no 
guidance for what it means to be a “court of equity,” and the origins of this status are murky.   
88 Id. at 53. 
89 Id. at 56.
90 Id. at 55.  
91 Id. at 56-57. 
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IV.  THE LIMITATION OF BANKRUPTCY EQUITY BY STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
A.  SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATIONS OF EQUITY IN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
The current Bankruptcy Code authorizes equitable decision-making in a limited number 
of circumstances.  The Code refers twenty-four times to decisions that are to be made “according 
to the equities of the case” or “in the interests of justice.”92  Several of these provisions are 
92 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(10) (2000) (trustee is to perform all obligations of the debtor on an unexpired 
lease of personal property unless court decides otherwise “based on the equities of the case.”); 11 U.S.C. 
§ 502(j) (2000) (reconsideration of allowed or disallowed claim is to be made “according to the equities 
of the case”); 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2000) (claims may be subordinated “under principles of equitable 
subordination”); 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(III) (asbestos channeling injunction may only be issued if 
pursuit of claims outside of plan would likely threaten “plan’s purpose to deal equitably with claims and 
future demands”); 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) (2000) (injunction issued in conjunction with chapter 11 
plan only if “the court determines…such injunction…is fair and equitable”); 11 U.S.C. § 524(h)(1)(A) 
(2000) (referencing the “fair and equitable” requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)); 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) 
(2000) (after acquired property clauses in security agreements are valid except to the extent that the court 
orders otherwise after notice and a hearing “based on the equities of the case.”); 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) 
(2000) (limitation on post-petition effect of after-acquired property clauses of security agreements to be 
“based on the equities of the case”); 11 U.S.C. § 557(d)(2)(D) (2000) (disposition of grain or proceeds of 
grain may be by “such other method as is equitable in the case”); 11 U.S.C. § 723(d) (2000) 
(determination of distribution of surplus recovered by a partnership trustee against general partners shall 
be equitable); 11 U.S.C. § 1112(d)(3) (2000) (conversion of case from chapter 11 to chapter 12 must be 
equitable); 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (2000) (debtor rejecting a collective bargaining agreement shall 
make a proposal for modifications in employee benefits and protections that assures that “all creditors, the 
debtor, and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably”); 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (2000) 
(collective bargaining agreements to be rejected only if “the court finds…the balance of the equities 
favors rejection”); 11 U.S.C. § 1114(f)(1)(A) (2000) (debtor modifying retiree benefits must assure that 
“all creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably”); 11 U.S.C. § 
1114(g)(3) (2000) (modification of payment of retiree benefits if “all creditors, the debtor, and all of the 
affected parties are treated fairly and equitably, and [a modification of the order] is clearly favored by the 
balance of the equities”); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2000) (cramdown plan must be “fair and equitable” to 
be confirmed); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2000) (defining what “fair and equitable” includes for the 
purposes of § 1129(b)(1)); 11 U.S.C. § 1170(e)(1) (2000) (approval of abandonment of railroad line 
requires “a fair arrangement at least as protective of the interests of employees as that established under 
section 11347 of title 49”); 11 U.S.C. § 1172(c)(1) (2000) (approval of railroad reorganization plan 
requires “a fair arrangement at least as protective of the interests of employees as that established under 
section 11347 of title 49”).  See also 11 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(1) (2000) and  11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1) (2000) 
(“circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable” for failure to make payments 
under a plan); 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3)(B) (2000) and 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)(A)(i) (2000) (no “undue 
hardship”); 11 U.S.C. § 557(f)(1) (2000) (“in the interests of justice”).  Many historically equitable 
doctrines, such as good faith, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2000), fraud, see 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000), and 
laches, see 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2000), are incorporated throughout the Code, but without allowing judicial 
discretion. 
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essentially parallel to each other or interlinked as parts of a single Code section.93  Accounting 
for parallel or interlinked provisions, there are only fourteen truly distinct provisions that call for 
doing equity, and in only one of these provisions, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b), does the Code spell out 
what equity requires.94  Section 1129(b)(1) requires that a “cramdown” reorganization plan that 
is adopted over the objections to a class of creditors must be “fair and equitable.”95  Section 
1129(b)(2) then lists a set of non-exclusive conditions defining what it means to be “fair and 
equitable.”96  The conditions listed are not broadly applicable principles of adjudication, but 
specific requirements for cramdown plans, so section 1129(b)(2) does little to inform the 
exercise of equity in other areas where the Code calls for it.
1.  The Bark and the Bite of Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers:  How Confining Is the Code?
Section 1129(b) was the statutory provision at issue in Norwest Bank Worthington v. 
Ahlers, the Supreme Court’s most rhetorically striking decision on the scope of courts’ equitable 
powers in bankruptcy.97  The issue before the Court in Ahlers was whether the absolute priority 
rule has a “new value” exception for contributions by equity holders of “labor, experience, and 
expertise” to a debtor’s operations.  The absolute priority rule, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(b)(2)(B), requires that equity holders in a debtor enterprise receive nothing in a 
93 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(III)  and 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) 
(2000) and 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (2000), 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) 
(2000), 11 U.S.C. § 1114(f)(1)(A) (2000), and 11 U.S.C. § 1114(g)(3) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) 
(2000) and 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2000) and 11 U.S.C. § 524(h)(1)(A) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 1170(e)(1) 
(2000) and 11 U.S.C. § 1172(c)(1) (2000); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1228(b)(1) (2000) and 1328(b)(1) (2000); 11 
U.S.C. §§ 524(c)(3)(B) (2000) and 524(c)(6)(A)(i) (2000).
94
 Arguably, 11 U.S.C. § 1170(e)(1) and 11 U.S.C. § 1172(c)(1) originally detailed a measure for equity, 
in that they call for railroad reorganization plans, including the abandonment of a railroad line to contain 
“a fair arrangement at least as protective of the interests of employees as that established under section 
11347 of title 49.”  49 U.S.C. 11347 has since been omitted.  See Pub. L. 104-88, title 1, § 102(a), Dec. 
12, 1995, Stat. 804.  See 49 U.S.C. § 11326(a) (2000).  
95
 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2000).  
96
 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2000).
97
 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin
25
reorganization unless all the classes of creditors above them receive property of value equal to 
the allowed amount of their claims.  The Supreme Court declined to rule on the proposed 
“infusion-of-money-or-money’s-worth” exception to the absolute priority rule.  Instead, it held 
that even if there were such an exception after the codification of the absolute priority rule in 
section 1129(b), the instant contribution was insufficient.98
The debtors in Ahlers argued that section 1129(b)’s provision that a reorganization be 
“fair and equitable” required the objecting creditor to vote “in the best interests of all creditors 
and debtors”, not merely its own self-interest.99  The debtors also emphasized their sympathetic 
status as hard-pressed family farmers.100  The Court sharply rejected their equity argument, 
declaring, “whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be 
exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”101  In this case, the confine that limited 
equity was section 1129(b)(2)(B), which laid out what constituted a “fair and equitable” plan.
What exactly does it mean that bankruptcy equity “can only be exercised within the 
confines” of the Code?  This phrase has become the standard retort to “the bankruptcy court is a 
court of equity.”  First, it could mean that equity is only a power to implement the Code.  If so, 
though, it is odd to call it equity, as this power exists for all federal courts under the All Writs 
Act.102  In any case, this reading is probably precluded by the Court’s later decision in United 
States v. Energy Resources Co., Inc., where it observed that section 105(a) powers “are 
consistent with the traditional understanding that bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have 
broad authority to modify creditor-debtor relationships.”103  Modifying creditor-debtor 
98 Id. at 203 n.3. 
99 Id. at 206.
100 Id. at 209.
101 Id. at 206.  
102
 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).  
103
 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990).  
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relationships goes far beyond enforcement of court orders. 
Ahlers could also mean that bankruptcy equity is synonymous with the terms of the Code, 
that is to say that the terms of the Code are equity codified.104  This reading can be squared with 
Energy Resources, as “broad authority to modify creditor-debtor relationships” can be read as a 
description of bankruptcy court’s statutory powers.  Nonetheless, this reading too fails, for the 
Code would not require actions to be “fair and equitable” if that is exactly what the Code’s 
provisions were.  The Code’s fourteen provisions referring to equity would be superfluous if the 
Code itself were equity.
A third reading of Ahlers, adopted by many courts, is that equity powers must be 
consistent with the Code’s specific provisions.105  Such a reading mirrors section 1123(b)(5) of 
the Code, which authorizes bankruptcy courts to approve reorganization plans containing 
“any…appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.”106  This 
reading too is consistent with Energy Resources, as well as with the Supreme Court’s admonition 
that “courts should be loath to announce equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or 
prohibitions that are unqualified by the statutory text.”107  It is also consistent with the Court’s 
jurisprudence under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.108
This third reading also comports with the Supreme Court’s later decision in Young v. 
104
 Krieger, supra note 1, at 311. (“equity lies not in the court, but in the Bankruptcy Code it applies.”).
105 E.g., Jamo v. Katahdin Fed. Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir. 2002) (bankruptcy 
court lacked power to modify a reaffirmation agreement or compel the parties to enter into a judicially-
crafted reaffirmation agreement) (“Section 105(a) does not provide bankruptcy courts with a roving writ, 
much less a free hand.  The authority bestowed thereunder may be invoked only if, and to the extent that, 
the equitable remedy dispensed by the court is necessary to preserve an identifiable right conferred 
elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code.”).
106
 11 U.S.C. §1123(b)(5) (2000).
107 Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990).
108 See, e.g., SEC v. United States Realty, 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940).
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United States.109  In Young the Court unanimously held that the three-year lookback period of 
section 507(a)(8)(A)(i),110 which mirrors the three-year statute of limitations of the Internal 
Revenue Code111 and grants the Internal Revenue Service a priority position for its tax liens, is 
tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy under the principle of equitable tolling.  The 
Court noted, “Since nothing in the Bankruptcy Code precludes equitable tolling of the lookback 
period, we believe the courts below properly excluded from the three-year limitation the period 
[at issue].”112  In Young, Court had no difficultly allowing an equitable practice not specifically 
authorized by the Code because it was not precluded by the Code.
Under the third reading, so long as there is not a specific Code provision directly on 
point, the court has a free hand in deciding whether and how to use its equity powers, limited 
only by the extent of those powers and proper exercise of its discretion.113  Such a reading is 
consistent with the nature of equity discussed in Pepper v. Litton—that equity ensures that 
substantial justice will not be bound by technical considerations.  Thus, when it is a close call 
whether the exercise of equity powers would be inconsistent with or contradict the Code, the 
third reading’s presumption should be in favor of allowing the exercise of the equity powers.114
The problem with readings Ahlers in any of these ways is that it ignores the case’s 
unusual statutory context.  When one reads Ahlers statement that “whatever equitable powers 
remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the 
109
 535 U.S. 43 (2002). 
110
 11 U.S.C. § 507 (a)(8)(A)(i) (2000).
111
 26 U.S.C. §§ 6501 – 6502 (2000).
112 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 47 (2002).
113 See Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. at 549-50 (“Even if consistent with the Code, however, a bankruptcy 
court order might be inappropriate if it conflicted with another law that should have been taken into 
consideration in the exercise of the court’s discretion.”).
114
 There is also a fourth reading of Ahlers, which is really a broader version of the third reading.  This 
fourth reading is that equity must be consistent not just with the Code’s specific provisions, but with the 
general tenor of the Code and the policies underlying it.  
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Bankruptcy Code,”115 not as a free-floating statement of a generic truth, but as it was made, 
within the context of the case, its narrow scope becomes apparent:  Ahlers’ statement that equity 
exists solely within the confines of the Code can apply only to objections to section a plan not 
meeting the requirements of section 1129(b).  
This is not because section 1129(b) was the actual issue litigated in the case; it would be 
reckless to read the Supreme Court’s decision so narrowly.  Rather, it is because section 1129(b) 
is the only section of the Code that refers to “fair and equitable” and then defines some of the 
requirements of fairness and equity for the purposes of the section.  There is no other section of 
the Bankruptcy Code that explicitly defines what “equity” requires in a specific condition.  The 
rest of the Code lacks any such “confines” of directly applicable statutory language.  Therefore, 
the “confines of the Bankruptcy Code” are much less confining for other equity-based claims.  
Instead of the tight fence of the statutory specifications in section 1129(b)(2), there is only the 
porous boundary of general inferences of indirectly conflicting statutory provisions.  Ahlers’ 
bark is far worse than its bite.  
Nonetheless, the fourteen discrete situations in which the Code calls for the exercise of 
equitable principles in decision-making are hardly enough for a bankruptcy court to be called “a 
“court of equity.”  Some of the specific Code provisions requiring decisions to be made “in the 
interests of justice” deal with such obscure topics as “the period for the final disposition of grain 
or proceeds of grain.”116  The status of “court of equity” implies a larger scope to bankruptcy 
courts’ equity powers than the fourteen specific directives of the Code.  As the Supreme Court 
noted in Energy Resources, its most recent decision touching on the equity powers of bankruptcy 
courts, “bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-debtor 
115 Id.
116
 11 U.S.C. § 557(f) (2000).
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relationships.”117  The scope of such “broad authority” must be understood to apply to more 
areas of bankruptcy proceedings than determinations on the proceeds of grain.  The following 
section considers what statutory authorization, if any, there is for bankruptcy courts’ general, 
rather than specific, equity powers.  
B.  IS THERE A GENERAL STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR BANKRUPTCY EQUITY POWERS?
In Anglo-American legal tradition, bankruptcy relief has only existed as a matter of 
statute; it has never been a Constitutional or common law right or existed as part of general 
Chancery powers in equity.118  If bankruptcy proceedings themselves are a creature of statute, it 
would follow a fortiori that the powers of bankruptcy courts are also statutorily limited.  This 
principle was recognized by the Supreme Court in an early bankruptcy case, decided under the 
second bankruptcy act, Ex parte, the City Bank of New Orleans (In the Matter of William 
Christy),119 which held that the equity powers of district courts sitting in bankruptcy derive only 
from the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.120
Historically, bankruptcy courts had equity powers as a matter of statute.  Today, this 
article demonstrates, there is no longer direct statutory authorization, and the Code provision that 
courts generally cite as the source of bankruptcy equity powers, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), is 
affirmatively not a statutory authorization of equity.  Currently there is no statutory authorization 
for bankruptcy equity powers; to the extent that they now exist it is only as a matter of federal 
common law.  Thus, to understand the problems of statutory authorization of equity power under 
117
 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990).  
118
 Krieger, supra note 1, at 275, 277-292.  See also Plank, supra note 11, at 668; Berry v. Root, 148 F. 2d 
945, 946 (5th Cir. 1945) (“While a court of bankruptcy often applies equitable principles, and may 
sometimes entertain a controversy in equity arising out of the bankruptcy in which it will follow the 
precedents and practice of a court of equity, yet as respects the original bankruptcy proceeding it is not 
strictly a court of equity, but a statutory court created by the Bankruptcy Act, and governed by it.”).
119
 44 U.S. 292. 311-313 (1845).
120
 27 Cong. Ch. 9; 5 Stat. 440 (1841).
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the current Bankruptcy Code of 1978,121 it is necessary to foray into the preceding Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898, 122 which built on the history, and, at times the language of the 1841 Act, albeit 
through the intervening 1867 Act.123  In 2005, the Supreme Court noted, “[o]n occasion, a 
would-be doctrinal rule or test finds its way into our case law through simple repetition of a 
phrase --- however fortuitously coined.”124  Although the precise origin of the “court of equity” 
maxim remains uncertain, the history of American bankruptcy law shows that bankruptcy courts’ 
status as a “court[s] of equity” is less an official statutory status of particular significance than 
“fortuitous coinage” that has taken on a life of its own and outlived its statutory origins.
1.  Section 2(a)(1) of Bankruptcy Act of 1898
In Pepper v. Litton, the status of bankruptcy courts as “courts of equity” hinged on a 
specific statutory authorization, section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898:125
Courts of bankruptcy are constituted by §§ 1 and 2 of the Bankruptcy Act [of 
1898] and by the latter section are invested “with such jurisdiction at law and in 
equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy 
proceedings.”  Consequently this Court has held that for many purposes “courts of 
bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently 
proceedings in equity.” By virtue of §2[,] a bankruptcy court is a court of equity 
at least in the sense that in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the 
Act, it applies the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence.126
Section 2(a)(1) of the 1898 Act laid out the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts:
That the courts of bankruptcy…are hereby invested, within their respective 
territorial limits…with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them 
121
 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2000).
122
 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 55 Cong. 2nd Sess., Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (codified as amended at 11 
U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (repealed 1978)).
123 See Steve H. Nickles & David G. Epstein:  Bankruptcy Symposium: Another Way of Thinking About 
Section 105(a) and Other Sources of Supplemental Law Under the Bankruptcy Code, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 7, 
13-14 (2000).  
124 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2074 (2005) (holding that the “substantially advances 
government interests” test for regulatory takings does not apply).
125
 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 55 Cong. 2nd Sess., Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 544-545 (1898) (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (repealed 1978)).
126 See 308 U.S. at 304 (internal citations omitted).
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to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings….127
Section 2 of the 1898 Act then enumerated a non-exclusive128 list of eighteen specific powers of 
the court.129  The fourteenth enumerated power, section 2(a)(15), was to “make such orders, issue 
such process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be 
necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act.”130  Although Pepper v. Litton did 
not specify which subsection of section 2 of the 1898 Act it referenced, it seems clear that it was 
referring to section 2(a)(1), given that Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,131 the authority cited in Pepper,132
revolved around that section.133
Local Loan Co.’s discussion of section 2(a)(1) clarified that although the jurisdictional 
grant in the 1898 Act was of both jurisdiction at law and in equity.  Jurisdiction at law was 
granted for the purpose of punishing bankruptcy crimes; otherwise, bankruptcy was an equitable 
proceeding:
The words “at law” were probably inserted to meet clause (4) of §2[(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898], which empowers such [bankruptcy] courts to arraign, 
try and punish certain designated persons for violations of the act.  But otherwise 
courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity and their proceedings 
inherently proceedings in equity.134
Thus, statutory authorization for bankruptcy equity in Pepper v. Litton was section 2(a)(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.  
127
 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 55 Cong. 2nd Sess., Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 544-545 (1898) (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (repealed 1978)).
128 See id. § 2 ¶ 2.
129 Id. §§ 2(a)(2) – (19).
130 Id. § 2(a)(15).  
131
 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
132
 308 U.S. at 304.
133 Id. at 240.
134 Id. See also Bardes, 178 U.S. at 535 (“the words ‘at law,’ in the opening sentence conferring on the 
courts of bankruptcy ‘such jurisdiction, at law and in equity, as will enable them to exercise original 
jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings,’ may have been inserted to meet clause 4, authorizing the trial and 
punishment of offences, the jurisdiction over which must necessarily be at law and not in equity.”).
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The assumption underlying Pepper v. Litton was that bankruptcy courts have equitable 
powers by virtue of statute, not by virtue of some ex nihilo status as bankruptcy courts.  The 
statutory derivation of equity powers means that these powers must be limited to the extent of the 
statutory authorization.  The statutory authorization of equity powers, and by implication 
equitable adjudication, is odd for a detailed statutory regime; to the extent that one sees the 1898 
Act (or the 1978 Act) as authorizing equity powers, it raises the question why Congress would 
do so.  Arguably, the answer lies in the fact-intensive nature of bankruptcy135 and Congress’s 
inability to legislative sufficiently precise rules to govern all situations.  Congress wanted a 
flexible statutory regime.  It also speaks to the collective nature of bankruptcy—to divide a 
limited fund among multiple claimants requires creativity and the balancing of equities.  
There is no legislative history to support such a view, however.  Congress never 
articulated such a desire independent of the Code’s own provisions.  As we shall see, bankruptcy 
equity in the sense of authorizing broad non-Code powers and equitable decision-making is as 
much a judicial creation as a legislative one.  In any event, repeated revisions of the bankruptcy 
laws have provided bankruptcy courts with the powers of a court of equity without 
Congressional comment, perhaps ratifying the exercise of equity powers.136  The 1898 Act 
provided Justice Douglas with a reasonably explicit statutory authorization of equity powers.  
The current statutory authorization for bankruptcy equity powers under the Bankruptcy Code of 
1978, if any, is less clear.
2.  12 Days of Equity?  The Questionable Repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1481
135 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55-56 (“The equity powers of the bankruptcy court play an important part in 
the administration of bankrupt estates in countless situations in which the judge is required to deal with 
particular, individualized problems.”).
136 Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 157-58 (2000) (Congressional 
ratification of prior agency practice may be inferred from absence of comment in later legislation).
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As the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 was originally adopted, it contained a provision 
analogous to section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.137  28 U.S.C. § 1481, entitled “Powers of 
bankruptcy court,” provided:
A bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty, 
but may not enjoin another court or punish criminal contempt not committed in 
the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment of 
imprisonment.138
28 U.S.C. § 1481 would seem to continue the pre-Code equity powers for bankruptcy courts, for, 
as the Third Circuit has noted, “The enactment of the Code in 1978 increased the degree of 
regulation Congress imposed upon bankruptcy proceedings, but it did not alter bankruptcy 
courts’ fundamental nature.”139
28 U.S.C. § 1481 was supposed to go into effect on April 1, 1984.140  Before this 
occurred, however, the Supreme Court ruled in Northern Pipeline Construction. Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co. that the 1978 Code’s system of Article I bankruptcy judges was 
unconstitutional.141  Northern Pipeline was decided, in part, on an assumption that 28 U.S.C. § 
1481 was in effect.142 Accordingly, the implementation of 28 U.S.C. § 1481 was postponed 
137 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, P.L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978), § 241. 
138
 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982) (possibly repealed in 1984).  The House Report on the Bankruptcy Code 
noted that section 1481 “gives the bankruptcy court the powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty.  It 
is the concomitant of the bankruptcy courts increased jurisdiction, and is necessary to enable the 
bankruptcy court to exercise that jurisdiction and its powers under the bankruptcy code.  It is in addition 
to any power granted under 28 U.S.C. 1651 (the All Writs Statute) or under section 105 of the bankruptcy 
code.”  H.R. REP. NO. 595; 95th Cong., 1st Sess; HR 8200 (Sept. 8, 1977). 
139 The Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp., on behalf of Cybergenics Corp., v. 
Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 567 (3d Cir. 2003).
140
 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, P.L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682 (Nov. 6, 1978), § 402(b).  Also see id. 92 
Stat. 2683, § 404 (providing for transition from Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to Bankruptcy Code of 1978).  
For effective date of rest of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, October 1, 1979, see id., 92 Stat. 2682 (Nov. 
6, 1978), § 401.  Thus, 11 U.S.C. § 2a continued to be in effect until March 31, 1984.  Id. 92 Stat. 2683, § 
404(a).  
141 458 U.S. 50 (1982).  
142 Id. at 55. See supra note 140.
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several times,143 finally going into effect on June 28, 1984.144
On July 10, 1984, twelve days after 28 U.S.C. § 1481 became effective, the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984145 went into effect.  Section 113 of the 1984 
Amendments noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1481 “shall not be effective,”146 but section 121(a) of the 
Amendments provided that 28 U.S.C. § 1481 would be effective as of the date of the enactment 
of the 1984 Amendments, July 12, 1984,147 an odd provision for an already effective statute.  As 
a court has noted, this bizarre sequence of enactments is “one of Congress’ clumsiest 
performances.”148
Most courts and commentators that have addressed the issue have regarded 28 U.S.C. § 
1481 as repealed.149  The last official printing of the United States Code in 2000 does not include 
28 U.S.C. § 1481, and Lexis and Westlaw services do not list 28 U.S.C. § 1481 as part of the 
current United States Code.  These courts reason that section 121(a) of the 1984 Amendments 
was “intended again to postpone the effective date of § 1481 so as to take care of the hiatus 
143 See Pub. L. No. 98-249, 98 Stat. 116 (March 31, 1984) (postponing effective date until May 1, 1984); 
Pub. L. No. 98-271, 98 Stat. 163 (April 30, 1984) (postponing effective date until May 26, 1984); Pub. L. 
No. 98-299, 98 Stat. 214 (May 25, 1984) (postponing effective date until June 21, 1984); Pub. L. No. 98-
325, 98 Stat. 268 (June 20, 1984) (postponing effective date until June 28, 1984).
144 See Pub. L. No. 98-325, 98 Stat. 268 (June 20, 1984).
145 98 P.L. 353; 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
146
 98 P.L. 353; 98 Stat. 333, § 113 (1984).
147
 98 P.L. 353; 98 Stat. 333, § 121 (1984).
148 In re Haddad, 68 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. D. Mass., 1987).
149 See, e.g., Industrial Tool Distrib., Inc., 55 B.R. 746, 749 n.6 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985) (“it is highly 
likely that Congress meant to make §1481 prospectively ineffective, which is what § 113 of the 1984 Act 
does.  Further, since § 1481 was already in effect and there was no reason no give it an effective date of 
July 10, 1984, § 121(a) was obviously an oversight.”); SEC v. Danning (In re Carter), 759 F.2d 763, 766 
(9th Cir. 1985); see City Nat’l Bank of Miami v. Gen. Coffee Corp. (In re Gen. Coffee Corp.), 758 F.2d 
1406 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1037 n.2 (3d Cir. 1985); Thistlethwaite v. 
First Nat’l Bank of Lafayette (In re Exclusive Indus. Corp.), 751 F.2d 806, 807 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985); 
Omega Equip. Corp. v. John C. Louis Co., Inc., 51 Bankr. 569, 572 (D.D.C. 1985); Robinson v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 52 Bankr. 940, 941 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).  See also 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 
3.01[8a] (15th ed. 1985) (“Section 1481 was effectively repealed by the Bankruptcy Amendments and 
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.”); 1987 Advisory Committee Note to Bankruptcy Rule 9020, reprinted 
in10-9020 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th Ed. Rev. 2005) App. 9020, (referring to the “former section 
1481); id. n.1 (“With the enactment of Pub. L. No. 98-353 (1984), section 1481 was repealed.”).
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin
35
which then existed between June 28th and July 10th.”150  The provisions cannot be read as 
canceling each other out, as there is no other purpose for section 121(a) than to postpone the 
effective date until 28 U.S.C. § 1481 became ineffective by virtue of section 113.
On the other hand, there is no legislative history that specifically addressed the repeal of 
28 U.S.C. § 1481.  The meaning of the conflicting statutory provisions is ambiguous to say the 
least, and since divining Congressional intent in these circumstances is well nigh impossible, 
basic principles of statutory interpretation should govern.  The plain reading of sections 113 and 
121(a) causes the two sections to cancel each other out, leaving 28 U.S.C. § 1481 untouched and 
effective as of June 28, 1984.151  Indeed, as recently as 1996, a bankruptcy court referred to 28 
U.S.C. § 1481 in one of its decisions as if it were still in effect.152  One can only surmise that if 
Congress intended to repeal it, that it was because Congress believed that 28 U.S.C. § 1481’s 
jurisdictional grant was inconsistent with the holding in Northern Pipeline.  Yet, if this were the 
case, why did Congress continue postponing the implementation date of 28 U.S.C. § 1481, rather 
than repealing it?  
The issue of 28 U.S.C. § 1481’s repeal is far from clear, and its resolution is far from an 
academic problem.  If bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers derive from a textual authorization 
and that authorization no longer exists, do the powers continue to exist or are the courts acting 
ultra vires?  If the powers do exist even without any statutory authorization, that might affect the 
application of certain Supreme Court decision to bankruptcy courts.  Moreover, if the powers 
150 In re Haddad, 68 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. D.Mass., 1987).
151 See Better Homes of Va. v. Budget Serv. Co., 52 B.R. 426, 430 (E.D. Va. 1985) (“under the general 
rule of statutory construction as to mutually exclusive statutes passed on, and effective on, the same date, 
§ 1481 would remain unaffected by either provision”), aff’d on other grounds, Budget Serv. Co. v. Better 
Homes, 804 F.2d 289, 293 n.4 (4th Cir. 1986).
152 See Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus. (In re Elder-Beerman Stores Corp.), 
197 B.R. 629, 632 (Bankr. D.Ohio, 1996).  See also, In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc., 61 B.R. 758, 775 n.35 
(S.D. Tex. 1986).
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continue to exist because of an alternative source of authorization, is the scope of that 
authorization the same as 28 U.S.C. § 1481?  Would 28 U.S.C. § 1481 authorize greater powers 
for bankruptcy courts than an alternative source of equitable powers?  Or might 28 U.S.C. §1481 
place limits on bankruptcy courts equitable powers that would not otherwise exist, such as its 
limitation on the criminal contempt powers? 
If 28 U.S.C. § 1481 was never repealed, then it continues to provide statutory 
authorization for the equity powers of bankruptcy courts.  Accordingly, the emphasis that many 
courts have put on other sections of the Bankruptcy Code, especially section 105(a), is 
unnecessary and misplaced, and has misdirected the debate about the scope of bankruptcy equity 
based on inapplicable statutory language, as discussed at length below.  If 28 U.S.C. § 1481 is 
still valid, then the limits of bankruptcy courts’ equity powers are whatever 28 U.S.C. § 1481 
authorizes, limited only by Constitutional concerns. 
If, on the other hand, 28 U.S.C. § 1481 was repealed, as seems to be the case, it no longer 
provides a statutory authorization for the equity powers of bankruptcy courts.  No replacement 
section was ever enacted.  The awkward repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1481 raises several questions:  Is 
there currently any textual authorization for bankruptcy courts equitable powers?  If so, what 
limits does that textual authorization place on the exercise of equitable powers?  If there is no 
valid textual authorization of bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers, do these powers continue to 
exist?  And in either case, might there be other non-textual limits on these powers?  In other 
words, one way of determining the meaning of equitable powers is to probe their limitations, be 
they textual, Constitutional, prudential, or otherwise.
3.  Old Wine in New Vessels?  11 U.S.C. § 105(a)
The House Committee Report on the 1978 Code noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1481 was “in 
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addition to any power granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (The All Writs Statute) or under section 
105 of the Bankruptcy Code.”153  Similarly, the Supreme Court indicated in Continental Illinois 
National Bank & Trust v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.154 that section 2(a)(15) of 
the 1898 Act and the All Writs Act (then codified at 28 U.S.C. § 262)155 were separate heads of 
judicial power distinct from a bankruptcy court’s status as a court of equity as derived from 
section 2(a)(1) of the 1898 Act.156  In Continental Illinois National Bank, the Court upheld a 
bankruptcy court’s injunction against the enforcement of a lien on the sale of a debtor’s bonds 
held as collateral by creditors.  The Court held that “[t]he bankruptcy court, in granting the 
injunction, was well within its power, either as a virtual court of equity, or under the broad 
provisions of § 2[(a)](15) of the Bankruptcy Act or of § 262 of the Judicial Code.”157
Conceivably, there could be statutory authorization of the equity powers of the bankruptcy courts 
in these statutory sections.  Section 105 of the 1978 Code, 11 U.S.C. § 105, is a provision 
analogous to section 2(a)(15) of the 1898 Act.  It currently158 provides:
(a) The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.  No provision of this title 
providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed 
to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any 
determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders 
or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a court may not appoint a 
receiver in a case under this title.
(c) The ability of any district judge or other officer or employee of a district 
court to exercise any of the authority or responsibilities conferred upon the 
court under this title shall be determined by reference to the provisions 
153 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 448 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6404.
154 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
155
 28 U.S.C. § 262 (1934) (authorizing federal courts "to issue all writs not specifically provided for by 
statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions").
156 Id. at 675.
157 Id. at 676.
158
 The second sentence of section 105(a) was added as part of the 1986 Amendments to the Code.
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relating to such judge, officer, or employee set forth in title 28.  This 
subsection shall not be interpreted to exclude bankruptcy judges and other 
officers or employees appointed pursuant to chapter 6 of title 28 from its 
operation.159
Section 105(a), in particular, has become the provision usually cited as authorizing the equitable 
powers of the bankruptcy court.  As one bankruptcy judge has noted, “Parties in interest in 
bankruptcy often call upon section 105 of Title 11 as a means of enlisting the aid of judicial 
authority whenever the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly address a particular situation.”160
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the support for section 105(a) as authorizing 
bankruptcy equity powers is weak.  The word “equity” does not appear in section 105.  This is 
not an accidental omission.  Congress used the word “equity” (in the sense of justice and not 
ownership) and “equitable” in fourteen distinct Code provisions.161  A general grant of equity 
powers in section 105(a) would render the Code’s direction for the court to act in accordance 
with principles of equity in specific circumstances redundant.
By its terms, the first sentence of section 105(a) only authorizes the court to do whatever 
it finds “necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions” of the Code.  A plain language 
reading of section 105(a)162 would mean that section 105(a) grants only the power to implement 
specific statutory sections and does not confer any substantive powers itself.  
On the other hand, section 105(b) expressly prohibits a bankruptcy judge from appointing 
a receiver.163  Receivership is a traditional type of relief, so perhaps the exclusion of one type of 
159
 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000).  
160
 Manuel D. Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court:  Section 105, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 487, 489 
(1988).
161 See infra note 92.
162 In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 211 (3rd Cir. 2000) (section 105(a) does not “create substantive 
rights that would otherwise be unavailable under the Bankruptcy Code.”).  Cf. Norwest Bank Worthington 
v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (“whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must 
and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code”).
163
 11 U.S.C. § 105(b) (2000). 
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equitable relief implies an authorization of others.  Indeed, section 105 contains a much broader 
authorization than its predecessor section, section 2(a)(15) of the 1898 Act.  As one bankruptcy 
court has observed, 
Unlike the restriction under prior law that an order of a Bankruptcy Court must be 
“necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this act,” § 105 authorizes the 
Bankruptcy Court to also issue orders “appropriate to carry out the provisions of 
this title.”164
Thus, the phrase “provisions of this title” could be read to include the more general goals of 
specific provisions or even the general policy goals of bankruptcy.  More expansive readings of 
section 105(a) are problematic, though, because the Code never speaks directly about its own 
purpose; the policy goals of the Code are only addressed in the legislative history, not in “the 
provisions of this title.” 
The second sentence of section 105(a), added in 1986, may provide an interpretive key to 
the first sentence.  The second sentence was added as part of the 1986 amendments to the Code 
in order to provide clear authorization of sua sponte action by bankruptcy courts.165  If the 
second sentence of 105(a) is read as a gloss on, or clarification of, the first sentence, then the 
entire section looks like an authorization of judicial management and enforcement powers, not a 
grant of general equitable powers.  
Indeed, the language of section 105(a) would be a strange way for Congress to have 
authorized something as important as general equitable powers.  Reading section 105(a) as 
statutory authorization of any equitable powers of a bankruptcy court stretches the statutory 
language.  Many courts and commentators, however, have taken section 105(a) as an explicit 
grant of equity power,166 which has then lead to a misplaced debate on the breadth of this 
164 In re Howell, 4 B.R. 102, 105 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
165 See 132 Cong. Rec. S5092 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
166 E.g., In re Stone & Webster, Inc., 286 B.R. at 539; In re Wellman, 89 B.R. 880, 883 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
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statutory grant of equity.
The legislative history makes the ascription of equity authorization to section 105(a) even 
more questionable.  The House Committee Report insists that a bankruptcy court is a court of 
equity, but it does so in reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1481, not 11 U.S.C. § 105.167  The legislative 
history of 28 U.S.C. § 1481 itself refers to section 105.  The inference, however, is that 28 
U.S.C. 1481 is the authorization of equity powers, whereas that 11 U.S.C. § 105 is merely an 
enforcement provision like the All Writs Statute,168 much like sections 2(a)(1) and 2(a)(15) of 
the 1898 Act.  
The House Committee Report’s comments on section 105 indicate that subsection (a) was 
meant to clarify the extension of the All Writs Statute to bankruptcy courts.  The House 
Committee Report noted:
Section 105 is similar in effect to the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1651, under 
which the new bankruptcy courts are brought by an amendment to 28 U.S.C. 451, 
H.R. 8200 § 213[, 95th Cong. (1977)].  The section is repeated here for the sake 
of continuity from current law and ease of reference, and to cover any powers 
traditionally exercised by a bankruptcy court that are not encompassed by the All 
Writs Statute.169
1988); In re Wilnor Drilling, Inc., 29 B.R. 727, 729-30 (S.D. Ill. 1982); Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. 
Brown (In re James), 20 B.R. 145, 149 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); Deborah A. Crabbe, Are Non-debtor 
Releases/Permanent Injunctions Authorized Under the Bankruptcy Code? 2003 AM. BANKR. INSTIT. J. 
LEXIS 94 (May 2003); David B. Stratton, Equitable Remedies in Bankruptcy Court:  Grupo Mexicano, 
Substantive Consolidation and Beyond, 2003 AM. BANKR. INSTIT. J. LEXIS 39, at *3 (March 2003); Hon. 
Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of the Role of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1330, 1360-68 (1993); Brian Leepson, Note and Comment, A Case for the Use of a 
Broad Court Equity Power to Facilitate Chapter 11 Reorganization, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 775, 776, 793, 
798 (1996); Jason A. Rosenthal, Note, Courts of Inequity:  The Bankruptcy Laws’ Failure to Adequately 
Protect the Dalkon Shield Victims, 45 FLA. L. REV. 223, 230-238 (1993); Adam J. Wiensch, Note, The 
Supreme Court, Textualism, and the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 79 GEO. L. J. 1831, 1861 
(1991). 
167 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 359 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6315.
168
 28 U.S.C. 1651 (2000). (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue 
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law.”)  28 U.S.C. § 451 (1982) (possibly repealed in 1984), a definitional section for the All 
Writs Statute, clarified that bankruptcy courts were included in the application of the All Writs Statute.
169 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 316-317 (1977).  
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Thus, if section 105 is just a duplicative enactment of the All Writs Statute for bankruptcy courts, 
it is hardly an authorization of broad equity powers; at most it might authorize some equitable 
remedies such as injunctions for contempt and the issuance of the section 362 automatic stay.170
To read the All Writs Statute as authorizing the sort of equity powers that Justice Douglas 
wrote of in Pepper v. Litton taxes the statutory language.  In the context of a statutory scheme, 
the All Writs Statute is an enforcement provision, as the Supreme Court has noted,
Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that 
authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.  Although that Act 
empowers federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises, 
it does not authorize them to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with 
statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate.171
The All Writs Statute does not authorize courts to operate according to “the principles and rules 
of equity jurisprudence,” nor does it authorize courts to look to substance over form so that 
“technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done.”172
Moreover, if section 105(a) is merely a duplicative version of the All Writs Statute, it is 
hard to see what if anything makes bankruptcy a “court of equity” in a sense unique enough from 
other federal courts that it bears comment.  If 105(a) and the All Writs Statute are the source of 
equity powers, then all federal courts are “courts of equity.”  The repeated and insistent use of 
this phrase by courts in reference to bankruptcy courts indicates that there is something that 
makes bankruptcy courts different from other federal courts by virtue of being courts of equity.  
Article III courts are authorized to hear cases “in Law and Equity.”173  Indeed, other federal 
courts, such as the Tax Courts, regularly look to the substance of transactions instead of their 
170
 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
171 Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985). 
172
 308 U.S. at 304-305. 
173 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §. 2.
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form,174 as a matter of federal common law, even if the form complies with the technical 
requirements of the statutory scheme of the Internal Revenue Code.  Yet, no one would ever 
think to refer to the Tax Courts as “courts of equity.”  Thus, being a court of equity must mean 
something more than just looking to substance over form.  Arguably, as we shall see, it means 
something more akin to pursuing “substantial justice” or fairness, which may involve deviations 
from a well-defined statutory system. 
Neither the All Writs Statute nor the statutory language of section 105(a) authorize equity 
powers for bankruptcy courts.  The current statutory authorization of general bankruptcy equity 
powers is highly questionable.  Nonetheless, many courts cling to section 105(a) as an 
authorization of bankruptcy court’s general equity powers, which has led to questionable rulings 
both for and against various non-Code practices. 
C.  SQUARE PEGS IN ROUND HOLES:  THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY LOCATING BANKRUPTCY 
EQUITY POWERS IN SECTION 105(A)
Even though an examination of the history of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code indicates that 
section 105(a) was not intended to authorize or limit bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers, and 
does not even refer to them one way or the other, it has filled courts’ need for a statutory 
touchstone for the authorization of equitable powers in bankruptcy.  Courts like to have statutory 
authorization for their actions.  Clear statutory directives allow judges to avoid having to make 
hard decisions or value judgments and allow for easy appellate review.  Statutory directives 
allow courts to resolve the tension that exists in bankruptcy between the adjudicative methods of 
equity and statute.  
Unfortunately, the language of section 105(a), drafted as an enforcement provision, and 
174
 See Comm’r. v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).  Similarly, the economic analysis of law 
so en vogue with some judges over the last couple of decades is precisely an analysis of economic 
substance instead of legal form, yet no one would think to term this equitable analysis.
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possibly intended to ratify bankruptcy courts’ pre-Code powers, now bears the weight of 
significantly more expansive powers.  Section 105(a) has become the frame of judicial reference 
for, and, inevitably, a limitation on, equitable powers whose source was never in its statutory 
language.  Using an inappropriate statutory provision as a stand-in talisman for an actual 
provision dealing with bankruptcy equity has led to a variety of bad or questionable decisions 
and misplaced debates about the scope of bankruptcy courts’ equity powers, about the way those 
powers are to be applied, and about the propriety of a variety of non-Code practices.
The language of section 105(a) has led several courts to reject non-Code practices 
normally authorized under the equitable powers of a bankruptcy court.  These courts have held 
that section 105(a) only gives the power to implement other sections of the Bankruptcy Code, 
and is not authorization of substantive powers.  
1.  First Day Orders:  Capital Factors, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp.
In Capital Factors, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., the Northern District of Illinois reversed the 
bankruptcy court’s “first day order” that authorized pre-plan payments to “critical” vendors for 
pre-petition obligations, another non-Code practice.175  The district court rejected arguments that 
the payments were statutorily authorized under section 105(a) powers or were otherwise 
equitably permitted under the equitable doctrine of necessity.176
The District Court found that the doctrine of necessity could be applied only through 
175 Capital Factors, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 291 B.R. 818 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
176 Id.  The doctrine of necessity developed in equity receiverships for railroads.  See, e.g., In the Matter 
of B & W Enters., Inc., 713 F.2d 534, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1983).  It is actually an amalgam of two rules from 
equity receiverships for railroads, the Six Months Rule and the Necessity of Payments Rule.  See id.; see 
also In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R 487, 492 n.7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).  See B & W Enters., 713 F.2d at 
536-37.  Only the Six Months Rule has been incorporated in the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. 1171(b) 
(2000) and only for railroad reorganizations.  See id.; see also CoServ, 273 B.R at 492 n.7.  But see K-
Mart, 291 B.R. at 822 (“The doctrine [of necessity] is not codified anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code….”) 
(emphasis added).
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section 105(a),177 but “the grant of equitable power in § 105 is limited in that it ‘allows 
[bankruptcy] courts to use their equitable powers only as necessary to enforce the provisions of 
the Code, not to add on to the Code as they see fit.’”178  The district court also cited a Seventh 
Circuit case, In the Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific Railroad Corp.,179
decided under the 1898 Act, in which Judge Posner wrote:
the fact that a proceedings is equitable does not give the judge a free-floating 
discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views of justice 
and fairness, however enlightened those views may be.180
The K-Mart district court noted  that the effect of allowing pre-plan payments to certain 
creditors would be “to elevate the claims of the ‘critical’ vendors over those of other unsecured 
creditors and to subordinate the claims of non-‘critical’ unsecured creditors.”181  The problem, as 
the district court saw it, was that “[t]he bankruptcy court altered the priority scheme set forth in 
the Bankruptcy Code.”182
The difficulty with “critical vendor motions” and “first day orders” is that even if they 
deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, they can be necessary to preserve the value 
177 Id. at 822.
178 Id.
179 In the Matter of Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul, and P. R.R. Comp., 791 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1986).  See infra
text accompanying notes 215-221 for a discussion of this case.  Curiously the district court failed to cite 
another equally binding case decided under the 1898 Act, In re Kane, 127 F. 552 (7th Cir. 1904), in which 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court bankruptcy decision that had allowed a debtor to use his state 
law exemption but not according to the procedures required at state law.  The Kane court declared in no 
uncertain terms that “A court of bankruptcy is a court of equity, seeking to administer the law according 
to its spirit, and not merely by its letter.”  Id. at 553.
180
 291 B.R. at 823 (internal citation omitted.).
181 Id. at 822.  The concern over pre-plan payments is potentially two-fold.  First, it elevates the claims of 
“critical” vendors over those of other unsecured creditors, functionally subordinating the “non-critical” 
unsecureds to the “critical” unsecureds.  Second, paying off pre-petition claims pre-plan often incurs 
“more senior debt at the expense of unpaid unsecured creditors, since [the] secured, super-priority, post-
petition loan will increase concomitantly with the amounts paid [to the critical vendors]” subordinating 
“non-critical” unsecureds to the DIP lender for a greater amount.  See CoServ, 273 B.R. at 496.
182
 291 B.R. at 823.  The passage of a year between K-Mart’s bankruptcy filing and the district court’s 
decision cast also question on the “critical” nature of any vendor and hence the necessity of confirming 
the order.
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of the estate for the benefit of the creditors as a group. The Code’s priority scheme183 deals with 
the priority of distributions at the time of a plan.  Critical vendor motions, however, deal with 
pre-plan payments.  In some cases, a pre-plan payment to select creditors at time one allows 
other creditors to receive a larger recovery at time two, under a plan, than if there had been no 
pre-plan payment.  Of course, if creditors do not think that the plan will work, this logic does not 
apply, as creditors do not want good money chasing bad.  The irony is that creditor actions to 
prevent critical vendor motions because of a lack of confidence in a reorganization’s success 
often become self-fulfilling prophecies because the debtor is unable to continue operations while 
in bankruptcy and must liquidate.  
Insisting on the Code’s priority scheme in some circumstances fails to recognize the 
practical limitations of courts’ power under the automatic stay and can actually harm the net 
estate.  Consider a situation in which the debtor has significant property outside of the United 
States, say an $80 million oil rig in the North Sea.184  Among the debts that the debtor owes is a 
$2 million repair bill for work done by a British oil service company without any assets in the 
United States.  As a practical matter, the automatic stay of section 362185 cannot be enforced 
against the oil rig service company if it seizes the oil rig under English law.  
Thus, unless the oil rig service company is paid in full, up front, it will seize the rig.  In 
these circumstances, following a narrow interpretation of the Code will deprive the bankruptcy 
estate of an $80 million, revenue-producing asset on account of a $2 million debt.  Creditors 
value principles much less than principal.  Insisting on the letter of the Code defeats its purposes.  
A first day order permitting the pre-plan payment of a pre-petition debt to the oil service 
company will actually protect value for other creditors and assist in the rehabilitation of the 
183
 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2000). 
184
 Many thanks to Martin Bienenstock of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP for this scenario.  
185
 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
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debtor.  A deviation from the priority scheme of section 507186 at the beginning of the 
bankruptcy is necessary to effectuate section 362’s protection of estate property, and increase the 
asset pool available for distribution under a plan.  
The difficulty that bankruptcy courts face, however, is distinguishing between sensible 
first day order requests, like with the oil rig, and preferential treatment of favored creditors that 
does not benefit the estate.  Often, all the court has to go on in ruling on first day order motions 
is the uncorroborated testimony of the debtor’s attorney or an officer of the debtor.  This creates 
a great potential for abuse of critical vendor motions.  Cronies of a debtor’s CEO who are also 
creditors and vendors that are not “critical” can both get favored treatment and circumvent the 
Code’s priority system.  
For example, in Capital Factors, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., there were no less than 2,330 
“critical” vendors187 for whom K-Mart requested a “$300 million slush fund.”188  The number of 
critical vendors seems excessive, although the business model for “mart” stores like K-Mart is to 
carry a huge variety of products and offer one-stop shopping.  Even if only ten percent of the 
critical vendors actually withheld future shipments unless paid pre-plan for pre-petition 
obligations, the withholding would devastate a “mart” debtor’s operations.  The reputational hit 
of bankruptcy to a store like K-Mart is significant, but poorly stocked shelves during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy would hurt the prospects for a successful reorganization even more. 
K-Mart could probably do without most individual vendors, but this is beside the point.  For a 
“mart,” the issue is not which individual vendor is critical, but a critical mass of suppliers.
This raises the question, then, of how to separate out the “critical” vendors who will 
186
 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2000).
187 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2004).  
188 LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE:  HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE 
BANKRUPTCY COURTS 134 (Ann Arbor:  Univ. of Michigan Press, 2005).
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ultimately continue to supply the debtor without pre-plan payment of pre-petition obligations 
from those who will not.  Requiring testimony is simply impractical, as there is no time for a 
serious evidentiary hearing lasting weeks in the case of a large “mart” debtor.  Yet merely taking 
the debtor’s word seems insufficient.  A court could require the vendors to produce affidavits 
that unless paid pre-plan for pre-petition debts, they will cease further supply, but what does this 
really accomplish?  Such affidavits could only be procured in time for a bankruptcy filing by 
informing all the vendors of the impending filing, which can hurt the debtor, as the vendors will 
likely cease supply immediately.  Moreover, it would be too easy of a system to game and would 
result in pro forma affidavits from most vendors.  Once the gate of critical vendor motions is 
opened, it cannot be shut.  The bankruptcy court cannot practically serve as gatekeeper.  
Allowing the debtor to serve as gatekeeper, though, invites abuse of the bankruptcy process.  
a. Regulatory Capture and the Bankruptcy Courts? 
The critical vendors motion in K-Mart forced the Seventh Circuit t o deal with a 
regulatory agency capture problem.  “Capture” is the term used to describe the domination of a 
government regulatory agency by the interests of the industry that it oversees.  There are no 
agencies with rule-making power in bankruptcy.  In this sense, bankruptcy is unique among areas 
of federal law.  The Office of the United States Trustee does not have rule-making power for the 
bankruptcy system.  The Judicial Conference makes Bankruptcy Rules, but these operate quite 
differently than, say, regulations promulgated by the EPA; Bankruptcy Rules, like the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, are essentially procedural.  Bankruptcy courts, however, do fill some 
of the roles of an administrative agency, and the interests they regulate are primarily debtors.  
And, although, bankruptcy judges work as individuals, they can be seen as operating as 
collectives for certain purposes, at least within districts.  
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In a provocative book, Lynn M. LoPucki has argued that certain judicial districts, 
including the Northern District of Illinois, have consciously become debtor-friendly venues in 
order to attract a greater share of large corporate bankruptcy filings.189  A debtor can file for 
bankruptcy in any district in which the debtor or any of its affiliates is incorporated.  Debtor-
friendly actions that a court can take include approving large attorneys’ fees, allowing payment 
of attorneys’ fees on a monthly, rather than a quarterly, basis, approving director-and-officer 
liability releases, refusing to appoint trustees-in-bankruptcy, and granting first-day motions and 
critical vendor orders. 
Bankruptcy judges, according to LoPucki, have done this for prestige, power, and 
celebrity that come from managing large cases.190  They also do so to please the local bar in 
order to assure reappointment.191  Most importantly, though, they have done so because they are 
acutely conscious of the economic impact of filings on their district.  A large bankruptcy case, 
lasting two years or so, and involving dozens, if not hundreds of lawyers, paralegals, secretaries, 
etc., can bring employment and tremendous revenue to the local bankruptcy bar.192  It also 
provides a boon to the local economy through hotel, restaurant, and transportation fees.  For a 
small city like Wilmington, Delaware, for example, the courts play a major role in the local 
economy.  Moreover, districts with particularly heavy caseloads are more likely to receive 
additional judgeships from Congress.  
Districts marketing themselves as debtor-friendly venues raises questions of what sort of 
measure of discretion should be allowed and what sort of review should be undertaken of 
decisions.  Judicial review is complicated because, according to LoPucki, not only bankruptcy 
189 Id. at 133-35. 
190 Id. at 20.
191 Id. at 20-21.  
192 Id. at 21.
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judges, but also district judges are complicit in making debtor-friendly forums.  The typical 
response to agency capture is to raise transaction costs on the agency’s doing business.  
In the bankruptcy court context, raising transaction costs is not as simple as raising them 
on agencies.  For agencies, it often involves requiring more extensive documentation of 
reasoning behind decisions, greater delay in decision-making, greater notice to the public, and 
more opportunities for public feedback.  Raising transaction costs on bankruptcy courts is not 
possible or advisable.  The Bankruptcy Code already contains extensive notice and hearing 
provisions,193 and there is little that can be done to increase these requirements.  Procedures that 
impose delay on bankruptcy court decisions are contrary to the interests of both creditors and 
debtors, as the quick resolution of a bankruptcy is generally in the interest of the debtor and most 
creditors.  Time-value of money accrues during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding, but 
unsecured creditors may not include post-petition interest in their claims,194 at least when the 
debtor is insolvent, and secured creditors have a claim for post-petition interest only up to the 
value of their collateral.195
The only obvious way to raise transaction costs on bankruptcy courts is to require more 
extensive documentation of supporting facts.  Judge Easterbrook’s ruling in K-Mart can be seen 
as a public choice theory response to abuse of judicial discretion.  The Seventh Circuit still 
allows first day orders and critical vendor motions, but it requires better evidentiary 
documentation of the need for the orders.  In theory, increased documentation raises the cost of 
issuing such orders on the court (the regulator) and raises the cost of acquiring such orders on the 
193 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1) (sale of property other than in the ordinary course of business after 
notice and hearing), 363(c)(2) (use, sale, or lease of cash collateral requires notice and hearing), 503(b) 
(notice and hearing required for allowance of administrative expenses) (2000).
194
 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2); United Sav. Assoc. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd., 484 U.S. 
365, 372-73 (1988).  
195
 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2000).  
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debtor (the equivalent of the regulated entity).  
The problem with the public choice response in bankruptcy is that in bankruptcy practice, 
it is not the courts, but the moving party that typically drafts an order.  Thus, requiring better 
evidentiary documentation would simply transfer the costs of motions onto the moving parties, 
rather than requiring the court to document more facts.  To the extent that the regulated entity, 
the debtor, is the moving party, there is even less deterrence against court capture because the 
debtor is not playing with its own money.  Additional legal expenses involved in procuring first 
day orders are administrative expenses of the bankruptcy estate196 and are at the top of 
bankruptcy’s priority tree.197  In the typical bankruptcy in which all creditors do not recover 100 
cents on the dollar, any increased costs in critical vendor motions are borne by the unsecured 
creditors who do not have administrative expense claims.   Thus, the debtor’s ability to play with 
creditor money only amplifies the traditional criticism of public choice theory response to 
regulatory capture, namely, that increasing the costs on regulatory changes only exacerbates the 
relative resource disparities between regulated parties (which have an incentive to apply a large 
share of their resources to lobbying for favorable regulation) and the public at large, in this case 
the debtor and its unsecured creditors.  
Thus, increased evidentiary requirements like the Seventh Circuit’s in K-Mart are likely 
themselves do little to combat court capture.  The Seventh Circuit has, however, with a string of 
opinions, made itself an affirmatively unfriendly circuit for debtors; unfortunately, circuit splits 
on critical vendor motions only exacerbate the problem of court capture, by making debtor-
friendly circuits even more appealing.  In the years leading up to –K-Mart, the Northern District 
of Illinois had become a major contender for large Chapter 11 filings.  Notably, no “mega” 
196
 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4) (2000).
197
 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (2000).
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bankruptcy cases have been filed in the Seventh Circuit since the K-Mart critica l vendors 
decision.198
b.  K-Mart’s Statutory Approach to the Capture Problem
In K-Mart, the district court did not consider the policy problems of capture.  Nor did it 
consider the practical business and administrability concerns that complicate critical vendor 
motions, even though two of the four motions challenged in K-Mart dealt with foreign vendors, 
who present the strongest case for the necessity of authorizing pre-plan payments of pre-petition 
obligations to protect value for the estate.199  Instead, the district court in K-Mart turned the issue 
into a matter of statutory interpretation of section 105(a).  The district court viewed section 
105(a) as the locus of the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court.  Accordingly, the powers 
were limited by the language of section 105(a) as well as by the systemic jurisprudential 
concerns about judicial lawmaking in the face of Congress’ express priority scheme in the Code.  
For the district court in K-Mart, the Code did not just place specific limitations on general 
equitable powers, but defined the outer limit of those powers.  Exactly what room is left for 
equity is not spelled out; K-Mart raises the question of what it means for bankruptcy to be a 
proceeding in equity when there is no room for a court to exercise the discretion of equity 
beyond what is allowed in any other proceeding.  Does bankruptcy equity have any meaning? 
The Seventh Circuit did little to answer this question when it took up K-Mart on appeal.  
Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook declared that section 105(a) “does not create discretion 
to set aside the Code’s rules about priority and distribution; the power conferred by section 
198 See LOPUCKI, supra note 188, at 133-35.  Ironically, LoPucki notes that lawyers say that the Chicago 
bankruptcy courts lack “predictability” because of the Seventh Circuit’s failure to approve of non-Code 
practices unconditionally.  Id. at 134. 
199 See supra discussion accompanying notes 184-186.
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105(a) is one to implement rather than override.”200  Judge Easterbrook declaimed: 
A ‘doctrine of necessity’ is just a fancy name for a power to depart from the 
Code….Older doctrines may survive as glosses on ambiguous language enacted 
in 1978 or later, but not as freestanding entitlements to trump the text.201
As Judge Easterbrook would have it, the only possible role for equitable practices is to decide 
ambiguous statutory language.  This is hardly something unique to bankruptcy; courts regularly 
weigh equities in any situation involving ambiguous statutory language.  What, if anything, then 
does it mean for bankruptcy to be a “proceeding in equity”?  Is it merely a tip of the hat to 
bankruptcy’s historical origins?  Or might it have more substantial meaning, such as a mandate 
to do equity?  
2.  Pre-Plan Payments of Pre-Petition Debts:  Official Committee of Equity Security Holders v. 
Mabey
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Mabey202 vividly posed that very question.  Mabey was 
an appeal from a district court’s confirmation of a bankruptcy court order under section 105(a) 
directing the pre-plan establishment of an emergency fund for women injured by Dalkon Shield 
inter-uterine devices (IUDs).  The Fourth Circuit held the order violated the Code’s pro-rata 
distribution scheme by effecting a pre-confirmation distribution, even though the disbursement 
would be deducted from what the claimants would otherwise receive and would go directly to 
doctors for treatment to prevent irreparable damage to the women’s reproductive ability.203  The 
doctrine of necessity played no role in the Fourth Circuit’s decision.  There were no critical 
vendors and no potential tangible benefit to the estate from the payments.  The situation was 
critical for the tort victims, not for the debtor.  There was a risk that by paying the tort victims 
200 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F. 3d 866, 871 (2004).  
201 Id. 
202 Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 
962 (1988).
203 Id. at 300.
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earlier they might get a windfall if at the time of distribution under the plan there would not be 
enough assets in the estate to satisfy other creditors claims.  But there was also the possibility 
that the estate’s value at distribution would be greater than anticipated.  The Fourth Circuit did 
not consider any of this or weight the competing equities. Under the Bildisco balancing principle, 
though, the weight of the equities was clear-cut.
The Fourth Circuit took a facially more generous approach to equitable powers than the 
district court in K-Mart.  Rather tha n saying that the equitable powers of a bankruptcy court are 
solely to enforce the Code, the Fourth Circuit, anticipating Ahlers, held that equity power could 
be wielded, but only when it did not contradict the Code:
While the equitable powers emanating from § 105(a) are quite important in the 
general bankruptcy scheme, and while such powers may encourage courts to be 
innovative, and even original, these equitable powers are not a license for a court 
to disregard the clear language and meaning of the bankruptcy statutes and 
rules….204
As the Fourth Circuit applied its standard, 
the creation of the Emergency Treatment Fund at this stage of the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings violates the clear language and intent of the Bankruptcy 
Code, and such action may not be justified as an exercise of the court’s equitable 
powers under 105(a).205
The Fourth Circuit did not try particularly hard to avoid a conflict between the bankruptcy 
court’s exercise of its equitable powers and the Code.  The Mabey opinion did not point to the 
“clear language” of the Code that the bankruptcy court disregarded.  There is nothing in the Code 
that states that there may not be any payment before a plan; instead the Fourth Circuit inferred 
this from the provisions of sections 1121–29 providing for the filing and confirmation of a plan 
204 Id. at 302.  The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar position in American Hardwoods.  It noted that 
“[w]hile endowing the court with general equitable powers, section 105 does not authorize relief 
inconsistent with more specific law,” and then proceeded, as in Mabey, to find the equitable relief granted 
inconsistent with the Code. 885 F.2d at 625.
205 Mabey, 832 F.2d at 302.
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and from Bankruptcy Rule 3021, entitled “Distribution under Plan.”206  By its terms, however, 
Rule 3021 says nothing about pre-plan distribution and need not be read to exclude it.207  There 
is no reason that the Fourth Circuit had to infer a ban on pre-plan distributions from a 
Bankruptcy Rule that speaks of distributions under a plan.  The statutory scheme itself gave 
ample wiggle room, had the Fourth Circuit desired to take it.  Instead, the Fourth Circuit looked 
for specific statutory authorization, because it did not have confidence that its equity powers 
could themselves be the authorization.  What bears emphasis is that while Mabey would be the 
correct outcome in a strict statutory regime, bankruptcy is different because it is supposed to 
apply the statutory scheme with equitable considerations in mind.  
One might compare the result in Mabey with that in In re CoServ, L.L.C.,208 where 
Bankruptcy Judge Lynn of the Northern District of Texas used the notoriously ill-defined 
concept of fiduciary duties to rule that a critical vendor order was required by the Code.209
Judge Lynn held that “Claims May be Paid if Necessary to Performance of the Debtor in 
Possession’s Fiduciary Duty,” which includes the duty to “protect and preserve the estate, 
including an operating business’s going-concern value.”210  As Judge Lynn explained, 
There are occasions when this duty can only be fulfilled by the preplan 
satisfaction of a prepetition claim….In such instances it is only logical that the 
bankruptcy court be able to use Section 105(a) of the Code to authorize 
satisfaction of the prepetition claim in aid of the preservation or enhancement of 
the estate.211
206 Id.
207 FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 3021 (1987) (“After confirmation of a plan, distribution shall be made to 
creditors whose claims have been allowed, to holders of stock, bonds, debentures, notes, and other 
securities of record at the time of commencement of distribution whose claims or security interests have 
not been allowed and to indenture trustees who have filed claims pursuant to Rule 3003(C)(5) and which 
have been allowed.”).
208
 273 B.R 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
209 Id. at 496-97.
210 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106 (2000)).
211
 273 B.R. at 497.
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If there is a will, judicial creativity knows few limits.
Given the lack of an explicit conflict with a statutory prohibition, the bankruptcy court’s 
order Mabey hardly seems an abuse of its equitable powers under the Fourth Circuit’s standard.  
If the plight of women whose reproductive ability212 would be irreparably damaged without 
immediate medical care does not cry out for the use of equitable powers when there is not a 
necessary conflict with the Code, it is hard to imagine what would.  Certainly, the Fourth Circuit 
did not suggest any scenario.  Functionally, Mabey, like the K-Mart decisions, leaves virtually no 
room for equity in bankruptcy beyond a court’s normal powers to enforce and implement 
statutory provisions.  Mabey is entirely inconsistent with Justice Douglas’s explanation in 
Pepper v. Litton that, as a court of equity, a bankruptcy court was to ensure that “technical 
considerations” did not stand in the way of “substantial justice.”  By reading section 105(a) to be 
the authorization of bankruptcy court’s equitable powers, the Fourth Circuit in Mabey avoided 
doing equity on account of an arguably inapplicable statutory limitation.   
3.  Division of a Limited Pot:  In the Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific 
Railroad Corp.
K-Mart  and Mabey were both concerned about upsetting the Code’s priority scheme.  
But the Code’s priority scheme is affected not just by the timing of payments, but also by any 
change in the size of the pot available for distribution or the number of claims.  The priority 
scheme of section 507 is in many ways the heart of the Code, but if it is inviolate, it is hard to see 
what room is left for equity within the Code other than its fourteen specific directives.213  On the 
other hand, as Judge Posner observed in Chicago, Milwaukee, creating a fair and equitable 
212
 It is worthwhile noting that reproductive ability has special constitutional significance.  See Skinner v. 
Ok. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (heightened equal protection and due process scrutiny when reproductive ability 
is at stake).  
213 See supra note 92.
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distribution of a limited pot is exactly what bankruptcy courts are supposed to do:  
[t]he function of equitable considerations in a bankruptcy proceeding is to guide 
the division of a pie that is too small to allow each creditor to get the slice for 
which he originally contracted.214
Chicago, Milwaukee was decided in the aftermath of a successful reorganization of a 
solvent railroad under Section 77 the Bankruptcy Act of 1898; it did not involve a pre-plan 
payment to critical vendors or the doctrine of necessity.  The Seventh Circuit upheld the district 
court’s refusal to exercise its discretionary equitable powers under section 2(a)(15) of the Act to 
decelerate the principal on a defaulted 100-year debenture with an acceleration clause because in 
a solvent bankruptcy a creditor should get the full benefit of his bargain.  In this case, the 
debenture indenture’s acceleration clause was part of the bargain made in the shadow of 
bankruptcy, so there was no inequitable windfall to the debenture holders, as all other creditors 
received 100 cents on the dollar.215
214
 791 F.2d at 528.
215
 In Chicago, Milwaukee the railroad-debtor had issued 100-year debentures, which would pay 5% per 
annum, if there were available net income, with the principal to be repaid at the end of the term. Id. at 
525-26.  After the railroad filed for bankruptcy, the indenture trustee declared the debentures in default.  
Id. at 526.  (It is not clear from the opinion if the default was simply the filing for bankruptcy—an ipso 
facto clause, permitted under the Act, unlike under the Code—or if there was a monetary default.)  By the 
terms of the indenture, this accelerated the debentures to becoming immediately payable in full.  The 
acceleration raised issues of how to value the debenture holders’ claims, particularly in regard to what 
interest rate to use to calculate present value and what to do for years for which there was no way of 
predicting if there was available net income on which the 5% interest payment was contingent.  
The debtor had appealed, arguing that the district judge should have decelerated the debentures.  
While the debenture holders did not challenge the district judge’s power to decelerate, id., the Seventh 
Circuit upheld the district judge’s decision, because the debtor was solvent, not because deceleration 
would have been an abuse of equitable power.  Id. at 527.  Indeed, Judge Posner noted that “The only 
good reason for refusing to give a creditor in reorganization all that he bargained for when he extended 
credit is to help other creditors, the debtor’s assets being insufficient to pay all creditors in full.”  Id. 
Creditors, of course, bargain in light of bankruptcy, which includes both the Code’s priority 
scheme and the court’s section 105(a) powers, including the possibility of a deviation from the priority 
scheme.  In any case, unsecured creditors can hardly claim a reliance interest on their priority, as they 
usually have no way of knowing what sort of haircut to expect because they do not know the debtor’s 
assets and liabilities.  
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The Fourth Circuit in Mabey216 as well as the district court217 and the Seventh Circuit218
in K-Mart cited a the sentence from Chicago, Milwaukee as authority for their limitation of 
section 105(a) powers:  
The fact that a proceeding is equitable does not give the judge a free-floating 
discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views of justice 
and fairness, however enlightened those views may be.219
When this sentence is read in context, however, it is apparent that Judge Posner was saying 
something quite different.  
Rather than saying that equitable considerations cannot affect the distribution scheme, 
Judge Posner was saying that there is room for equitable discretion when the debtor is insolvent 
and creditors cannot be paid 100 cents on the dollar, the situation in most bankruptcies:
The fact that a proceeding is equitable does not give the judge a free-floating 
discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views of justice 
and fairness, however enlightened those views may be.  The function of equitable 
considerations in a bankruptcy proceeding is to guide the division of a pie that is 
too small to allow each creditor to get the slice for which he originally contracted.  
Hence if the bankrupt is solvent[,] the task for the bankruptcy court is simply to 
enforce creditors’ rights according to the tenor of the contracts that created those 
rights; and one of those rights in this case was the right to accelerate the 
repayment of principal.220
Just as the statutory authorization of bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers is questionable, so too 
is the case law authority upon which Mabey and K-Mart relied for limiting bankruptcy equity.221
216 Mabey, 832 F.2d at 302.  There is a certain irony to this miscitation, as in Mabey, the Fourth Circuit 
called the district court to task for citing an authority that did not speak to the issue.  Id.
217 K-Mart, 291 B.R. at 832.  
218 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 871.
219
 791 F.2d at 528.
220 Id.
221
 Judge Posner’s own authority for Chicago, Milwaukee is questionable—he cites a concurrence he 
authored, Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring) 
and an opinion that he authored, Shondel v. McDerMott, 775 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) and that 
cites the Piper Aircraft as authority.  In both the opinion and concurrence, Judge Posner held forth on the 
nature of equity and its scope in the merged courts of law and equity, but only regarding non-bankruptcy 
contexts. 
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Unfortunately, those decisions themselves are part of the body of case law now cited in support 
of limiting non-Code practices in bankruptcy.  
4.  Unraveling Authority:  The Questionable Case Law Basis for a Limited Reading of Section 
105(a) Powers
Curiously absent from the opinions of most courts that have declared that section 105(a) 
is only an enforcement power is an articulated textual or policy reason for such a reading.  
Instead, most decisions merely cite the sweeping declarations of earlier opinions, which 
themselves, cite declarations from still earlier opinions.  When one traces back these chains of 
authority, however, the thread unravels, as is the case with Chicago, Milwaukee line of citation.  
Frequently, the original opinions from which declarations about the scope of bankruptcy equity 
derive deal with very different contexts and issues and were written in the context of different 
statutory authorization. Even then, the opinions rarely discuss the textual, policy, and prudential 
concerns that favor limiting the scope of bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers through the 
language of section 105(a).  
Perhaps courts consider the issue so self-evident that discussion of textual or policy 
considerations in not merited, but given the frequency with which section 105(a) arises, this is 
surprising.  More likely, what lies behind courts’ unwillingness to grapple with what section 
105(a) and equity might actually mean is a sense of unease about judicial discretion, particularly 
in the context of Code-based systems.  Although judicial lawmaking is certainly commonplace, 
some judges, conscious of their position as unelected, politically unaccountable figures, are 
uncomfortable with judicial lawmaking.  Moreover, even judges who do not have such qualms 
might be uncomfortable with writing on a blank slate and would prefer to exercise discretion 
within guidelines.  Bankruptcy frequently presents an even greater challenge because exercises 
of discretion are particularly hard in cases that present purely monetary rather than moral issues.  
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A chain of Fifth Circuit decisions illustrates the process through which the slogans that 
now serve as authority for limiting the equity powers of bankruptcy courts under section 105(a) 
have become divorced from their unusual original (and arguably limiting) contexts.  When one 
examines the context of the origins of these slogans, their wide-applicability is questionable, 
especially as they often serve as a proxy for consideration of the statutory and policy limitations 
on bankruptcy equity.  
The most recent case in this chain of questionable Fifth Circuit cases is In re Mirant 
Corp.222  In Mirant, the bankruptcy court enjoined the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) from taking any action to force the debtor power company to comply with its 
unprofitable governmentally-regulated contracts. The district court overruled the injunctions223
and on appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the injunctions were impermissible because they were 
overbroad.224  Notably, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that a bankruptcy court’s section 105(a) powers 
permit it to enjoin a federal regulatory agency.225
 Before reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that:
A court's powers under § 105(a) are not unlimited as that section only “authorizes 
bankruptcy courts to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the 
substantive provisions of the Code,” and does not permit those courts to “act as 
roving commissions to do equity.”226
Yet, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that a more narrowly tailored injunction in furtherance of 
the Code’s section 365 provisions for rejection of an executory contract would have be 
222 In re Mirant Corp., 303 B.R. 319 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003).
223 In re Mirant Corp., 303 B.R. 304 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
224 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Mirant Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co. (In re Mirant 
Corp.), 378 F.3d 511, 524 (5th Cir. 2004).
225 Id. at 523.
226 Id. at 523 (citing In re Southmark Corp., 49 F.3d 1111, 1116 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing in turn In the 
Matter of Oxford Mgmt., Inc., 4 F. 3d 1329, 1334 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F. 
2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986)))).
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permissible under section 105(a).227  The problem was not with using section 105(a) authority 
per se, but rather with the scope of its exercise. 
The Bankruptcy Code assumes, as the Fifth Circuit noted that “a debtor is subject to 
ongoing agency regulation while in bankruptcy.”228  Moreover, under section 362(b)(4), the 
FERC is usually exempt from the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision.229  Even if an 
injunction of the FERC would further some other provision of the Code, it would seemingly 
contradict section 362(b)(4), and certainly be contrary to the general policies expressed in the 
Code.  Thus, there is a serious, if unmentioned, tension in the Fifth Circuit’s Mirant decision.  
Even if section 105(a) were to be used in furtherance of the rejection provisions of section 365, it 
is not clear why this would give the bankruptcy court license to ignore or contradict other 
explicit provisions of the Code, unless section 105(a) were something closer to “a roving 
commission[] to do equity.” 
There is a reasonable textual solution to this tension, namely that section 362(b)(4) only 
exempts government regulatory agencies from the automatic stay, but still leaves open the 
possibility of an injunction on motion after the filing of a bankruptcy petition.  In other words, 
the automatic stay does not prevent normal injunctions, even by a bankruptcy court.  The Fifth 
Circuit, however, did not consider that possibility in the Mirant opinion.  Instead, the Fifth 
Circuit adopted a common law-type solution.  The Fifth Circuit declared that it would allow the 
use of section 105(a) powers to enjoin actors exempt under section 362(b)(4) from the automatic 
stay, but only under “exceptional circumstances.”230  In other words, there is license to depart 
227 See Mirant, 378 F.3d.at 524.
228 Id. at 524.
229 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2000) (exempting from the automatic stay the “commencement or 
continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit…to enforce such governmental 
unit's…police and regulatory power”).
230 La. PSC v. Mabey (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc.), 185 F.3d 446, 457 n.18 (5th Cir. 1999)  
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from the Code and even contradict explicit provisions, but this authority will be tested under the 
judge-made standard of “exceptional circumstances.”  
The cases that the Fifth Circuit relied on for authority in Mirant were of an entirely 
different ilk.  The Fifth Circuit in Mirant cited In re Southmark Corp.231 for the proposition that 
section 105(a) does not constitute a “roving commission[] to do equity.”232 Southmark in turn 
cites Chiasson v. J. Louis Matherne & Assocs. (In re Oxford Management, Inc.)233 for this 
proposition, for which Oxford Management quotes United States v. Sutton234 as authority.  These 
cases have also been relied on by courts outside the Fifth Circuit,235 including the Seventh 
Circuit in K-Mart. 236
Oxford Management and Sutton were clear cut cases of equity as pity, not equity to 
further reorganization or mitigate a harm.  In Sutton, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
reversal of bankruptcy court’s section 105(a) authorization of monthly support payments from 
the estate to the wife and children of the formerly wealthy debtor in order to maintain them in a 
plantation-style house.237  At one point, these payments had been as high as $10,000 a month.  
The bankruptcy court entered the support order on the theory that “the debtor had a continuing 
duty to support his spouse and children.”238  In doing so, the bankruptcy court confused the duty 
of the debtor as an individual with that of bankruptcy estate.  Moreover, it went against the well-
(citing Corporacion de Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo v. Mora, 805 F.2d 440, 449 n.14 (1st 
Cir. 1986)).
231
 49 F.3d 1111, 1116 (5th Cir. 1995).
232 In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d at 523.
233
 4 F.3d 1329, 1334 (5th Cir. 1993). 
234
 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986).
235 See, e.g., In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1311 (1st Cir. 1993); In re Chi., Milwaukee, 891 F.2d  
at 162.
236 Capital Factors v. K-Mart Corp., 359 F.3d at 871.  
237
 786 F.2d 1305.  See also Leal, supra note 160, at 491 n.6 (plantation-style house).
238 Id. at 1306.
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establish practice under the 1898 Act of not permitting such payments.239  While the wife and 
children of the debtor might be somewhat sympathetic figures, especially as they did not appear 
to have a hand in the debtor’s undoing—criminal fraud in his oil business—they were not 
creditors (even though a ridiculous administrative expense claim was raised) and were arguably 
beyond the purview of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.    
Curiously, Sutton is one of the few cases that refer to the legislative history of section 
105(a).  While Sutton notes that the House Report describes section 105(a) as akin to the All 
Writs Statute,240 the opinion omits the following sentence in the House Report, which stated that 
section 105(a) existed also “to cover any powers traditionally exercised by a bankruptcy court 
that are not encompassed by the All Writs Statute.”241  If Sutton had considered this, it would 
have been in a quandary of determining what those “traditional powers” were, and as Sutton 
notes, under the 1898 Act the treatment of support claims from spouses and children changed 
over time.242
Most notable about Sutton, however, is that the appeal presented a clear case inequitable 
use of equitable powers to provide excessive and lavish support for non-debtors.  Although 
Sutton was not decided based on the level of support provided to the wife and children of the 
debtor, the excessive level of support undoubtedly swayed the court.  With a different set of facts 
that would rebalance the equities, such as support payments to cover the medical bills of a 
terminally ill child or spouse, one wonders whether the Fifth Circuit would have reached the 
same conclusion.  As such, Sutton is an exceptional case, and questionable authority for the 
general scope of bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers.   
239 Id. at 1306-07.
240 Id. at 1307.  
241 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 316-317 (1977).  
242
 786 F.2d at 1306-07.
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Oxford,243 a case frequently cited by the Fifth Circuit for the limitations on equity, also 
presents an exceptional scenario.  In Oxford, the bankruptcy court ordered, under its section 
105(a) powers, that the bankruptcy estate pay a pre-petition claim for a real estate commission  
outside of the plan.  There was no critical vendor motion or claim that the payment was 
necessary for a reorganization.  Rather, the bankruptcy judge (and the affirming district court 
judge) simply thought that the payment was necessary for unspecified equitable reasons.  
While there may be an unreported factual pattern behind Oxford that explains the actions 
of the bankruptcy court, this is the sort of application of equity that smacks of the Chancellor’s 
proverbial foot,244 a “what the judge ate for breakfast” jurisprudence.  If equity is ever to be 
applied, it should be for specific ends beyond feeling kindly towards a particular party.  The 
application of equity to facilitate a reorganization for the general aggregate benefit of the parties 
involved or to mitigate what could become an irreparable injury, as in Mabey, should be 
evaluated differently than “gee, I liked that creditor” cases.  To that end, a clearer articulation of 
federal common law tests than “exceptional circumstances” is crucial.  As courts feel their way 
through the problems of discretion, they often stumble into the creation of federal common law, 
but the results are clunky, in part because there is little awareness of the endeavor. 
The pattern in the Fifth Circuit is typical:  when dealing with easy cases of clear abuse of 
discretion, the circuit court waxed eloquent with overbroad dicta about the scope of bankruptcy 
equity, without pointing to any particular authority.  Then, when tougher cases later arose, in 
243 4 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1993).
244 See John Selden, TABLE TALK 43 (Pollock ed., 1927) (“Equity is A Roguish thing, for Law wee have a 
measure known what to trust too.  Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as 
that is larger or narrower, soe is equity.  Tis all one as if they should make the Standard for the measure 
wee call A foot, to be the Chancellors Foot; what an uncertain measure would this be; One Chancellor 
ha’s a long foot another A short foot a third an indifferent foot; this the same thing in the Chancellors 
Conscience.”).
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which non-Code practices were urged for a more meritorious use, the dicta from the earlier cases 
serves as a bar.  Too often, it is dicta and not actual holdings, limited by their facts, that are 
remembered.  Thus, it is likely that Judge Easterbrook’s unfortunate Jovian wit in K-Mart, that 
“A ‘doctrine of necessity’ is just a fancy name for a power to depart from the Code,” will be 
what lasts of the opinion, not his actual moderate holding that permits sufficiently reviewed and 
documented critical vendor orders.  
5.  The Dangers of the Teleological Approach to Bankruptcy:  Just For Feet
The previous sections illustrate the problems that arise when courts apply catch-phrases 
and slogans from earlier decisions outside of the original unusual factual contexts in order to 
limit the exercise of bankruptcy equity.  Different problems arise, however, when courts take a 
more generous view of bankruptcy equity. 
In Just For Feet, for example, the District Court for the District of Delaware authorized 
the pre-plan payment of foreign and domestic trade vendors under the necessity of payments 
doctrine and section 105(a) because “paying certain pre-petition claims may be necessary to 
realize the goal of chapter 11—a successful reorganization.”245  Declaring that it was within “its 
equitable powers to authorize payment to vendors when such payment is critical to the 
reorganization,” the district court interpreted section 105(a) to authorize actions taken to fulfill 
the policy goal, not just specific statutory provisions, of the Bankruptcy Code, even though the 
effect of its ruling was to deviate from the Code’s distribution scheme.246 Just For Feet would 
245
 242 B.R. 825-26 (D. Del. 1999) (emphasis added). 
246 Id.  Allowing pre-plan payments in full to certain critical vendors functionally subordinates other 
unsecured creditors.  See supra note 181.  Section 510(c) of the Code authorizes subordination of claims, 
11 U.S.C. 510(c) (2000), but instructs that this is to be done in accordance with principles of equity, and 
equitable subordination usually requires that the subordinated party have unclean hands.  See, e.g., B & W 
Enters., 713 F.2d at 537-38 (“the subordination of a creditor’s claim normally requires a showing that the 
creditor ‘has acted inequitably in the course of his relationship with the debtor and that those actions have 
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imply that unless there is a literal and unavoidable contradiction between the action taken under 
the equitable powers and a controlling precedent or statute, there is no limit on the equitable 
powers as long as they further reorganization.  This is the danger of the teleological approach to 
bankruptcy that places successful reorganization over everything else.  The rights of non-
consenting creditors get trampled for the sake of the reorganization.  
Courts’ desire to cabin off equitable discretion has led to a heavy emphasis on finding 
some sort of statutory authorization for non-Code practices in bankruptcy equity.  This, in turn, 
has led to an inappropriate reliance on section 105(a) as a framework for analyzing non-Code 
practices and produced numerous decisions that are decidedly at odds with the general tenor of 
equity in the sense of substantial justice, as expressed in Pepper v. Litton.  Even in cases where 
the equities were clear-cut, such as Mabey, the courts felt that without explicit statutory 
authorization, they were unable to rule with the equities.  On the other hand, as Just for Feet
shows, some sort of limiting principle on the application of bankruptcy equity is necessary. 
V.  HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS ON BANKRUPTCY EQUITY 
A.  HISTORICAL EQUITY POWERS:  GRUPO MEXICANO DE DESARROLLO, S.A. V. ALLIANCE BOND 
FUND, INC.
Historical practice is the other method courts have used to constrain equity.  The clearest 
example of this method of limitation is Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond 
Fund, Inc.247  Grupo Mexicano was not a bankruptcy case; it was an insolvency case dealing 
with the ability of federal courts to craft creative remedies using their equity powers.  Grupo
harmed the debtor or his other creditors in some way.’”).  
The Just For Feet court’s lack of hesitation in allowing pre-plan payments to critical vendors may 
have been because the debtor appeared to be balance-sheet solvent and merely suffering from liquidity 
problems, 242 B.R. at 823, a situation not unlike that in Chicago, Milwaukee.  If this were the case, then a 
pre-plan payment would not change the distribution scheme because all creditors could be paid in full, 
although they would have incurred a risk in the interim.  
247
 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
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Mexicano, however, amply illustrates both the prudential concerns underlying courts’ discomfort 
with equitable discretion and the problems of using historical practice as a limiting device.  
One of Grupo Mexicano’s creditors feared that Grupo Mexicano was insolvent and 
preferring its Mexican creditors in its asset allocation in order to frustrate its American creditors’ 
efforts to enforce any possible judgment for them.  The creditor requested a preliminary 
injunction restraining Grupo Mexicano from transferring its assets.  The district court granted the 
preliminary asset freeze injunction.  
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not have the authority to 
issue such an injunction. The Court noted that “[w]e do not question the proposition that equity 
is flexible; but in the federal system, at least, that flexibility is confined within the broad 
boundaries of traditional equitable relief.”248  Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that federal 
courts have the equity jurisdiction that was exercised by the English Court of Chancery at the 
time the Constitution was adopted and the Judiciary Act of 1789 was enacted.  “[T]he equitable 
powers conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not include the power to create remedies 
previously unknown to equity jurisprudence.”249  Without specific statutory authorization the 
judicial power is limited to its original meaning.  The injunction requested by the creditor was a 
so-called “Mareva” injunction, which was first deployed by the English Chancery in 1975,250
and was a “dramatic departure from prior practice.”251
Citing Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, the Court rejected 
the idea that equitable remedies could be any remedy that appealed to “the grand aims of equity,” 
or which was part of “a general power to grant relief wherever legal remedies are not ‘practical 
248
 527 U.S. at 322.   
249 Id. at 332. 
250 Id. at 328 n.9.  
251 Id. at 328.  
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and efficient,’ unless there is a statute to the contrary.”252  Such a power, according to Justice 
Scalia’s opinion, would be inconsistent with a “government of laws, not of men.”253  Unchecked 
judicial discretion would make equity vary with the length of the Chancellor’s proverbial foot.254
In the bankruptcy context, such arbitrary justice would lead to incongruous decisions that are 
particular incompatible with the uniformity sought by any Code-based regime.  It would also 
create tremendous uncertainty for creditors and debtors. 
Underlying the Court’s concern about unbridled equity powers is a concern about 
separation of powers.  If there were no limits on federal courts’ equity powers other than 
efficiency and practicality, it would be the courts, and not Congress, that would determine not 
only what remedies exist for the vindication of rights, but also, by extension, what rights exist, 
for “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy.”255  Thus, in Grupo Mexicano, the 
granting of a Mareva injunction would have acknowledged a right to such an injunction.  As the 
Supreme Court recognized, it cannot be the province of the court to create such rights; the 
Constitutional role of the courts is not to legislate.  Legislation by politically unaccountable 
actors such as unelected Article III judges with life tenure and salary protection or even of 
bankruptcy judges, appointed by the Circuit Courts for terms, runs contrary to the entire notion 
of separation of powers. 
Although the Supreme Court used the language of separation of powers, one can also 
sense a general judicial nervousness about “doing justice” instead of “doing law.”  The Court 
simply did not know what to do with “a roving commission to do equity,” particularly in a case 
252 Id. at 321.  We should be chary of taking Story’s treatise as a normative statement—treatises are as 
frequently normative as positive—but a full analysis of Story’s approach to equity jurisprudence is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
253 Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163).   
254 See supra note 244.
255 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163.
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involving a struggle between various sophisticated creditors, in which one’s moral compass 
provides little guidance.  This is apparent from the odd manner in which the Court tried to limit 
equitable discretion.  The Court’s originalist reading of Article III equity power evidences 
surprising judicial modesty for a Court that would surely not limit its power to hear only forms 
of actions available in 1789.  It also ignores the evolving nature of equity up to 1789, not to 
mention its evolution in British courts since 1789 (such as the development of the Mareva
injunction).  Grupo Mexicano is an arbitrary amputation of a living judicial tradition.  
However questionable the 1789 English Chancery standard is, it should not be surprising, 
for it is hard to think of another bright line rule for sorting exercises of equitable discretion that 
would not be at least as strange.  The originalist decision in Grupo Mexicano is strong evidence 
of courts’ general discomfort with discretion and their desire to channel and guide the exercise of 
such discretion.  Statutory (or Constitutional) language is the preferred means of limiting 
discretion, but when these tools are not available, discretion must still be curtailed, even if it 
involves creating judicial glosses on text or even federal common lawmaking, an act which 
invokes the very separation of powers problem that Grupo was concerned with—judicial 
lawmaking.  Judicial lawmaking, then, is chiefly a concern when it is an exercise of judicial 
discretion rather than effecting a channeling thereof.  
Grupo Mexicano raises several questions from the perspective of bankruptcy jurisdiction.  
First, does Grupo Mexicano apply to bankruptcy courts?  If so, how much of a limitation would 
this put on bankruptcy equity powers?  Does Grupo Mexicano conflict with the pre-Code 
practices doctrine? 
The Supreme Court’s 1935 holding in Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railway Co. counsels against an application of Grupo 
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Mexicano to bankruptcy.  In Continental Illinois, the Supreme Court noted that “the power of 
Congress under the bankruptcy clause is not to be limited by the English or Colonial law in force 
when the Constitution was adopted.”256  But does this mean that Grupo Mexicano only binds 
equity powers of federal courts when not in bankruptcy?  It would be an unusual situation if 
federal courts’ equity powers in general were far more constricted than their equity powers in 
bankruptcy; surely Congress did not conceive of such a differentiation when granting bankruptcy 
courts equity powers—it intended to grant the same equity powers as otherwise existed.  The 
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1481, for example, states that “a bankruptcy court shall have the powers 
of a court of equity, law, and admiralty, but may not enjoin another court or punish criminal 
contempt not committed in the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment of 
imprisonment.”257  Thus, the grant of equity powers to bankruptcy courts was of the general 
equity powers of federal courts. Congress could not grant more than exists; indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 
1481 grants more limited equity powers than federal courts generally have, as it excludes 
criminal contempt powers and the injunction of other courts’ actions.  
Assuming that Continental Illinois is not a bar to the application of Grupo Mexicano to 
bankruptcy, Grupo Mexicano appears, then, initially, to bind bankruptcy courts.  Grupo 
Mexicano refers to “federal courts,”258 not just district courts.  Are bankruptcy courts “federal 
courts” in the sense of the Grupo Mexicano opinion?  That is, does Grupo Mexicano apply only 
256 Cont’l Ill., 294 U.S. at 669-70 (internal citations omitted). 
257
 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982) (possibly repealed in 1984).  The House Report on the Bankruptcy Code 
noted that section 1481 “gives the bankruptcy court the powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty.  It 
is the concomitant of the bankruptcy courts increased jurisdiction, and is necessary to enable the 
bankruptcy court to exercise that jurisdiction and its powers under the bankruptcy code.  It is in addition 
to any power granted under 28 U.S.C. 1651 (the All Writs Statute) or under section 105 of the bankruptcy 
code.”  H.R. REP. NO. 595; 95th Cong., 1st Sess; HR 8200 (Sept. 8, 1977). 
258
 527 U.S. at 319 (“‘the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by 
the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment 
of the original Judiciary Act, 1789 (1 Stat. 73.)’”) (quoting A. Dobie, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 660 (1928)).
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to Article III courts, or to all federal courts?  
There is nothing in Grupo Mexicano that indicates a limitation to Article III courts, but 
this is not an issue directly addressed by the opinion.  By its very nature, however, the issue that 
arose in Grupo Mexicano could not have arisen in bankruptcy.  As the Court itself noted, 
The law of fraudulent conveyances and bankruptcy was developed to prevent 
such conduct [as Grupo Mexicano’s]; an equitable power to restrict a debtor’s use 
of his unencumbered property before judgment was not.259
Upon filing for bankruptcy, the assets of the debtor become part of a court-supervised estate; no 
assets can flow out of the estate without the court’s approval.  Moreover, the estate can recover 
assets transferred by the debtor before bankruptcy.260  The result, as Judith Resnik has noted, is 
that “in light of Grupo Mexicano, bankruptcy judges may have more power to freeze assets than 
do life-tenured judges,”261 since asset transfers in bankruptcy require court approval, whereas 
district judges cannot freeze assets pending monetary relief.262
The greater power of bankruptcy courts to freeze assets than an Article III court does not 
say that the equity powers of a bankruptcy court are greater than that of an Article III court.  The 
bankruptcy asset freeze is statutory,263 so it does not derive from bankruptcy courts’ equitable 
powers, even if it can only be enforced via injunction.  Indeed, because bankruptcy courts hear 
their cases on reference from the district court,264 a district court that did not refer a bankruptcy 
case would administer the same statutory asset freeze.  The equity powers (as opposed to 
statutory powers) of a bankruptcy court cannot be greater than those of the district court, as the 
259
 527 U.S. at 319.
260 See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000) (voidable preferences); § 548 (2000) (fraudulent transfers); Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, §§ 4-5. 
261
 Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 
IND. L.J. 223, 266 (2003).
262 See In re Dow Corning, 280 F.3d 648, 657-58 (6th Cir. 2002). 
263
 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000) (use of estate property); § 541 (2000) (property of the estate defined).
264
 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).  
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bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court.  Thus, Grupo Mexicano would define at least an 
outer boundary to the equity powers of bankruptcy courts.  
On the other hand, bankruptcy courts exist as units of the district courts by virtue of 
statute, not the Constitution.  Grupo Mexicano is a Constitutional holding addressing the powers 
inherent in Article III, clause 2.  Since the authority of bankruptcy courts derives Constitutionally 
from Congress’s Bankruptcy Power under Article I, Clause 8,265 Grupo Mexicano may not affect 
bankruptcy courts.  Indeed, the powers of bankruptcy courts might, in some areas, be greater
than that of Article III courts, as they are Constitutionally limited only by Bankruptcy Power and 
generally applicable provisions such as the requirement of Due Process.266
Conceivably, then, bankruptcy courts’ equity powers could exceed those of the district 
courts.  Yet, the Supreme Court has, in the context of the Appointments clause, noted that Article 
I courts exercise the “judicial power” referred to in Article III, clause 1.267  This presents a strong 
indication that Article III-based holdings will apply to non-Article III courts when they exercise 
the “judicial power”, of which equity powers are unquestionably a part.    
1.  Grupo Mexicano in Bankruptcy
Assuming Grupo Mexicano limits the equity powers of bankruptcy courts, how has this 
affected actual bankruptcy practices? Lower courts have generally managed to make Grupo 
Mexicano inapplicable in two ways.  Some lower courts have claimed a statutory, non-equitable 
authorization for the practice in question.  Others claim that Grupo Mexicano does not apply to 
bankruptcy proceedings.268  Still other lower courts have claimed that the non-Code practice has 
265 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
266 See John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction to Disputes Outside Article 
III:  A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of Bankruptcy, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1188, 1199 (1993).
267 Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 889 (1991). 
268 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 209 n.14.
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been ratified as a matter of federal common law before Grupo Mexicano was decided, that is, 
that the relief in question is “traditional equitable relief” even if its pedigree does not extend to 
the English Chancery in 1789. 
In In re Stone & Webster, the both methods were at work.  In Stone & Webster, a 
reorganization plan was presented that provided for the substantive consolidation of the debtor 
and some seventy-two debtor subsidiaries into one estate.269  This would obviously affect the 
payout that various creditors could receive.  Under the unconsolidated plan, the creditors of the 
parent debtor would receive a 100% recovery and its shareholders $3/share, while the creditors 
of a subsidiary would get only 7¢ on the dollar at most.270  “With substantive consolidation, 
creditors of all debtors [would] receive significant recovery from aggregated estates,” but the 
parent’s creditors would not get 100 cents on the dollar.271
The parent debtor’s equity holders’ committee argued against the substantive consolidation 
and claimed that it was beyond the scope of the court’s equity powers in light of Grupo 
Mexicano.272  The bankruptcy court reviewed the long history of substantive consolidation and 
noted with particular relish a 1941 case, Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp.,273 in which 
the Supreme Court itself upheld substantive consolidation.274  The bankruptcy court ultimately 
granted the substantive consolidation based on statutory authorization under section 1123 of the 
Code,275 instead of section 105(a) powers.  Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court strongly implied 
that it believed that substantive consolidation would survive Grupo Mexicano, absent section 
269 In re Stone & Webster, 286 B.R. 532 (Bankr. D. Del., 2002).




 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941).
274
 286 B.R at 538-39.
275
 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2000).  
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1123, based on its historic status.276  Likewise, in Owens-Corning, the Third Circuit determined 
that Grupo Mexicano was not a bar to substantive consolidation, even though it ultimately 
decided against a deemed substantive consolidation in regard only to some creditors.277
The argument that Grupo Mexicano does not apply to non-Code practices of sufficient 
historical pedigree was made explicit by the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 
Tennessee in granting a substantive consolidation motion in In re American Homepatient, Inc.
Although the American Homepatient court was aware of the Stone & Webster decision,278 which 
avoided ruling on the issue, the American Homepatient court ruled that Grupo Mexicano did not 
bar substantive consolidation under equity powers and granted the consolidation motion.279  The 
court noted the long pedigree of substantive consolidation and that the practice had been 
repeatedly ratified by the Supreme Court under the Act.280  In the eyes of the American 
Homepatient court, this made substantive consolidation acceptable under Grupo Mexicano, even 
though it never addressed whether such a remedy was possible in 1789 or if Grupo Mexicano
impliedly repudiated earlier Supreme Court decisions.281  It was good enough for the American 
Homepatient court that the practice had existed, with the Supreme Court’s blessing, under the 
1898 Act and had not been repudiated by the Code. 
Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.)282 presents 
the most amazing twist on Grupo Mexicano’s application in bankruptcy.  In Dow Corning, the 
276 286 B.R. at 537.  
277 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 209 n.14.
278 In re Am. Homepatient, Inc., 298 B.R. 152, 165 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2003).
279 Id. at 166.
280 Id. at 165.
281
 Similar reasoning, albeit less explicit appears in Official Comm. of Asbestos Claimants v. G-I 
Holdings, Inc. (In re G-I Holdings Inc.), 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2029, at *19-*20 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2001) 
(finding authority to consolidate debtors, but declining to do so).
282
 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002).
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bankruptcy court held that non-debtor releases were authorized by section 1123(b)(6),283 but 
refused to approve the releases because it believed that they were precluded by Grupo 
Mexicano.284  The district court reversed on the basis that the statutory authorization trumped the 
Constitutional limitation on equitable, but not statutory powers.285
The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court on similar reasoning, but cited section 105(a) as 
the grant of statutory power to carry out non-debtor releases through injunctions.286  The Sixth 
Circuit concluded that “due to this statutory grant of power [in section 105(a)], the bankruptcy 
court is not confined to traditional equity jurisprudence and therefore, the bankruptcy court's 
Grupo Mexicano analysis was misplaced.”287  The underlying assumption of the Sixth Circuit’s 
opinion was that Grupo Mexicano applies to the equity powers of the bankruptcy courts.288  The 
only reason that Grupo Mexicano did not bar the non-debtor releases is that they were not an 
exercise of equitable powers, but rather an exercise of section 105(a) powers, which the Sixth 
Circuit correctly read as a grant of statutory powers and not a statutory grant of equitable powers.
Grupo Mexicano may limit some non-Code practices.  To the extent that a court finds 
statutory authorization for those practices under section 105(a), however, it can claim that Grupo 
Mexicano is inapplicable because it governs only the exercise of equity powers that exist under 
Article III, not statutory grants of equity powers.  Even if Grupo Mexicano’s technical 
limitations can be avoided in the bankruptcy context, though, it does not follow that Grupo 
Mexicano’s underlying separation of powers concern is assuaged, a problem considered in 
greater detail below. 
283
 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6) (2000) (“Subject to subsection (a) of this section, a plan may…(6) include any 
other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.”).
284 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 744 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999).
285 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 480 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
286 See 280 F.3d at 657-658.
287 Id.
288 Cf. In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 209 n.14.
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B.  THE PRE-CODE PRACTICES DOCTRINE
1.  Section 105(a) as a Source for the Pre-Code Practices Doctrine? 
Even though Grupo Mexicano may not apply to bankruptcy courts, historical practice 
serves as a limitation on (or justification for) equitable powers in bankruptcy through the pre-
Code practices doctrine.  The pre-Code practices doctrine is the statutory interpretation principle, 
repeatedly enunciated by the Supreme Court,289 that pre-Code practices continue to be valid, 
unless Congress evinced clear intent to depart from them under the Code.  Although the pre-
Code practices doctrine has come to us in Supreme Court decisions, the earliest hint at such a 
doctrine is in the legislative history of section 105(a). 
Arguably, although the plain language of section 105(a) does not authorize equity 
powers, it is a device that incorporates bankruptcy courts’ historical equity powers into the Code.  
Such a reading is not apparent from the text of section 105(a), but the House Committee Report 
noted that section 105(a) was meant to “cover any powers traditionally exercised by a 
bankruptcy court that are not encompassed by the All Writs Statute.”290  Thus, according to the 
House Report, section 105(a) goes beyond the All Writs Statute and incorporates historical 
bankruptcy court powers into the Code.  
If the legislative history is given credence, section 105(a) merely confirms the pre-Code 
powers of a bankruptcy court.  These pre-Code powers cannot include general equity powers, 
however.  Equity powers were authorized as a matter of statute under the 1898 Act.  Whatever 
powers section 105(a) incorporates, it cannot include those that were statutorily authorized under 
the 1898 Act, or else section 105(a) would reincorporate the entire 1898 Act.  Given that the 
1978 Code replaced the 1898 Act, such a broad reading of the legislative history of section 
289 See discussion accompanying notes 293-335 infra.  
290 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 316-317 (1977). 
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105(a) is not tenable.  What, then, was the legislative history referring to?  Clearly to some 
unenumerated powers of bankruptcy courts.  
Unfortunately, only a handful of the published opinions that consider the scope of section 
105(a) reference the legislative history.  None have seriously considered what “powers 
traditionally exercised by a bankruptcy court” means.  Incorporation of historical practice is 
extremely problematic because bankruptcy practice has not been static in the United States for 
the last two centuries nor has it been uniform.  Variation between districts and referees were 
major complaints under the 1898 Act.291 At the very least, one would like to know to how 
widespread and well-established “traditional powers” must be, whether these powers can be 
expanded by analogy, whether they include powers from proceedings similar to bankruptcy, such 
as equity receiverships,292 and, most importantly, whether a bankruptcy court’s traditional 
powers included general equitable powers or only specific, limited equitable powers.
Although it is unclear precisely what powers section 105(a) was referring to, it seems to 
state that section 105(a) incorporates the pre-1978 federal common law of bankruptcy as 
developed under the 1898 Act.  Obviously, this is tempered by any provision in the 1978 Code 
explicitly disavowing such pre-1978 federal common law.  In other words, this is essentially a 
statement of the pre-Code practices doctrine.  
2.  Development of the Pre-Code Practices Doctrine
The Supreme Court first addressed the relation between equity and pre-Code practices in 
a series of cases from 1986 to 1998:  Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection,293 Kelly v. Robinson,294 United Savings Ass’n. of Texas v. Timbers of 
291
 Wiensch, supra note 166, at 1831. 
292 See supra note 212.
293
 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
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Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.,295 Ahlers,296 United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 297
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport,298 and Cohen v. de la Cruz.299  The 
majorities in these cases shifted, and the Court usually addressed the role of pre-Code practices 
in dicta, but, taken as a whole, these cases form a clear jurisprudence on the role of pre-Code 
practices in bankruptcy.  These cases also point to the existence of a federal common law of 
bankruptcy before the 1978 Code.
The Court first addressed the role of pre-Code practices in a pair of 1986 opinions, 
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Kelly v. 
Robinson.  In these decisions, the Court emphasized that the Code was written against the 
background of bankruptcy practice as developed under the 1898 Act, which must inform any 
reading of the Code.  In Midlantic, the Court refused to hold that the Bankruptcy Code abrogated 
exceptions created by the courts in construing the Bankruptcy Act.  In other words, while 
specific Code sections supplant pre-Code practices, there is no general presumption that pre-
Code practices have been displaced by the Code.  The Court also acknowledged the special place 
of pre-1978 federal common law in bankruptcy:  
The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation 
to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent 
specific.  The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the 
scope of bankruptcy codifications.300
Thus, the Code does not abrogate what we might characterize as the pre-1978 federal common 
law of bankruptcy as a whole.
294
 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
295
 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
296
 485 U.S. 197 (1988).  
297
 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
298
 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
299
 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
300
 474 U.S. at 501 (emphasis added).
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On these lines, the Court in Kelly v. Robinson301 specifically looked to the practice of 
courts under the Act, even though the practice was itself a departure from the text of the Act.  
The debtor in Kelly had been convicted of welfare fraud but given a suspended sentence 
conditioned on meeting the terms of her probation, which included making restitution 
payments.302 The debtor then filed for bankruptcy, listed her restitution obligations as a debt, and 
received a discharge.303  When the debtor ceased making her restitution payments, the state 
probation authority informed her than it considered the restitution obligation non-
dischargeable.304  The debtor then filed for a declaratory judgment from the bankruptcy court, 
which held the debt to be dischargeable under section 523(a)(7) of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(7), which prohibits the discharge of any debt “to the extent such debt is for a fine, 
penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not 
compensation for actual pecuniary loss.”305  The debtor argued that the restitution payments were 
for actual pecuniary loss and thus dischargeable and appealed.  
The Supreme Court held that the restitution obligation was non-dischargeable because the 
statute under which the restitution order was made did not require restitution to correlate with the 
actual loss suffered.306  The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code also swayed the Court in 
its interpretation that section 523(a)(7) was not meant to allow the discharge of criminal 
restitution orders.  The language of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 had allowed for (but did not 
require) the discharge of criminal penalties.307  Most courts, however, had refused to discharge 
301
 479 U.S. 36 (1986). 
302 Id. at 38-39.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 39-40.
305 Id. at 40-41.
306 Id. at 52-53.
307 See The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, §§ 17, 57, 63, 30 Stat. 544.
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criminal penalties.308  Thus:
Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against the background of an established 
judicial exception to discharge for criminal sentences, including restitution orders, 
an exception created in the face of a statute drafted with considerable care and 
specificity.309
Kelly, like Midlantic, teaches that a reading of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code must be 
informed by the pre-1978 federal common law of bankruptcy—non-statutory pre-Code practices.
In United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,310 the Court took a very narrow reading of 
its decisions three years earlier in Midlantic and Kelly.  The government had secured a tax lien 
on debtor and objected to a reorganization plan that did not grant it post-petition interest on its 
lien, up to the value of the collateral.311  The debtor urged that judgment and statutory liens be 
treated differently than consensual security interests.312  The debtor claimed that pre-Code 
practice distinguished between consensual and non-consensual liens and, citing Midlantic and 
Kelly, argued that absent explicit repudiation in the Bankruptcy Code, such practices should be 
assumed to continue.313
The Court rejected the debtor’s argument and distinguished Midlantic and Kelly in ruling 
for the Government.  The Court noted that its Midlantic decision was not dependent upon pre-
Code practice, which merely provided “interpretive assistance.”314  Similarly, pre-Code practice 
was but an interpretive aid in Kelly, as it “reflected policy considerations of great longevity and 
importance.”315  The Court emphasized that “in determining that Congress had not intended to 
308 479 U.S. at 44-46.
309 Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
310
 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
311 Id. at 237.
312 Id. at 243.
313 Id.
314 Id. at 243-244.
315 Id. at 245.
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depart from pre-Code practice…we did not rely on a pale presumption to that effect.”316  Thus, 
“in an appropriate case, a court must determine whether Congress has expressed an intent to 
change the interpretation of a judicially created concept in enacting the Code.”317
Such appropriate cases, however, do not include those where the statutory language of 
the Bankruptcy Code is clear, and its natural interpretation does not conflict with any significant 
state or federal interest, such as criminal justice or environmental protection, or with other parts 
of the Code.318  In short, when interpreting unambiguous statutory language that does not conflict 
with other law, there is no reason to turn to pre-Code practices.  Moreover, the Court noted, pre-
Code practice must be widespread and consistent to be considered.319  If a practice only existed 
in a few cases, Congress cannot be assumed to be cognizant of it.320
 Four Justices dissented and argued that the statutory language in question was far from 
unambiguous321 and that the Court took too narrow a view of Midlantic and Kelly.322 Instead, the 
dissent claimed that, “The rule of Midlantic is that bankruptcy statutes will not be deemed to 
have changed pre-Code law unless there is some indication that Congress thought it was 
effecting such a change.”323  The dissent also noted that in the previous term, the Court had 
declared, “[I]t is most improbable that [a change in the existing bankruptcy rules] would have 
been made without even any mention in the legislative history.”324  In Ron Pair the Court backed 
316 Id. at 244-245.
317 Id. at 245.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 246.
320 Id.  Cf. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 525 (noting that there cannot be a presumption that Congress adopted any 
particular pre-Code practice if that practice was not consistent and widespread). 
321
 Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 249.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 252.
324 Id. at 254 (quoting Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. at 380 (unanimously affirming that “adequate 
protection” under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1982) does not entitle an undersecured creditor to interest on its 
collateral during the automatic stay)).
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away from the broad statement about the role of pre-Code practices in interpreting the Code that 
it had articulated in Midlantic and Kelly.   
Two years later, however, in Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport,325 the 
Court appeared to reaffirm the broad reading of Midlantic and Kelly. Davenport presented the 
same issue as Kelly, the dischargability of criminal restitution orders, but in a Chapter 13 context.  
In Kelly, a Chapter 7 case, the Court held the restitution order to be non-dischargeable.326  In 
Davenport, however, the Court ruled, based on different statutory language, that restitution 
orders are dischargeable in Chapter 13.  The 7-2 majority emphasized, though, in a point that the 
dissent echoed for its own argument:327
Our refusal to carve out a broad judicial exception to discharge for restitution 
orders does not signal a retreat from the principles applied in Kelly.  We will not 
read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear 
indication that Congress intended such a departure.328
The crucial factor for the Court was the unambiguous statutory language:  “Where, as here, 
congressional intent is clear, our sole function is to enforce the statute according to its terms.”329
3.  The Current State of the Pre-Code Practices Doctrine
The most recent Supreme Court statement on the pre-Code practices comes from Cohen 
v. de la Cruz,330 a civil parallel to Kelly.  In Cohen, the Court held that section 523(a)(2)(A) 
barred the discharge of liability arising from the debtor’s fraud, including punitive damages.  The 
statutory language in question excepted from discharge “any debt…for money, property, 
services, or…credit, to the extent obtained by…false pretenses, false representation, or actual 
325
 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
326 See supra note 306.
327
 495 U.S. at 565.
328 Id. at 563.
329 Id. at 564.
330
 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
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fraud”,331 and thus could be read not to cover punitive damages, depending on whether the 
emphasis was on “any debt” or “debt…for.”  The unanimous Court noted that under the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, all liabilities arising from fraud were non-dischargeable, not just the 
portion of liability that was restitutive.332  The Court quoted Davenport333 to the extent that the 
Bankruptcy Code cannot be read, “to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication 
that Congress intended such a departure.”334  This factor, along with the statutory language, the 
meaning of parallel statutory provisions, and the general policy against allowing bankruptcy to 
be used to shed liability for fraudulent behavior all supported the decision.335  While the decision 
in Cohen v. de la Cruz did not rest solely on resort to pre-Code practices, it shows the continuing 
importance of pre-Code practice in elucidating the statutory language of the Code.  
The Court’s well-established methodology for bankruptcy cases is this:  first consider the 
applicable statutory language.  If it is clear, then apply that language.  If the language is 
ambiguous, however, then there can be recourse to pre-Code practices as an interpretive aid 
similar to legislative history.  This methodology puts tremendous pressure on the Court’s 
determination of the clarity of the statutory language, much as the Court’s parallel Chevron
methodology336 in Administrative Procedure Act cases does.337  There is an unfortunate 
circularity to this methodology; the clarity of statutory language is sometimes only apparent in 
light of an examination of non-textual sources, such as pre-Code practices and legislative history.
4.  Problems with the Pre-Code Practices Doctrine
331
 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A) (2000).
332 See 523 U.S. at 221.
333
 495 U.S. at 563.
334
 523 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
335 Id. at 222.  
336 Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
337
 Alan Schwartz, Constitutional Law and the Supreme Court:  the New Textualism and the Rule of Law 
Subtext in the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 149, 187 (2001). 
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The pre-Code practices doctrine is problematic.  First, it places an arbitrary limit on the 
development of the federal common law of bankruptcy.  By authorizing pre-Code non-Code 
practices, there is an implicit exclusion of post-Code non-Code practices.  This distinction makes 
little sense.  Bankruptcy law existed as a matter of statute both before and after 1978.  The Court 
has recognized the existence of federal common law of bankruptcy from before 1978.  Why 
should there not be post-1978 federal common law?  While the 1978 Code might affect pre-Code 
federal common law, there is no reason to think that it precludes a continuing development of 
federal common law of bankruptcy
Indeed, federal common law is arguably more important than ever for the successful 
operation of the bankruptcy system.  Reorganization techniques have only become more 
complex under the Code.  Shouldn’t bankruptcy courts have the flexibility to adapt to these 
techniques?  Most other areas of federal law have agencies with rule-making authority that give 
those areas of law the flexibility to adapt to new developments via interstitial lawmaking.  
Bankruptcy is alone among major areas of federal law in lacking an administrative agency with 
rule-making power.  Why shouldn’t bankruptcy judges, who, like agencies, are Article I entities 
with particular technical expertise, have similar interstitial lawmaking powers?  
The second problem with the pre-Code practices doctrine is defining pre-Code practices.  
Simply put, the historical literature on pre-1978 bankruptcy practice is inadequate for this task.
Even if it were adequate, there is still the question of how a pre-Code practice is defined.  Are 
these practices to be interpreted narrowly or can they be broadened to analogous situations?  For 
example, the Code contains no mention of substantive consolidation.338  Instead, it is “a caselaw 
338 See In re Raejean Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 765 (9th Cir. 2000) (“even though substantive consolidation 
was not codified in the statutory overhaul of bankruptcy law in 1978, the equitable power undoubtedly 
survived enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.”). But see 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (2000) 
(“Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a plan shall—…provide adequate means 
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doctrine[,] which has been developed over the years.”339  Substantive consolidation started as a 
practice almost identical to veil piercing: 
In the early years, when the doctrine of substantive consolidation was first 
evolving, the courts applied a test almost identical to the test for alter ego and/or 
piercing the corporate veil….In the older [pre-Code] cases, the application of 
substantive consolidation was limited to extreme cases involving fraud or neglect 
of corporate formalities and accounting procedures.340
The limited pre-Code application of substantive consolidation has been expanded under 
section 105(a) equitable powers to include consolidation of corporations that have observed the 
necessary corporate formalities and not engaged in fraud, when the creditors relied on corporate 
interconnectedness.  In order to give tort victims greater compensation, the District of Delaware 
even extended substantive consolidation in In re Owens Corning to a situation in which there 
was reliance on formal separateness and neither fraud nor abuse of corporate formalities.341
for the plan’s implementation, such as—…merger or consolidation of the debtor with one or more 
persons”) (emphasis added). 
339 In re Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 B.R. at 567 (Bankr. C.D.Cal. 1993).
340 Id., at 568.  Veil-piercing type substantive consolidation cases still occur.  E.g., Raejean Bonham, 229 
F.3d at 750.  See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 205-09, for the history of substantive consolidation.  
341 See In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (granting substantive consolidation), 
rev’d, In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195. 
Even non-bankruptcy practices, such as the “doctrine of necessity,” have been transformed into 
“pre-Code” practices and then expanded by analogy to areas that they did not historically cover.  The 
doctrine of necessity was adopted from the related field of equity receiverships for railroads.  See supra
note 176.  Two of the factors arguing for the importance of keeping a bankrupt railroad in operation, 
especially in the earlier half of the twentieth century, were the importance of the rails to the national 
economy and the difficulty for consumers in finding an immediate replacement.  See, e.g., In re Boston & 
Me. Corp., 634 F.2d 1359, 1374-78 (citing Gregg v. Metro. Trust Co., 197 U.S. 183, 196 (1905) 
(McKenna, J., dissenting) for the position that it declined to adopt, “[The] principle has its foundation in 
the public interests.  A railroad, from its nature and public responsibilities, must be kept a going concern.  
This is the supreme necessity, and affords the test of the equity invoked for the claims for supplies.”).  
These factors underlay Judge Lynn’s decision authorizing pre-plan payments to critical vendors 
in the bankruptcy of Mirant Corporation:  “Debtors are among the most important providers of [electric] 
power in the United States and a disruption of the services provided by them could have a meaningful, 
adverse effect on segments of the national economy.”  In re Mirant Corp., 296 B.R. 427, 428 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 2003).  The concern about the national economy hearkens back to the railroad origins of the 
doctrine of necessity; electric power is even more vital to the national economy today than railroads were 
a century ago.  While Judge Lynn cited as authority his own CoServ critical vendors decision, which held 
that the doctrine of necessity was only applicable for railroad reorganizations, 273 B.R. at 492, n7, he 
seems to have quietly reversed himself on this point in Mirant.  In the wake of Mirant, is the doctrine of 
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While bankruptcy courts’ statutory equity powers cannot be grandfathered in under the 
pre-Code practices doctrine, the practices formerly authorized under the equity powers of the 
bankruptcy courts might present a different situation if they were widespread and are not 
repudiated by an affirmative provision in the Code.  For example, the Ninth Circuit has noted 
that “[e]ven though [the practice of] substantive consolidation was not codified in the statutory 
overhaul of bankruptcy law in 1978, the equitable power [of substantive consolidation] 
undoubtedly survived enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.  No case has held to the contrary.”342
Such is the case with virtually all pre-Code bankruptcy practices authorized under the color of 
equity.  Difficulties have only arisen with attempts to apply the pre-Code practices doctrine to 
pre-Code equity receivership, i.e., non-bankruptcy practices.343
5.  Does the Pre-Code Practices Doctrine Imply a Living Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy? 
In the middle of the Court’s string of decisions discussing the pre-Code practices doctrine 
was Ahlers.  Ahlers touched on pre-Code practices only briefly, but its language is significant:
We think that the statutory language and the legislative history of § 1129(b) 
clearly bar any expansion of any exception to the absolute priority rule beyond 
that recognized in our cases at the time Congress enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Code.344
Not only does Ahlers comport with the general thrust of the Court’s jurisprudence, that the pre-
1978 federal common law of bankruptcy continues to be valid, but there is also an important 
negative implication to Ahlers.  Ahlers refused to allow a judicial expansion of the pre-1978 
necessity is limited just to railroads, or may it and other pre-Code practices not explicitly rejected by the 
Code be expanded by analogy to new areas?  If one can expand the doctrine of necessity to electric 
power, it seems reasonable to expand it to other instrumentalities of national commerce, such as air 
traffic, shipping, or trucking.  But see B & W Enters., 713 F.2d 534 (allowing for rescission of pre-plan 
critical vendor payments in a trucking case without ruling on authority to allow such payments). 
342 In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 2000).  
343 See supra, note 176.
344
 485 U.S. at 206.  
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exceptions to the absolute priority rule, but this was based on the existence of a codification of 
the absolute priority rule in the 1978 Code and a legislative history that supported the exclusive 
nature of the codification.  This implies that pre-Code practices that are not codified can be 
expanded—that is, there is a living federal common law of bankruptcy in addition to the pre-
Code practices doctrine. 
VI.  THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF BANKRUPTCY
A.  CAN THERE BE A FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF BANKRUPTCY?
1.  Defining Federal Common Law
Definitions of federal common law vary,345 but as the Supreme Court uses the term, “in 
the strictest sense, [it is] a rule of decision that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a 
federal statute, but rather to the judicial ‘creation” of a special federal rule of decision.”346  The 
Supreme Court’s definition focuses on one end of the spectrum between judicial interpretation 
and judicial lawmaking,347 as opposed to the broader definition suggested by Martha Field:  “any 
rule of federal law created by a court…when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by 
federal enactments— constitutional or congressional.”348  Field’s definition “includes much we 
think of as interpretation; it leaves no clear-cut line between federal common law and federal 
interpretational law.”349
The Supreme Court’s definition encompasses both interstitial lawmaking and more 
traditional common lawmaking, such as creation of new rights of action or rules of decision.  
Non-Code practices tend to fall within the narrower ambit of the Court’s definition.  They range 
345
 Field, supra note 73, at 889.
346 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).  
347 See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
348
 Field, supra note 73, at 890.  Cf. Redish, supra note 73. 
349
 Field, supra note 73, 893-94.  
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from interstitial lawmaking, that is filling in the gaps where Congress has not spoken but 
working with the statutory structure—e.g., pre-plan payments for pre-petition debts or cross-
collateralization—to creating rules of decision and rights of action—substantive consolidation, 
non-debtor releases, and channeling injunctions other than those issued under 11 U.S.C. § 
524(g).  
2.  The Status of Federal Common Law Post-Erie
It is hornbook law going back to Justice Brandeis’ proclamation in Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins that there is “no federal general common law.”350  But it is also well established that 
there is federal common law in a  “few and restricted”351 specific areas.352  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., these areas: 
fall into essentially two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is 
“necessary to protect uniquely federal interests” and those in which Congress has 
given the courts the power to develop substantive law.
The vesting of jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise 
to authority to formulate federal common law, nor does the existence of 
congressional authority under Art. I mean that federal courts are free to develop a 
common law to govern those areas until Congress acts.  Rather, absent some 
congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal 
common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights 
and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes 
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations 
and admiralty cases.353
Thus, there are two areas by which federal common lawmaking power can exist:  when 
350
 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  While Erie revolved around the federalism concerns of federal general 
common law applying to diversity jurisdiction cases, it also has separation of powers implications.    This 
article focuses solely on the separation of powers implications and does not address the relationship of 
federal and state law.  See supra note 11.  
351 Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).  
352 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 US 301, 308 (1947). 
353 Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641. 
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necessary to protect a uniquely federal interest and when Congress has authorized it.354
3.  Where Does Bankruptcy Fall in the Texas Industries Analysis?
Can there be a federal common law of bankruptcy under Texas Industries?355 This article 
argues yes on the basis of the language of the Bankruptcy Clause, the legislative history of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the pre-Code practices doctrine, and the nature of bankruptcy practice.  
Generally, federal common law is considered in the context of whether courts should 
apply federal common law instead of state law as the rule of decision.  This question in the 
bankruptcy context is beyond the scope of this article.356  Rather, the question this article aims to 
address is when there is no state law to provide a rule of decision, can federal courts in 
354 In spite of the Supreme Court’s acceptance of federal common lawmaking in limited enclaves, the very 
possibility of federal common law is still questioned.  Martin Redish, supra note 73, at 766-67, has 
argued that any federal common lawmaking is a violation of the Rules of Decision Act (RDA), which 
provides that “[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United 
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil 
actions in the courts of the United States where they apply.” 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
Although far beyond the scope of this article, I would posit that the RDA is unconstitutional to 
the extent that it is a per se bar on federal common lawmaking, as common lawmaking is a core part of 
the Article III “judicial power” and cannot be removed by act of Congress.  In any event, federal common 
lawmaking in bankruptcy would not be barred even by Redish’s proposed stricture.  First, the Rules of 
Decision Act originally referred to “trials at common law” not “civil actions.”  The change was only made 
in 1948, 62 Stat. 944 (June 25, 1948).  Thus, the RDA did not originally apply to bankruptcy, which was 
not a “trial at common law.”  In re De Gottardi, 114 F.328 (D.Cal. 1902). But cf. Peachtree Lane Assocs. 
v. Granader (In re Peachtree Lane Assocs.) 186 B.R. 663 (Bankr. N.D.Ill.) (rejecting contention that
current RDA does not apply in bankruptcy because it only governs Article III courts).Assuming that 
bankruptcy is a “civil action” in the meaning of the statute, which itself could be debated, it is doubtful 
that Congress intended the RDA to extend to bankruptcy even if it wanted to expand the scope of the 
RDA’s application.  Second, bankruptcy is a case where Congress has provided for federal common 
lawmaking, and third, this is a case where an act of Congress requires federal common law, both as a 
matter of statutory structure vis-à-vis state law and as a matter of practical necessity, points that are taken 
up in the text below.
355 Erie itself arguably does not apply to bankruptcy, as bankruptcy jurisdiction is federal question, not 
diversity.  See In re Zaepfel & Russell, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 709 (D.Ky. 1941), aff’d 136 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 
1943).
356 See Cross, supra note 266, at 1227 (noting that state-law claims in bankruptcy are not proper areas for 
the creation of federal common law); also see supra note 11.
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bankruptcy create a federal common law that goes beyond the letter of the Code?357  To put this 
into some perspective, state law and federal non-bankruptcy law generally determine the 
existence and size of claims,358 but bankruptcy law provides the priority of claims, which is 
crucial when there is a limited pot.  For example, property rights such as security interests are 
created by state law, but federal law (including Erie) determines their status in bankruptcy.  
 The possibility of a federal common law of bankruptcy is an open question.  The 
Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue, and the courts of appeals are split.  The 
Second359 and Third360 Circuits have acknowledged a federal common law of bankruptcy in their 
dicta to illustrate parallel non-bankruptcy common law practices.  The Eighth Circuit has 
rejected the existence of a specific delegation of power to create a federal common law right to 
extend state redemption periods in Chapter 12 farm bankruptcies under 11 U.S.C. 1222(b)(3) and 
(5), but the provision by provision approach implies an acceptance in principle that there could
be federal common lawmaking power in bankruptcy, at least under Texas Industries’ second 
path, even if it did not exist in this instance.361  In contrast, the Sixth Circuit created the very 
right that the Eighth Circuit denied, albeit without any discussion of its authorization to make 
357
 This article does not address other areas of federal common law that interact with bankruptcy, such as 
federal common law of procedure or patents and copyrights.   
358 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 54-55. 
359 Compagnie Noga D’Importation et D’Exportation S.A. v. The Russian Fed., 361 F.3d 676, 688 (2d Cir. 
2004) (“we note that an issue similar to the one before us has arisen in the federal common law of 
bankruptcy and set off.”) (noting parallelism between treatment of different federal agencies as 
constituent parts of the same entity under federal common law of bankruptcy and treatment of the Russian 
Federation and the Government of Russia as part of same entity for arbitration purposes). 
360
 Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 87 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that substantive consolidation 
for Title VII purposes, like in bankruptcy, is one of federal common law, although it is an “intentionally 
open-ended, equitable inquiry”).  But cf. In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 570-71 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“…the court seemed to say that the Bankruptcy Code contains an ‘interstice’–
a gap–regarding the circumstances under which an appeal that might upset a plan of reorganization may 
be pursued.  Further, the court appeared to suggest that the federal courts have the authority to create a 
rule of federal common law to fill this gap.”).
361 Justice v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 849 F.2d 1078, 1087-88 (8th Cir. 1988).
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federal common law.362  Other courts have certainly engaged in what can only be described as 
federal common lawmaking without ever addressing the issue.363
The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit court of appeals to take up the question of whether 
there is a general delegation of federal common lawmaking power in bankruptcy.  In Walker v. 
The Cadle Co. (In re Walker), the issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether there was a right of 
action for contribution between joint violators of the automatic stay.364 The Fifth Circuit was 
facing the same question as the Supreme Court in Texas Industries—whether a right to 
contribution existed under federal common law—but in a bankruptcy, rather than an anti-trust, 
context.  This might have constrained the Fifth Circuit more than if Walker had dealt with the 
creation of a right without a parallel, non-bankruptcy situation previously addressed by the 
Supreme Court. 
Nonetheless, based on the absence of legislative history indicating that Congress intended 
to create such a right and the obvious purpose of the automatic stay to protect debtors, not 
violators, of the stay, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no such right.365  The Fifth Circuit 
observed that because there was no statutory right, it could only exist under federal common law, 
but that under Texas Industries, courts have a restricted ability to make federal common law:366
We do not wantonly use our power to fashion common-law remedies, for the 
Supreme Court has cautioned us to invoke the power of the “federal common 
law” only when either “a federal rule of decision is necessary to protect uniquely 
federal interests, [or] … Congress has given the courts the power to develop 
substantive law.”  This grant of power is very narrow, and although bankruptcy 
might seem to be a “uniquely federal interest,” the Court has stated that, ‘the 
existence of congressional authority under Art. I [does not] mean that federal 
362 In re Glenn, 760 F.2d 1428, 1435 (6th Cir. 1985) (balancing the equities regarding curing default in 
absence of Congressional directive).
363 E.g., In re Owens-Corning and the entire line of substantive consolidation cases cited therein, 419 F.3d 
at 206-209.
364 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).  
365
 51 F.3d 562, 566 (5th Cir. 1995).
366 Id. at 566-567.
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courts are free to develop a common law to govern those areas until Congress 
acts….Simply put, bankruptcy is not an area where the courts have wide 
discretion to fashion new causes of action.367
The Fifth Circuit then noted that “in enacting the Bankruptcy Code[,] Congress created a 
comprehensive legislative program….”368  For the Fifth Circuit, codification foreclosed the 
possibility of federal common law in bankruptcy.369  It is not clear, though, why this would not 
have been the case with the 1898 Act too, as bankruptcy exists only as a matter of statute.  While 
federal common law may add on to that statutory structure, it does not create bankruptcy relief 
where none existed before.   
Whatever the merits of the Fifth Circuit’s decision regarding the right to contribution, 
there are serious analytical problems in Walker’s treatment of federal common lawmaking 
power.  Texas Industries laid out two separate ways in which federal common lawmaking was 
authorized.  First, there are cases “in which a federal rule of decision is necessary to protect 
uniquely federal interests.”370  Second there are cases “in which in which Congress has given the 
courts the power to develop substantive law.”371   The Fifth Circuit’s analysis of both paths was 
cursory, and, more to the point, erroneous.  Federal common lawmaking in bankruptcy is proper 
under both of Texas Industries’ paths, as detailed below.
4.  Path 1:  Constitutional Sources for a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy
The Fifth Circuit noted that bankruptcy is not explicitly included in Texas Industries’ list 
of areas in which courts are free to develop federal common law under the first path.  Bankruptcy 
367 Id. at 567 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640) (bracketed language in original).  
368 Id. at 567 (quoting Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 111 Bankr. 162, 168 (N.D. Ill. 1990).  
369 Walker might not have foreclosed all federal common lawmaking in bankruptcy; while courts may not 
have “wide discretion” to do so, according to Walker, they may still have some discretion in the matter, 
although the opinion gives no indication as to where the line between discretion and wide discretion lies.
370 Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641. 
371 Id. 
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is not necessarily “concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and 
international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or [ ] relations with foreign 
nations and admiralty cases.”372  The Fifth Circuit, however, treated the Texas Industries’ list is 
exclusive, not illustrative.373  But the language of the Supreme Court’s list that “absent some 
congressional authorization…federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as” makes 
clear that it was only providing examples, not defining the boundaries of federal interests 
engendering common lawmaking power.374
Assuming Texas Industries’ list is illustrative, it does not answer the question of whether 
bankruptcy is an area of “uniquely federal interests” such that common lawmaking power should 
be presumed.  This article argues that this power should be presumed is because bankruptcy has 
been relegated to an exclusively federal role once Congress acted under the Bankruptcy Power.  
Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the Federal Constitution vests Congress with the power 
“To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”375  The key element in the Bankruptcy Clause is that 
it empowers Congress to pass uniform bankruptcy laws.376  The uniformity provision leaves little 
room for non-federal bankruptcy law, and thereby makes bankruptcy a “uniquely federal 
interest.”  Although the precise dimensions of the uniformity remain uncharted,377 the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz noted that the history of the 
372 Id. 
373
 51 F.3d at 567.  
374
 451 U.S. at 641 (emphasis added).  
375
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  
376
 The existence of Congressional power to legislate on bankruptcies does not alone grant federal courts 
common lawmaking power in bankruptcy.  451 U.S. at 641 (“…nor does the existence of congressional 
authority under Art. I mean that federal courts are free to develop a common law to govern those areas 
until Congress acts.”).
377 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. ___ (2006), No. 04-885, slip op. at 19 n.13 (Jan. 23, 2006).  
Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 n.9, 55 (uniformity requirement does not prevent bankruptcy law from 
incorporating the laws of the states despite variants in state law).  
© 2006, Adam J. Levitin
93
Bankruptcy Clause demonstrated that bankruptcy was an important enough federal interest that 
the states yielded their sovereign immunity in bankruptcy.378  Indeed, it was an important enough 
interest to receive particular mention in the Constitution.  
As the Court noted in Katz, the uniformity interest in bankruptcy is particularly strong 
because of the pre-Constitution history of bankruptcy and insolvency law.  Whereas England had 
one sovereign and was subject to one uniform bankruptcy law,379 each of the states enacted its 
own bankruptcy or insolvency law.380  This led to the 18th century equivalent of forum 
shopping—debtors would abscond to more favorable jurisdictions, and the fear of debtors’ flight 
was a major factor supporting debtors’ prisons.381  Rather than allow the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to govern such disputes, which would have continued the problem of debtors’ forum 
shopping, the Constitution instead opted to give Congress the power to create a uniform federal 
rule that would govern all bankruptcies.382  Indeed, the extent of the unique federal interest in 
bankruptcy is demonstrated by the authorization under the first bankruptcy act for federal courts 
to issue writs of habeas corpus to release debtors from state prisons, thereby overriding state 
criminal law, to facilitate their attendance at bankruptcy proceedings.383
The uniformity element, in conjunction with the provisions of the Code, operates to make 
bankruptcy exclusively, and therefore uniquely, federal.  Bankruptcy is essentially an in rem 
proceeding.384  Unlike equity receiverships at state law, bankruptcy has jurisdiction not over just 
specific items of property, but over the debtor and all the debtor’s property interests.385  Once an 
378 Katz, 546 U.S. ___ (2006), No. 04-885, slip op. at 20 (Jan. 23, 2006).  
379 Id. at 8.  
380 Id. at 7.
381 Id.
382 Id. at 10-11.  
383 Id. at 5.  
384 Id. at 4; Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U. S. 440, 448 (2004).
385 Buckner, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 122.
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order for bankruptcy relief is granted, any sort of state insolvency proceeding must give way to 
the bankruptcy proceeding because all assets of the bankruptcy estate are subject to federal 
jurisdiction.386  The automatic stay enjoins any state insolvency proceeding387 while a 
bankruptcy is pending, and the discharge injunction388 prevents any state insolvency proceeding 
based on pre-petition debts.389
Thus, the only way that a state insolvency proceeding can go forward once an order for 
bankruptcy relief is granted is for the bankruptcy court to lift the stay, which it is unlikely to do 
without consent of all creditors and the debtor; doing so eviscerates any meaningful bankruptcy 
jurisdiction and the Code’s priority scheme390 because it allows certain creditors to jump to the 
head of the line.  Thus, there can only be parallel state and federal insolvency proceedings when 
a federal court chooses to relinquish its jurisdiction.  This contrasts with areas of law like 
antitrust, in which there are both federal and state causes of action and potentially parallel federal 
and state proceedings for the same conduct.  Bankruptcy’s nature of exclusive jurisdiction over 
the debtor’s assets makes it a uniquely federal concern because it allows no room for state action.
In some sense, the case for bankruptcy being a uniquely federal interest is a preemption 
argument.  States are not per se preempted from passing and enforcing their own insolvency and 
bankruptcy laws; they are only barred from applying those laws once federal bankruptcy 
386
 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).  
387
 State regulatory proceedings are a different matter under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2000) (exempting 
from the automatic stay the “commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a 
governmental unit…to enforce such governmental unit's…police and regulatory power”).  See Pac. Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. People of the State of Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control, 350 F.3d 932 
(2003).  
388
 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2000).
389
 The possible exception to this would be a state insolvency proceeding based on pre-petition executory 
contracts or leases that “rode through” bankruptcy because they were neither assumed nor rejected by the 
trustee.  See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 546 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting 
the possibility of ride-through).
390
 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2000).  
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jurisdiction is triggered.391   That is to say, there is not traditional explicit, field, or conflict 
preemption, but an amalgam best described as a functional preemption; the explicit provisions of 
the Code create a conflict preemption when there is federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.  The Code’s 
functional preemption means that Congress essentially occupies the field.392  The uniformity 
element that is required in any Constitutional bankruptcy law combined with the in rem nature of 
bankruptcy and the Code’s expansive definition of the bankruptcy estate, automatic stay, and 
discharge injunction make bankruptcy a “uniquely federal interest.”
This reading conforms with the rest of the Article I, § 8, Clause 4, which deals with 
establishing a “uniform Rule of Naturalization”.393  The inclusion of these two topics, 
naturalization and bankruptcy in the same clause and the parallel construction suggests a parity 
between the issues.  No one would doubt that naturalization is a “uniquely federal interest.”  It 
follows then that bankruptcy too is a “uniquely federal interest.”
5.  Path 2:  Statutory Sources for a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy
If bankruptcy is a “uniquely federal interest,” then it does not matter if Congress 
authorized federal common lawmaking.  If bankruptcy is not a “uniquely federal interest” 
engendering common lawmaking powers, though, it may still be authorized by Congress’s 
action.  There is no question that Congress has the power under the Bankruptcy Clause to 
authorize federal common lawmaking in bankruptcy; the question under Texas Industries’ 
second path is whether it did.  
It is not clear how explicit an authorization is required by Texas Industries.  Field has 
noted, “[i]f [Texas Industries] is a directive standard, it clearly requires only an implicit rather 
391 Cf. Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 n.9 (“state laws are thus suspended only to the extent of the actual conflict 
with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress.”).  
392 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. ___ (2006), No. 04-885, slip op. at 12 (Jan. 23, 2006).
393
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  
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than explicit legislative directive.”394  If so, there arguably is such an authorization in the case of 
bankruptcy.  While the case for such an authorization involves some significant assumptions, it 
does accord with the legislative history, the pre-Code practices doctrine, and the practical 
realities of bankruptcy. 
The pre-Code practices doctrine indicates that Walker’s general “presumption that a 
remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a 
comprehensive legislative scheme”395 does not apply to bankruptcy.  Congress has repeatedly 
amended the Bankruptcy Code since the string of cases that have enunciated the pre-Code 
practices doctrine.  Congress is aware of the pre-Code practices doctrine and has done nothing to 
curtail it.396  Could this interpretive move also apply to finding a grant of common lawmaking 
powers absent an express directive?  Congress could have been clearer on this point, but there is 
arguably a delegation of lawmaking power to the bankruptcy courts via equity powers.
As noted above, the House Report on the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 cited 28 U.S.C. § 1481 
as authority for its statement that “[t]he bankruptcy court will remain a court of equity.”397  If one 
gives the legislative history credence, this comment, when read literally, does not speak to 
common lawmaking power or show that federal courts sitting in bankruptcy jurisdiction are in 
any way different from regular federal courts with equity jurisdiction.  As this article has argued, 
however, the use of the term “equity” in the bankruptcy context is really “fortuitous coinage” for 
what is better described as federal common lawmaking.  Generally, it is reckless to read 
394 Field, supra note 73, at 934 n.226.
395 51 F.3d at 567.
396 See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 125-26.
397 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 359 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6315 (“This section[, proposed 
11 U.S.C. 510(b),] is intended to codify case law, such as Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) and 
Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Co., 306 U.S. 295 (1939) and is not intended to limit the 
[bankruptcy] court's power in any way. The bankruptcy court will remain a court of equity, proposed 28 
U.S.C. 1481; Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).”).
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Congress’s use of term X to mean Y.  But in this case, the term “equity” in the context of
bankruptcy jurisdiction and powers is a term of art that means “federal common law.”   Thus, a 
“court of equity” is better understood as a “court with federal common lawmaking power.” 
For example, in Butner v. United States, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether 
state or federal law should govern the rights to the rents collected between a mortgagor’s 
bankruptcy and the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property.398  A circuit split existed on the 
issue.  Five circuits had determined the issue by looking to state law, whereas “[t]he Third and 
Seventh Circuits ha[d] adopted a federal rule of equity that affords the mortgagee a secured 
interest in the rents even if state law would not recognize any such interest until after 
foreclosure.”399  This “federal rule of equity” is more aptly described as “federal common law”; 
what the Third and Seventh Circuits did was create a rule of decision.   Although the Supreme 
Court rejected this “federal rule of equity” in Butner because of Erie concerns about its interplay 
with state law, the point remains that bankruptcy powers authorized as equity are better thought 
of as authorized by federal common law.  Butner only rejected federal common law in 
bankruptcy to the extent it conflicted with state law in that case; the implication in its ruling is 
that federal common law may exist in bankruptcy when it does not conflict with state law. 
Thus, reading “equity” as a term of art in the bankruptcy jurisdiction and powers context, 
the legislative history was stating that “the bankruptcy court will remain a court with common 
lawmaking powers.”  This reading comports with the pre-Code practices doctrine, which has in 
effect been ratified by Congress’ repeated amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that have left the 
doctrine unchanged or even codified non-Code practices.400  Moreover, because this reading is 
anchored in the legislative history, it can survive the possible repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1481.
398
 440 U.S. at 49.
399 Id. at 53 (emphasis added). 
400 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000).
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When 28 U.S.C. § 1481 is seen in conjunction with the history of the Bankruptcy Code,
and viewed with the added factor of Congressional ratification by inaction in its subsequent 
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code, there is a case to be made that Congress intended federal 
courts to have some sort of lawmaking authority in bankruptcy, even if this intention was only 
vaguely articulated.  Admittedly, no one of these elements, analyzed by itself, is sufficient for 
finding an implicit directive, but the picture from the combined total is greater than the sum of its 
parts, and when viewed in conjunction with the special bankruptcy concerns that explain why 
Congress would want to delegate such powers, it is plausible that there has been a delegation of 
lawmaking power to federal courts in bankruptcy cases. 
Arguably, by placing bankruptcy proceedings in courts, rather than an agency, Congress 
intended the existence of the common law power inherent in the judicial power, for as the 
Supreme Court has noted, even Article I courts possess the judicial power.401  Bankruptcy 
referees under the 1898 Act exercised wide-ranging discretion.402  As Alan Schwartz has noted: 
Congress in 1978 wanted to elevate the stature of the bankruptcy courts rather 
than reduce it.  This goal produced the replacement of the bankruptcy referee 
system with “real judges” who are appointed for substantial terms and paid high 
salaries.  To grant these new judges less authority to make policy than the referees 
they replaced would have been irrational.403
In short, it is hard to think that Congress would not have wanted federal judges to have common 
lawmaking power in bankruptcy.  Of course, such common lawmaking power is tempered by the 
strictures of the Code404 and by the scope of the bankruptcy power itself.405
6.  Explaining the Pre-Code Practices Doctrine Without Federal Common Law
401 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 889 (1991).  
402 See Wiensch, supra note 166, at 1831. 
403
 Schwartz, supra note 337, at 186.
404 E.g., Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206.  
405 See Plank, supra note 11 at 662; Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of 
Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1724 (2004).
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Federal courts have common lawmaking powers in bankruptcy under the “uniquely 
federal interests” path of Texas Industries and perhaps too under the “Congressional 
authorization” path.  Indeed, they must, for if they did not and the Fifth Circuit were correct in 
Walker, how does one explain the pre-Code practices doctrine, which recognizes pre-Code 
federal bankruptcy common law even after codification?  The only viable explanation is a sort of 
“water-over-the-dam” approach like the Supreme Court took in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. 
Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO.  In that case, the Supreme Court noted that:
it is much too late to deny that there is a significant body of federal law that has been 
fashioned by the federal judiciary in the common-law tradition, [but] it remains true that 
federal courts, unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have 
not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers…the federal lawmaking power is 
vested in the legislative, not the judicial branch of government; therefore, federal 
common law is ‘subject to the paramount authority of Congress.’406
Of course, the Northwest Airlines approach says nothing about how to treat past judge-made law.  
Is it still valid?  Is it grandfathered in under principles of stare decisis?  If deference were given 
to stare decisis, it does not explain the pre-Code practices doctrine, as codification presented an 
opportunity to approach bankruptcy practice with a clean slate without the accretions of 
precedents formed under the 1898 Act.  
In that case, can past judge-made bankruptcy law be challenged as applied to new parties 
on the basis of being judicially created?  It is hard to strike down the entirety of the “significant 
body of federal law that has been fashioned by the federal judiciary in the common-law 
tradition.”407  Not only have parties relied on the law as it has developed, but Congress has 
ratified much of this law both by subsequent codifications that incorporate it and by inaction.  It 
406 451 U.S. 77, 96 (1981). Also Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J, 
concurring) (the federal common law right of action created in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is “a relic of the heady days in which this Court 
assumed common-law making powers to create causes of action.”).
407 451 U.S. at 96.
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seems unlikely that past federal common lawmaking is to be invalidated.  The “water-over-the-
dam” approach lacks any intellectual consistency.  Like the pre-Code practices doctrine and 
Grupo Mexicano, it allows development up to an arbitrary line.  Such an approach of 
Constitutional convenience is anathema to a purist view of the Constitution and is an untenable 
method of Constitutional adjudication; our law must be based on better principles.
B.  FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF BANKRUPTCY IN ACTION
What does federal common lawmaking look like in action?  One example we have seen is 
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in K-Mart v. Capital Factors.  In K-Mart, Judge Easterbrook 
created a common law evidentiary requirement for critical vendor motions,408 even if the tenor of 
the opinion’s rhetoric came out strongly against such motions.  K-Mart thus created a rule of 
decision for critical vendor motions:  without an adequate showing of necessity supported by 
some sort of evidence, a critical vendor motion cannot be granted in the Seventh Circuit.  
Implied in this rule of decision is a non-Code right to make pre-plan payments for pre-petition 
debts upon a showing of necessity to the debtor’s reorganization.  In this sense, the Seventh 
Circuit actually authorized a significant deviation from the Code’s priority scheme.  
Likewise, Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware’s treatment of non-debtor 
releases in Genesis Health Ventures is an example of the creation of federal common law.  The 
Bankruptcy Code does not provide one way or another for releases of non-debtors.  The Code 
does provide a discharge injunction for the debtor that prevents actions to recover on pre-filing 
debts.409  The Code also allows for channeling injunctions that requires all claimants to look to a 
408
 Federal rules of evidence have long been an area in which common lawmaking has been permitted.  
See FED. R. EVID. 501 (evidentiary privileges in federal-question cases).  
409
 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2000). 
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settlement trust, but only in asbestos related bankruptcies.410  Otherwise, the Code specifically 
provides that the “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity 
on…such debt.”411  These provisions do not address the question of liability of non-debtors for 
debts not incurred by the debtor.412  Nor should they; one would think that bankruptcy courts 
would only have jurisdiction over bankruptcy estate, not disputes between third parties unrelated 
to claims on the estate.  Accordingly, several circuits do not permit releases of non-debtors.413
On the other hand, such disputes are often related to claims on the estate because the 
outcomes can affect the business operations of the estate.  Corporate debtors exist as a matter of 
law, but their actual operations are a function of people.  Sometimes, in order for a debtor’s 
reorganization to succeed, it needs specific personnel.  If these personnel are distracted by 
lawsuits, they may not be able to render effective services to the debtor.  
Having determined that section 105(a) powers were inapplicable to the situation,414 the 
Genesis Health Ventures court navigated these competing concerns by carefully laying out the 
factors that courts have considered when reviewing such releases and attempting to divine a 
multi-factor test—a rule of decision for when to permit such releases.415
A final example is the Third Circuit’s Owens Corning decision, reversing the District 
Court’s grant of the debtor’s substantive consolidation motion.  In Owens Corning, the debtor 
and most of its creditors moved for the substantive consolidation of the debtor and all its myriad 
410
 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000).  
411
 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2000).  
412 In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2000) (11 U.S.C. § 524(e) “only provides that a 
discharge of the debtor does not affect the liability of non-debtors on claims by third parties against them 
for the debt discharged in bankruptcy.”). 
413 See, e.g., In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1401; In re Zale Corp., 62 F.3d at 760; In re Western Real 
Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d at 600, modified by Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir.1991).
414 Genesis Health Ventures, 266 B.R. at 603.
415 Id. at 603-07
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subsidiaries, which had jointly filed for bankruptcy.416  Doing so would have created a larger 
combined pool of assets from which all general unsecured creditors could have drawn, regardless 
of the assets of the entity with whom they had transacted.  The motion was opposed by some of 
Owens Corning’s bank creditors.417  The bank creditors had made loans to Owens Corning and 
only five of its subsidiaries, all of which cross-guaranteed the others’ loans.418  Without 
substantive consolidation, there would be fewer claimants on assets held by Owens Corning and 
the five subsidiaries, and the banks would have a larger recovery than if they had to share with 
all the other creditors in the assets of all consolidated debtors.  The District Court granted the 
substantive consolidation motion in a situation in which there was reliance on formal 
separateness and neither fraud nor abuse of corporate formalities.419
In a carefully considered opinion, the Third Circuit reversed.  The Third Circuit noted 
that “[s]ubstantive consolidation, a construct of federal common law, emanates from equity.”420
This is the only occasion in which a federal court ruling on a non-Code practice has described 
the non-Code practice in terms of federal common law.  Notably, even in this case, there is an 
intertwining of federal common law and equity in the description of the non-Code practice. 
Substantive consolidation is historically an equity-derived practice,421 but it has become part of 
bankruptcy via federal common law.  The Third Circuit noted that a multi-factor checklist was 
unsatisfactory for analyzing substantive consolidation cases because they are intensely fact-
intensive.422  Instead, the Third Circuit articulated five principles to guide analysis of substantive 
416 In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. at 169.
417 Id. 
418 Id. at 170.
419 Id. at 173.
420 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 205.  
421 Id. at 206-09.  
422 Id. at 210-11.  
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consolidation motions and laid down the conditions required for granting such a motion.423  In 
doing so, the Third Circuit created a non-Code right and a corresponding rule of decision.  
C.  RECONCILING EQUITY WITH A GOVERNMENT OF CODES:  FEDERAL COMMON LAW
“The most important question regarding judicial discretion is universal:  will judges 
utilize their discretion to make public policy rather than defer to other institutions?”424  However 
one choose to answer this question as a general matter, bankruptcy presents a unique situation in 
which the structure of the bankruptcy system and the nature of bankruptcy cases weigh in 
strongly for urging judges to take the lead in lawmaking, albeit with proper deference to the 
policies that Congress has embodied in the Code.  
While common lawmaking power in bankruptcy is a matter of Constitutional and 
statutory interpretation, the realities of bankruptcy practice also call for the existence and use of 
such power.  Long ago, the Supreme Court noted the importance of the flexibility of the 
Bankruptcy Clause to encompass new developments in business:
…[T]he capacity of the bankruptcy clause to meet new conditions as they have 
been disclosed as a result of the tremendous growth of business and development 
of human activities from 1800 to the present day.  And these [prior bankruptcy 
acts], far-reaching though they be, have not gone beyond the limit of 
congressional power; but rather have constituted extensions into a field whose 
boundaries may not yet be fully revealed.425
Bankruptcy is extremely fact-specific.426 The nature of bankruptcy requires flexibility and 
discretion.  Bankruptcy is about how to divide efficiently and fairly a fund that is too small to 
423 Id. at 211.  
424
 Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court:  An Institutional Guide to 
Analyzing International Adjudication, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. ____ (2006) (forthcoming) 
(manuscript on file with author, at 3).  
425 Cont’l Ill., 294 U.S. at 671 (internal citations omitted). 
426 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55-56 (“The equity powers of the bankruptcy court play an important part in 
the administration of bankrupt estates in countless situations in which the judge is required to deal with 
particular, individualized problems.”).  Also Harvey R. Miller· The Changing Face of Chapter 11:  A 
Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization 
Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (1995). 
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satisfy all claimants.427  Satisfying multiple claimants from a limited fund always involves 
balancing the interests of the claimants, as well as the debtor in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases.  
Such balancing cannot always be done robotically according to the Code’s formulas.
The Code itself calls for judicial discretion in numerous instances.428  In addition to the 
various provisions calling on the court to act if it determines that the act in question is “fair and 
equitable” or the like,429 trustees can “use, sell, or lease” the bankruptcy estate’s property only 
“after notice and a hearing.”430  Relief from the automatic stay may be granted “after notice and a 
hearing” “for cause, including lack of adequate protection of an interest,” or a finding that the 
“property is not necessary for an effective reorganization.”431  “The court, after notice and a 
hearing, may authorize the trustee to obtain” prioritized secured credit.432  The trustee “subject to 
the court’s approval may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease,” and if the 
debtor has defaulted on the contract or lease, the trustee provides “adequate assurance of future 
performance under such contract or lease.”433  The court must valuate collateral in order to 
determine the extent to which a debt is secured.434  The court must decide whether the claims of 
creditors are “substantially similar” to other claims of creditors in a putative class for a 
reorganization plan.435  The court must determine whether a disclosure statement for a plan 
consent contains “adequate information.”436  A plan may only be confirmed if the court finds that 
“confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation, or the need for further 
427
 See Chic., Milwaukee, 791 F.2d at 528.
428
 Schwartz, supra note 337, at 187.  The following litany is drawn from Schwartz.  
429 See supra note 92.
430
 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000). 
431
 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2000).  
432
 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (2000).
433
 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)-(b) (2000). 
434
 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2000).
435
 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2000).
436
 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2000).
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reorganization, of the debtor”—that is that the debtor is a viable entity going forward.437  These 
are hardly the only instances in which a court must exercise discretion in bankruptcy. 
All of these instances call for an application of judgment by the court; there is already 
wide discretion invested in bankruptcy courts by the express provisions of the Code.  These 
provisions should not be read as excluding other discretion, as in Chapter 11, a “party in interest, 
including the debtor, the trustee… [a] creditor…an equity security holder, or any indenture 
trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.”438
Even for Chapters 7, 9, 12, and 13, these explicit Code provisions should be viewed as nothing 
more than the areas of necessary discretion that Congress could think of at the time of 
codification. Judging always involves some measure of discretion; the question is how it is to be 
channeled.  Contrary to the usual cannons of statutory interpretation, the history and nature of 
bankruptcy law, including the presumption that “[t]he bankruptcy court will remain a court of 
equity”439 urge for a reading of the Code as confirming specific discretionary powers, but not 
denying more general ones without explicit repudiation. 
The “court of equity” tradition recognizes this.  Equity could satisfy the practical 
demands of bankruptcy practice, but as noted above, it triggers a wariness or even hostility on 
the part of American courts440 and currently has questionable authorization if any.441  Federal 
common law involves less free-ranging discretion than equity and does not carry so much of the 
baggage of “judicial activism” because it is so firmly entrenched in our legal traditions—federal 
common law is channeled by precedent and judicially devised tests; not the span of the 
437
 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2000). 
438
 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2000). 
439 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 359 (1977), reprinted as U.S.C.A.A.N. 5963, 6315.
440 See supra section III. 
441 See supra section IV.B.
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Chancellor’s proverbial foot.442  Federal common law is a better way to channel judicial 
discretion than the statutory language of section 105(a) or the pre-Code practices doctrine.  
Federal common law is flexible yet principled, unlike equity which is merely flexible.  
Moreover, there is solid authority for federal common lawmaking in bankruptcy—the unique 
federal interest because of the uniformity requirement of bankruptcy laws, Congressional 
authorization implicit in the Code, and the pre-Code practices doctrine.  
Even courts that have limited bankruptcy equity through statutory language or judge-
made tests recognize that there is something unique about bankruptcy that requires more 
discretion than other proceedings.  The Fourth Circuit recognized this in a decision in the A.H. 
Robbins bankruptcy, when it allowed an injunction barring suits against non-debtor third-parties 
under the bankruptcy court’s section 105(a) powers.  There was no explicit statutory 
authorization for such an injunction, but it was upheld because, among other factors, “it was 
‘essential’ to the plan” and “‘the entire reorganization hing[ed] on [it].”443  Likewise, in Dow 
Corning, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that “the bankruptcy court, as a forum for resolving 
large and complex mass litigations, has substantial power to reorder-creditor debtor relations 
needed to achieve a successful reorganization.”444  In essence, the Sixth Circuit articulated a 
different doctrine of necessity—that without broad discretion bankruptcy courts are incapable of 
untangling the Gordian knot of creditor-debtor relations and shepherding complex corporate 
reorganizations to successful conclusions for the general benefit.  A rigid adherence to the Code 
is simply impractical in bankruptcy law. 
Given the fact intensive nature of bankruptcy, Congress cannot possibly envision all of 
442 See supra note 244.  
443 Am. Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 626 (citing In re A.H. Robbins Co. (Menard-Sanford v. Mabey), 880 F.2d 
694 (4th Cir. 1989)). 
444 In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 656.
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the unusual situations that might arise under the Code.  Courts have institutional advantages in 
lawmaking.445  This is especially true for specialized courts like bankruptcy courts that have 
expertise in a technical topic like corporate reorganization.  Thus, federal common law now 
tempers the rigidity of the Code, just as equity once tempered the rigidity of English common 
law. Federal common lawmaking, within the confines of the Code, ensures that Congress’s 
policy intent is served and not shackled by Congress’ choice of language.   
To the extent that courts go too far in making federal common law in bankruptcy, 
Congress can override their rulings by amending the Code.  As Judge Henry Friendly argued, 
federal common law:
permits overworked federal legislators, who must vote with one eye on the clock 
and the other on the next election, so easily to transfer a part of their load to 
federal judges, who have time for reflection and freedom from fear as to tenure 
and are ready, even eager, to resume their historic law-making function—with 
Congress always able to set matters right if they go too far off the desired 
beam.446
Indeed, as a positive matter, federal common lawmaking is what federal courts have been doing 
in bankruptcy for over a century.  Congress has yet to raise objections.  It certainly had the 
opportunity to do so when adopting the Bankruptcy Code, but instead chose to invest bankruptcy 
courts with wide discretion.  
The exercise of lawmaking power by bankruptcy courts is consistent with the post-New 
Deal system of administrative agencies exercising tremendous lawmaking power through rule-
making and adjudications.  Bankruptcy is the only major, Code-based legal regime in the United 
States for which there is no federal agency responsible for its implementation.447  Instead, in 
445
 Field, supra note 73, at 934.
446 Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie–and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 419 
(1964).  See also Henry Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking–Judges Who Can’t and Legislators Who Won’t, 
63 COLUM. L. REV. 787 (1963).
447 See supra text between notes 188 and 189.
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bankruptcy, the courts play the role that agencies fill in other areas of law.  Although bankruptcy 
proceedings are not governed by the Administrative Procedure Act,448 bankruptcy judges bring 
to bear the same sort of technical expertise that agencies do when engaged in rule-making.  
Viewing bankruptcy judges as an analog to agencies takes into account the technical, specialized, 
fact-specific nature of bankruptcy and also makes sense of the non-Article III status of 
bankruptcy judges.  While bankruptcy judges are appointed and subject to removal by the Courts 
of Appeals for the circuits in which they serve,449 their bankruptcy judge’s non-Article III status 
lessens separation of powers concerns, as their powers are not an aggrandizement of the judiciary 
at the expense of Congress.  Certainly if bankruptcy judges were appointed directly by Congress 
to exercise power under the Bankruptcy Clause, there would be no separation of powers concern.
Courts already regularly create non-Code rights in bankruptcy and create rules of 
decision to guide the granting of these rights.450  As a positive matter, federal common 
lawmaking is an important part of bankruptcy practice, but it masquerades under the guise of 
equity.  As Scott Rosenberg has noted, “federal courts simply do not speak the language of 
federal common law in bankruptcy cases.”451
As a normative matter, judicial lawmaking in bankruptcy should be called and analyzed 
in terms of federal common law, not equity.  Federal common lawmaking is already occurring, 
but no one recognizes it as such.  Courts seem to have some sense that equity is not the proper 
framework for their activities; instead, they produce a clunking common law without 
448
 5 U.S.C.§ 551 et. seq.
449
 28 U.S.C. § 152(a), (e). 
450 See, e.g., Mirant, 296 B.R. 427, 429-30 (applying CoServ critical vendors test); CoServ, 273 B.R. at 
498-99 (creating critical vendors test); In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (creating a seven-factor 
test for a bankruptcy court’s injunction of a non-consenting creditor’s claims against a non-debtor); 
Genesis Health Ventures, 266 B.R. at 606 (adopting a five-factor test for third-party releases from Zenith 
Electronics, 241 B.R. at 110); In re Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 B.R. at 571 (applying D.C. Circuit 
Auto-Train test and Second Circuit Augie/Resitvo test for substantive consolidation). 
451 Scott A. Rosenberg, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933, 982 (1982).
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acknowledging it.  It is time to call the process what it is and let courts do what they are good 
at—developing common law.  The vocabulary and the analytical framework need to be adjusted 
to match the actual judicial processes.   At the very least, the term “equity,” when used in the 
jurisdictional and court powers sense, as opposed to the specific provisions of the Code, should 
be understood as a term of art meaning “federal common lawmaking.”  Doing so will remove 
non-Code practices from the realm of rhetoric and let them be considered within the well-defined 
tradition of federal common law that adheres to precedent when applicable and provides 
certainty and rule of law along with flexibility to match new circumstances.
The mislabeling of federal common lawmaking as equity in bankruptcy has greatly 
colored courts approach to all actions authorized under the banner of equity, particularly non-
Code practices.  Federal common law provides the mechanism for balancing the serious and 
legitimate concerns posed by Grupo Mexicano about the exercise of equity powers with the 
arguments in favor of bankruptcy equity in Pepper v. Litton and Bildisco.  Federal common law 
reconciles the concerns about unbridled judicial discretion with the arguments that bankruptcy 
equity is authorized, legally required, consistent with the nature of bankruptcy, practically 
necessary, and harmonious with the post-New Deal state’s acceptance of agency rule-making 
power as consistent with the separation of powers doctrine.  
Federal common lawmaking does so by channeling discretion into the multi-factored 
rules of decision that are so frequently the hallmark of common lawmaking.  Even the most 
equitable of all bankruptcy practices, equitable subordination, has been shoehorned into a multi-
factor test.452  Common law tests limit judicial discretion while retaining the ability to adapt to 
452 See Brian Leepson, Note and Comment, A Case for the Use of a Broad Court Equity Power to 
Facilitate Chapter 11 Reorganization, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 775, 802-803 n.186 (1996).  Also Otero Mills, 
Inc. v. Sec. Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982), aff’d 25 B.R. 1018 
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1982); In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Augie/Restivo 
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new situations.  Common law judging is familiar to judges and adds to legal certainty by treating 
likes alike while still being sensitive to factual distinctions between cases.  It also acknowledges 
the importance of judicial expertise, particularly in a technical area like bankruptcy, and is part 
of the Article III judicial power in areas like bankruptcy that are “uniquely federal interests.”  
Common law presents a moderate, middle-ground between unrestrained equity and unbending 
and outdated, opaque, or absent statutory terms.
A common law understanding of bankruptcy practices also indicates that there is a broad 
middle-ground between the proceduralist or law-and-economics approach to bankruptcy and the 
practicalist or traditional approach.453  A common law interpretation is much closer to the 
traditional practicalist emphasis on the uniqueness of every bankruptcy case and the fact-
intensive nature of bankruptcy proceedings.  Yet, a common law approach also presents more 
predictable application of judicial discretion making it possible for parties to factor in legal 
regimes into their behavior ex-ante, as the proceduralists would like. 
Courts are equipped with the necessary tools for reconciling bankruptcy courts’ status as 
“courts of equity” with the statutory terms of the Bankruptcy Code.  They already use federal 
common law to do so; it is only the conceptualization and the vocabulary that is absent.  It is well 
time to reconsider these absences and to view non-Code practices in terms of federal common 
lawmaking rather than equity.  Doing so will allow courts to avoid choosing between the poles of 
rigid, robotic application of the Code and unpredictable, unprincipled discretion and should 
result in more sensible rulings on pre-Code practices. 
Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).  
453 See supra text accompanying notes 14-23. 
